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Does Personhood Begin During Pregnancy?
Published in Christopher Kaczor, The Ethics of Abortion, 2023
We could assume that the brain structure required for sentience is what really counts, not actually being sentient or potentially being sentient. But on this account, one wonders why this one necessary condition for sentience is chosen, neural brain structure, rather than some other necessary condition for sentience, say actually being conscious or being alive or having the genetic basis for sentience.
The Redefinition Issue
Published in David Lamb, Organ Transplants and Ethics, 2020
Personal identity concepts of death run into difficulties with borderline cases, such as anencephaly or profound dementia. There are much closer similarities between the persistent vegetative state and profound dementia than between the loss of brainstem function and the persistent vegetative state. Moreover, there are clinical objections to a diagnosis of death when there is persisting function in the brainstem. It is still uncertain whether fragments of consciousness or awareness may be mediated by sub-cortical structures. It is particularly difficult to prove that there is total absence of sentience when the brainstem is still functioning. Furthermore, what is meant by the expression ‘loss of cognitive faculties’ ? Does it exclude any type of perception that may, in part, be mediated by the lower part of the brain? If patients in persistent vegetative states are to be considered dead then how much neocortical damage would be necessary for a patient to be labelled vegetative? Their loss of cognitive faculties is usually, but not invariably, irreversible. This potential variation in clinical outcome probably reflects the lack of clinical homogeneity in vegetative patients, and reflects a lack of firm criteria for defining the vegetative state. No physician should diagnose death in such cases (Pallis, 1983).
Going to Court Too Soon
Published in Robert Wheeler, Clinical Law for Clinical Practice, 2020
Mrs G collapsed in church with a subarachnoid haemorrhage followed by cardiac standstill. Resuscitation commenced between 5 and 7 minutes later, but she sustained extensive damage to her brain. There was no evidence that she was sentient. A vegetative state was diagnosed. Some 6 weeks later, neither her level of consciousness nor degree of responsiveness had improved. She remained intubated although required minimal ventilation. Around this time, the hospital sought a court declaration that continued intubation was contrary to Mrs G's best interests. On the 14th of February, less than 8 weeks after her bleed, the judgement was handed down.
Moral Status or Moral Value? The Former May Require Phenomenal Consciousness, But Does It Matter?
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2023
None of this rules out the possibility of something that lacks sentience having intrinsic moral value. Allen (2006) notes that arguments for moral status typically identify some cognitive or mental properties (M-properties) that animals possess that are morally significant, and he argues that the more morally significant the property seems to be, the more scientifically contentious are the claims for its possession. He suggests an alternative strategy: identifying more easily scientifically observable M-properties and arguing that they confer moral status directly, not unlike Shepherd. Like Shepherd, he suggests that certain behaviors such as “caring” could be candidates, but again these seem anchored by the implied emotional and phenomenal mental states. Alternatively, one could argue for even more basic candidates, such as the intrinsic value of a certain kind of complexity, sustained low entropy states, or other kinds of order.
Regulating Possibly Sentient Human Cerebral Organoids
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2023
Thus, we do not see any reason against using a consciousness-based approach to regulating the use of human cerebral organoids. We are concerned by the inherent danger in discriminating against the potential suffering of plausibly conscious systems, through adding further criteria related to human uniqueness. We thus advocate a closer integration of sentience research going on in different cases, such as non-human animals, artificial intelligence, human embryos, and neural organoids. Research in these fields would greatly benefit from developing uniform standards that could be guiding policy-makers to develop consistent legislation without the need to introduce new and potentially contentious criteria. It is almost universally agreed that the capacity to suffer matters morally, and sentience research is making great strides toward assessing different levels or degrees of richness of this capacity. This is what should inform our ethical deliberations, and regulation of use.
Human Cerebral Organoids: Implications of Ontological considerations
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2023
Hassan Khuram, Parker Maddox, Aria Elahi, Rahim Hirani, Ali Issani
The article “Consciousness in a Bioreactor? Science and Ethics of Potentially Conscious Human Cerebral Organoids” (Zillo and Lavazza 2023) presents a thoughtful discussion on the potential ethical implications of Human Cerebral Organoids (HCOs). The authors argue that HCOs are a unique entity in the field of organoids as they have the potential to resemble a fundamental organ of the human organism, which could potentially show signs of consciousness in the future. Given this, the authors recommend using a precautionary principle that avoids underestimating the moral status of HCOs. However, the authors also highlight that sentience is not the sole criteria for moral consideration and the amount of moral consideration a particular being deserves depends on the sort of being it is. They further argue that despite its human origin, an HCO is not structurally capable of becoming a human individual, and hence potential moral overestimation of HCOs should be avoided, especially if their use can lead to important therapeutic benefits for human beings. We believe that the authors’ analyses and recommendations provide a valuable contribution to the bioethical science community. However, their claim that ontological considerations are also necessary when developing an ethical framework for HCOs raises important follow-up questions and implications. Namely, what are the ramifications of ontological classification of HCOs as it relates to research in animals and the donors of stem cells for HCOs?