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Communication systems and network technologies
Published in Kennis Chan, Future Communication Technology and Engineering, 2015
It is also very important how the VoIP client connects to the access point providing internet access. Ideally, a cable provides the most reliable bridge between the client and the access point, but it is not always possible to use wires, most notably in the mobile VoIP domain. At best, the mobile device is connected to an access point via 802.11, but in more realistic scenarios a mobile phone obtains internet access via 3G/ pre −4G networks. Older generation networks like HDSPA/HUSPA, were proven to be unsuitable for VoIP (Arjona, 2009), but with the advent of LTE, the scenario is different. An approach consists in using the traditional VoIP technologies on top of LTE networks, with the same issues and constraints, but there is a new technology named Voice over LTE (VoLTE) which defines a real-time protocol built from scratch, tailored for mobile pre-4G networks.
Security challenges in the transition to 4G mobile systems in developing countries
Published in Cogent Engineering, 2023
Fanuel Melak Asmare, Lijaddis Getnet Ayalew
During the transition from 1 G to 4 G, security protection has made significant advances. However, 4 G LTE, faces even more cyber threats than 3G. Since the Internet protocol will be the core protocol to provide all services of 4 G, this fundamental shift reverses the previous trend in telecom protocols, which were closed and thus served as a barrier to entry for attackers. In contrast, Internet technologies are open and well known to attackers, and there are numerous techniques for searching for vulnerabilities in them and numerous tools for easy exploitation (Vachhani,). Because IPV4 is still widely used in 4 G systems, it provides a plethora of loopholes and methods for a perpetrator to conceal his or her true identity and location. Online identities and servers are simple to conceal. Multiple servers can be used to mask and redirect packet flows and connections, allowing machines from innocent organizations to be used as a launchpad for cunning attackers. (Deibert et al., 2009; Bikos & Sklavos, 2012; Cao et al., 2013; He et al., 2018; Park & Park, 2007; Seddigh et al.,) examined various aspects of LTE security threats. In (Cao et al., 2013), LTE network security was discussed in detail, with six aspects of vulnerabilities thoroughly examined. The aspects covered were system architecture, access procedure, handover procedure, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) security, Home eNodeB (HeNB) security, and Machine Type Communication security. The vulnerabilities in 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) are summarized in (Park & Park, 2007), and the occurrence of malicious worms, viruses, and Voice over LTE (VoLTE) threats is indicated. Seddigh et al. (Seddigh et al.,) categorized security threats into layers. They stated that interference and scrambling attacks at the physical layer could affect LTE/LTE-A. It also examined attacks at the Media Access Control (MAC) layer, such as location tracking, bandwidth stealing, Denial of Service (DoS), and other security issues. Furthermore, this survey summarized security issues at higher layers. Bikos and Sklavos (Bikos & Sklavos, 2012) expand on LTE/LTE-A security by discussing ciphering algorithms and integrity methods. While researching current encryption and authentication techniques, they discovered flaws in LTE/LTE-A security algorithms and procedures. (He et al., 2018) provides a comprehensive and organized summary of LTE/LTE-related attacks. To determine and detect network attacks and to assess network security, security measurements were performed using real-time data.