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Day 2
Published in Bertha Alvarez Manninen, Dialogues on the Ethics of Abortion, 2022
What would the corresponding desire be for having a moral right to life? You need to have the capacity to desire continued existence right? What makes killing you morally wrong is that I frustrate your desire for continued life. But in order for you to have the capacity to desire continued existence, you need to be able to conceive of yourself as a distinct entity who can exist over time. And you can only do that if you actually possess self-consciousness, that is, if you’re actually a person in the strict sense.8
Informed consent
Published in Joseph Tham, Alberto García Gómez, Mirko Daniel Garasic, Cross-Cultural and Religious Critiques of Informed Consent, 2021
The question of “who or what am I” is, then, answered by the notion of a causally dependent self rather than an enduring self. It follows that “self” in self-identification and self-determination cannot be absolutely atomic and autonomous. From a psychological perspective, an individual’s self-consciousness is dependent on the “psychophysical continua” that form the momentary usage of the term “self.”11 What one has experienced that arrives at a sense of continuous self-awareness is nothing but “a bundle of successive impressions or perceptions” if we borrow an expression from David Hume. Nevertheless, the bundle of experiences one has is not, according to Buddhism, a random collection of experiences in any case; instead, one is in a particular kind of collection brought about by a particular set of causes and effects. As Nagasena’s metaphor demonstrates, there is a certain kind of reality to the “self,” just as there is a reality to a chariot. Along this line of thinking, voluntariness is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances rather than an individual-centred reality or merely the idea of self-determination. What one considers the “I” is in actuality “certain clusters of physical and mental events” linked causally dependent arising.12
The reflexive autoethnographer
Published in Kay Aranda, Critical Qualitative Health Research, 2020
I anticipate that you will have read my words in the quote in Box 11.7, and in this chapter more generally, in situated and shifting ways, and this will obtain if you go back to the chapter at different points in the future (Grant, 2018a). Does my reflexive self-consciousness evoke reader self-consciousness in you? When I speak to you directly in the second person, do my textual interruptions evoke textual interruptions in you; as you unavoidably re-story my narrative? Do I make you feel uncomfortable?
Dispositional Self-Consciousness and Hypnotizability
Published in International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 2022
Etzel Cardeña, Lena Lindström, Ann Åström, Philip G. Zimbardo
Yet, scales of dispositional self-consciousness (SC) have been very rarely evaluated as possible correlates of hypnotizability. One impediment may be the multivocality of the term. Self-consciousness has been defined as the process of becoming the object of one’s thoughts and awarenesses (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), but it includes different modalities, some seemingly positive and others negative. Three types of SC have been often distinguished: private, referring to awareness of one’s mental processes; public, referring to being conscious of what others think of one; and social anxiety, referring to feeling anxious in social situations (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1985). A factorial analysis of scales of self-consciousness, self-absorption, self-reflection, reflection-rumination, and mindfulness showed that social anxiety was in a factor of maladaptive processes including rumination and lack of insight and acceptance; private self-consciousness scale was in a factor with reflection and self-reflections scales; and there was a factor including public and private self-consciousness (DaSilveira et al., 2015).
Development and Validation of the Self-Compassion Scale for Youth
Published in Journal of Personality Assessment, 2021
Kristin D. Neff, Karen Bluth, István Tóth-Király, Oliver Davidson, Marissa C. Knox, Zachary Williamson, Andrew Costigan
Most of the research on self-compassion has been conducted with adults, although there is also evidence that self-compassion has benefits for adolescents. The first study on self-compassion in adolescents was published almost ten years ago (Neff & McGehee, 2010), and since then, the number of empirical studies has increased exponentially. Findings mirror that of adult studies, indicating that self-compassion is linked to wellbeing (Marsh, Chan, & MacBeth, 2018). For example, a meta-analysis found a strong negative association with depression, anxiety and stress (Marsh et al., 2018) among adolescents. There is a strong inverse correlation with negative psychological states such as social anxiety (Gill, Watson, Williams, & Chan, 2018) and body self-consciousness (Mosewich, Kowalski, Sabiston, Sedgwick, & Tracy, 2011). Research indicates that self-compassion acts as a buffer for teens with trauma (Zeller, Yuval, Nitzan-Assayag, & Bernstein, 2015), non-suicidal self-injury (Jiang et al., 2016), and maladaptive perfectionism (Ferrari, Yap, Scott, Einstein, & Ciarrochi, 2018). Self-compassion is also related to positive mental health in adolescents in the domains of interpersonal relationships, self-efficacy, executive functioning (Bluth, Park, & Lathren, in press), life satisfaction (Bluth & Blanton, 2015), resilience, curiosity and exploration (Bluth, Mullarkey, & Lathren, 2018), psychological wellbeing (Sun, Chan, & Chan, 2016), and social connectedness (Neff & McGehee, 2010).
Differences in metacognitive beliefs among patients with bipolar disorder with or without previous suicide attempts
Published in Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 2019
Ender Cesur, Özge Şahmelikoğlu Onur, Evrim Erten
Our findings indicated that the ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ subscale scores of BPDI− patients were significantly higher than those of both the BPDI+ group and the control group, but did not differ between the BPDI+ and the control group. As Wells [17] pointed out, the elevation in ‘cognitive self-consciousness scores’ was an indication of the excessive and dysfunctional monitoring of one’s thought processes. In Wells’ model of depression [6], dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs increase depressive symptoms. According to this, in our study, it seems contradictory that the ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ scores in the group without previous suicide attempts (considered as a symptom), were higher than those of the BPDI+ group and the control group. Using multiple logistic regression analyses, we found that the increase in ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ scores decreased suicide risk. ‘Cognitive self-consciousness’ means being aware of and monitoring one’s own thoughts and cognitive processes (for example, ‘I am constantly aware of my thinking’ and ‘I monitor my thoughts’). BPD patients with high ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ scores may feel the need to constantly review their thoughts because of the increased suicide risk of the illness. In this way, patients may be aware of suicidal ideation and may seek help to prevent suicide [38].