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Consciousness
Published in Justin Amery, The Integrated Practitioner, 2022
Descartes (in The Description of the Human Body, published in 1647) famously distinguished between two substances: mind and body. In so doing he lent his name to the ‘Cartesian dualism’ that dominated philosophy up until the post-modern era, and arguably still dominates medical thinking to this day. A dualist philosophy of mind and body has, however, been pretty well fatally undermined by the mind-body problem which is this: if the mind and body are of fundamentally different nature, how do they communicate with each other?
The soul
Published in Peter Hutton, Ravi Mahajan, Allan Kellehear, Death, Religion and Law, 2019
Peter Hutton, Ravi Mahajan, Allan Kellehear
Because of its central importance, this chapter has reviewed a sample of arguments used to try to prove and disprove the existence and character of the soul for over 2,000 years. The soul–mind–body problem continues onwards as theologians and scientists try to analyse the subjective experience we call reality which is created by our brains from sense perception. Not to all, but to most religions and believers, a soul or some sort of eternal spirit is central to their faith. Ultimately, whatever arguments are used, both for and against its existence, none is conclusive: the essence of the soul remains as elusive as ever unless one possesses belief – one way or the other. Perhaps the very last word on the subject should again go to Haldane who, as an atheist, when answering the question as to what would happen to him after death nevertheless concluded: ‘A man who is honest with himself can only answer, “I do not know”.’33
Changing “Unchangeable” Bodily Processes by (Hypnotic) Suggestions: A New Look at Hypnosis, Cognitions, Imagining, and the Mind-Body Problem
Published in Anees A. Sheikh, Imagination and Healing, 2019
In this chapter, I will describe and explain how “unchangeable” bodily structures and processes–for example, the size of a woman’s breasts, warts that have been present for many years, and incurable congenital skin diseases—can be beneficially altered by suggestions in situations labeled as hypnosis. The fact that anatomical-physiological processes can be influenced by suggestions is very important for medicine, psychology, philosophy, and the other disciplines which deal with the mind-body problem. In this chapter, I shall attempt to thoroughly document these suggestion-induced body changes and try to explain how they occur.
Do You Mind? Toward Neurocentric Criteria for Assessing Cognitive Function Relevant to the Moral Regard and Treatment of Non-Human Organisms
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2023
Sherry E. Loveless, James Giordano
In this issue, Joshua Shepherd (2023) offers defensible argument for broader consideration of cognitive and psychological features viable and valuable for sentiments about and interactions with non-human organisms (NHOs). We concur, as based upon our prior and ongoing work—pro-Richard Ryder (Ryder 2001), and historically, Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1823)—proposing painism as constitutional for moral regard and treatment of NHOs (Loveless and Giordano 2014, 2021). However, in particular ways pain, like consciousness and other cognitive/psychological functions and features, is representative of the proverbial mind-body problem. Indeed, assessing pain and non-expressive psychological features can be limited by their inherently phenomenal quality, subjective nature, and dependence upon communication. This reinforces the philosophical distinction between first person experience (i.e., verstehen) and second and/or third person explanation (i.e., erklären), which underlies difficulties in objectively evaluating subjective states (Kushner and Giordano 2018).
Neuroethics, Consciousness and Death: Where Objective Knowledge Meets Subjective Experience
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2022
Alberto Molina-Pérez, Anne Dalle Ave
The idea that consciousness depends on and/or is caused by brain activity is neither an empirical fact or a scientific theory, but a premise or working hypothesis, i.e. something that is held to be true and that makes it possible to study consciousness within the methodological framework of contemporary neuroscience. This idea may partially be rooted in the debate on the mind-body problem within the Western philosophical tradition. Therefore, revision proposals of the brain criterion of death, focusing on the cessation of spontaneous breathing and capacity for consciousness, appear to be based on a culturally charged conception of consciousness, the self, and their relationship to the brain. Clinicians have unquestionable expertise in their judgments about human physiology, but they are arguably less authoritative when it comes to issues and concepts that are also philosophical in nature (Rodríguez-Arias et al. 2020).
Problems of Living: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Cognitive-Affective Science
Published in Psychiatry, 2022
Stein is well known in philosophy of psychiatry circles for his 2008 book, Philosophy of Psychopharmacology (Stein, 2008) in which he tackled various philosophical questions surrounding the use of psychiatric medications. In that book he sketched out his framework of classic, critical, and integrative positions as a way of addressing questions in philosophy of science, language, medicine, and mind, and applied them to psychopharmacology. In Problems of Living, Stein expands on this framework to apply it to philosophical questions that extend far beyond the confines of psychiatry and psychopharmacology. The book delves into the following broad areas: the mind-body problem; the relationship between reason and emotions; happiness; pain and suffering; good and evil; truth and skepticism; and the meaning of life.