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Posttraumatic Personality Disorders
Published in Rolland S. Parker, Concussive Brain Trauma, 2016
Theory of mind refers to primates’ ability to understand the mental state of others and to predict behavior based on those states. It seems to depend upon the PFC (Kaas & Preuss, 2003). This process appears to develop in a consistent pattern during early childhood and perhaps is also consistent across cultures. Another component of social cognition is autonoetic consciousness, referring to an aspect of self-awareness allowing us to imagine our own experiences at different places and at different times. Two cases were presented where they experienced severe difficulties in recollecting any periods from their own lives, but had no measured difficulty in taking other persons’ perspectives and inferring their thoughts, feelings, and intentions (Rosenbaum, 2007).
The Relation of Alcohol-Induced Brain Changes to Cognitive Function
Published in Jenny Svanberg, Adrienne Withall, Brian Draper, Stephen Bowden, Alcohol and the Adult Brain, 2014
Beaunieux Hélène, Eustache Francis, Pitel Anne-Lise
Mild to moderate episodic memory deficits have been described in people with alcoholism (Chanraud et al., 2009a; Noël et al., 2012; Pitel et al., 2007). Pitel et al. (2007) suggested that alcohol-related structural abnormalities within the medial temporal lobe may underlie episodic memory alteration in these patients. Indeed, different components of episodic memory were shown to be impaired in patients with alcoholism (learning, encoding, retrieval and autonoetic consciousness), but those episodic memory impairments were not related to executive dysfunction, suggesting that episodic memory alteration observed in alcoholism could not be regarded as the consequences of frontal-based executive dysfunction, but rather as genuine hippocampal episodic memory deficits. Reduced hippocampal volume was reported in people with alcoholism with preserved episodic memory abilities, but no relationship was found between hippocampal volume and episodic memory performance (Sullivan et al., 1995). These findings suggest that hippocampal shrinkage itself cannot explain alcohol-related episodic memory deficits.
What is the self?
Published in Tamara Ownsworth, Self-Identity after Brain Injury, 2014
Tulving's (1985) model of memory systems and consciousness proposes three different memory systems that correspond to different types of consciousness or levels of self-knowing. Procedural memory is associated with anoetic or implicit consciousness, which is bound to one's current situation and environment (i.e., perceptual registration and raw response to internal and external stimuli). Semantic memory is linked to noetic consciousness, which allows us to be aware of and perceive relationships between objects and events and symbolic representations of the world formed in the past (e.g., the names of friends from school). Episodic memory corresponds with autonoetic consciousness, and reflects an integrative process that allows us to recall events from our past and link these to notions of self in the future, thus providing extended consciousness. There are some parallels between this model and Damasio's (1999) account of pro to-self, core self and autobiographical self (Table 2.2). However, core self is present only in the moment and reflects one's conscious experience of internal representations and the external world temporarily held in short-term memory (e.g., responding to a question someone has just asked). Autobiographical self entails extended or autonoetic consciousness, integrating past memories of self with one's ongoing experiences and future intentions and aspirations.
Painful reminders: Involvement of the autobiographical memory system in pediatric postsurgical pain and the transition to chronicity
Published in Canadian Journal of Pain, 2022
Anna Waisman, Maria Pavlova, Melanie Noel, Joel Katz
The episodic component of autobiographical memory is defined by autonoetic consciousness, which is the ability to mentally project oneself across time to “re-experience” specific events from the past and to imagine the future.13 Rather than being exact replicas of prior experiences, episodic memories entail reconstructive processes that are prone to error.30–33 That is, episodic memory is considered to be the product of binding accurate event details with relevant semantic or schematic knowledge and details from other events in order to fill gaps in remembering and make memories more coherent.30,34 Therefore, the way in which people remember and interpret their life experiences, to a great extent, depends on their preexisting knowledge and preconceptions about the world.31 On one hand, this can lead to biases that result in memory distortions.35 However, prior knowledge can also act to enhance new memories by integrating episodes within an existing semantic network.36,37 Younger children have a smaller repertoire of semantic knowledge to draw on, and this might be one reason why they are generally more susceptible to false memories and suggestibility.38 Though the inexact nature of memory retrieval might appear fundamentally disadvantageous, a memory system that is constructive in nature serves an adaptive role, because it allows individuals to categorize information, generalize knowledge across tasks, and imagine and simulate personal future events.16,39
Recognition in Posthypnotic Amnesia, Revisited
Published in International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 2021
Of course, successful recognition can be accomplished in several different ways. It is now understood that recognition by both amnesic and nonamnesic subjects can be supported by either conscious recollection of the study episode or a priming-based feeling of familiarity (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Along similar lines, Tulving (1985) distinguished between two forms of recognition memory: recognition-by-remembering entails retrieval of an episodic memory as part of one’s personal past (what Tulving called “autonoetic consciousness”). This personal connection is absent in recognition-by-knowing, in which the subject knows about a past event without actually remembering it – as in the famous patient studied by (Claparède, 1951/1911; see also Kihlstrom, 1995, 1997), who retained knowledge acquired through recent experience without remembering the experience itself. Although Tulving initially likened “knowing” to semantic memory, it has become popular to interpret “knowing” in terms of a priming-based feeling of familiarity (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; for a review, see Kihlstrom, 2021).
Personality and Authenticity in Light of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2021
Przemysław Zawadzki, Agnieszka K. Adamczyk
For now, however, we focus on episodic memory as it was (and often still is) commonly assumed as the only kind of memory which makes available self-referential content. This assumption has led philosophers and psychologists interested in the relation between memory and the self to preponderantly study and discuss the episodic memory system (Klein 2015a). In contrast to semantic memory, episodic memory provides its owner with a record of both the spatial and temporal characteristics of a specific remembered event, as well as the context of acquiring a given memory. Thus, episodic memory is sometimes called what-where-when (www) knowledge (Tulving 1972). This function of episodic memory is thought to be realized by its distinct phenomenology (Dokic 2014; Klein 2013b, 2014b, 2015b; Michaelian, Klein, and Szpunar 2016; Perner, Kloo, and Gornik 2007; Tulving 2002). One of the most influential concepts of the nature of this phenomenology refers to autonoetic consciousness. It is the idea that episodic memory involves mental time travel located at a subjective time other than the present and accompanied by the first-person perspective (Klein 2013a, 2013c; Michaelian 2016; Schacter, Addis, and Buckner 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007).