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Recognising and engaging with emotional change, mood problems and other psychiatric presentations
Published in Ross Balchin, Rudi Coetzer, Christian Salas, Jan Webster, Addressing Brain Injury in Under-Resourced Settings, 2017
Ross Balchin, Rudi Coetzer, Christian Salas, Jan Webster
The distinction between bottom-up and top-down reactivity is important because it helps to demonstrate how emotion reactivity can also be altered when ‘cognitive’ aspects of the mind – those that largely depend on the cortex – are impaired by brain injury. For example, mental time travel is a cognitive function that allows humans to think about the past or the future. When it is compromised, the possibility of triggering emotional states in relation to past or future events is also altered. This can occur in patients with amnesia or in those with concrete thinking (loss of the ability to think in an abstract way) as a result of frontal lobe damage. Importantly, feelings are not only triggered by external events (encountering a spider) or bodily reactions to these events (change in heart rate), but also by thinking about past and future events (remembering a previous encounter with a snake).
Anterograde memory in frontotemporal dementia
Published in Lars-Göran Nilsson, Nobuo Ohta, Dementia and Memory, 2013
John R. Hodges, Michael Hornberger, Oliver Piguet
Although recognition memory (at least for perceptually identical material) has repeatedly been shown to be normal in SD, it could be argued that this is not a true reflection of episodic memory as conceptualised by Endel Tulving (Tulving, 1995; Tulving, Hayman, & MacDonald, 1991), who has emphasised the “what, where and when” elements fundamental to everyday memory and the process of mental time travel that enables us to visit the past when recalling incidents from our life. In an attempt to address this aspect of memory, a more naturalistic task with incidental encoding of information was designed. As part of this task, patients were visited in their homes on two consecutive days (Adlam et al., 2009). On day one, they undertook a number of standard neuropsychological tasks but with the covert intent of creating a series of memorable everyday type events that could be used as tests of episodic memory the following day. On day two, the patients were asked to recall spatial (e.g., “Did I sit in this chair?”), temporal (e.g., “How long did I stay?”) and event (e.g., “Did I wear a brooch yesterday?”) based on details from the preceding day. As shown in Figure 9.2, SD patients, even those with quite advanced disease, were able to recall most of the information at a level equivalent to controls. This study offered unequivocal support for Elizabeth Warrington’s early observations on the preserved status of episodic memory in SD.
Changes in Cognitive Function in Human Aging
Published in David R. Riddle, Brain Aging, 2007
Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced events that occurred in a particular place and at a particular time. This kind of memory allows one to think back through subjective time — what Tulving calls mental time travel [28] — and it usually evokes an “I remember” response. Episodic memory may be distinctly human; it is the most advanced form of memory and is ontogenetically the latest to develop. It also seems the most susceptible to brain damage and the most affected by normal aging.
Personality and Authenticity in Light of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2021
Przemysław Zawadzki, Agnieszka K. Adamczyk
For now, however, we focus on episodic memory as it was (and often still is) commonly assumed as the only kind of memory which makes available self-referential content. This assumption has led philosophers and psychologists interested in the relation between memory and the self to preponderantly study and discuss the episodic memory system (Klein 2015a). In contrast to semantic memory, episodic memory provides its owner with a record of both the spatial and temporal characteristics of a specific remembered event, as well as the context of acquiring a given memory. Thus, episodic memory is sometimes called what-where-when (www) knowledge (Tulving 1972). This function of episodic memory is thought to be realized by its distinct phenomenology (Dokic 2014; Klein 2013b, 2014b, 2015b; Michaelian, Klein, and Szpunar 2016; Perner, Kloo, and Gornik 2007; Tulving 2002). One of the most influential concepts of the nature of this phenomenology refers to autonoetic consciousness. It is the idea that episodic memory involves mental time travel located at a subjective time other than the present and accompanied by the first-person perspective (Klein 2013a, 2013c; Michaelian 2016; Schacter, Addis, and Buckner 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007).
Patience Is a Virtue: Theory of Mind Longitudinally Predicts Children’s Delay during School Transition
Published in Developmental Neuropsychology, 2022
Barragan‐Jason and Atance (2017, p. 738) defined patience as “the ability to adjust one’s behavior while waiting without an explicit reward as a motivator,” such as when a child is waiting in a doctor’s office. Similar to delay of gratification, spontaneous patience develops with age and is associated with self-regulation of actions, thoughts, and emotions. Although patience does not yield a concrete benefit like a snack reward, it still involves a time perspective of anticipating and planning for the future. It has been argued that people with patience should be better at mental time travel (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). However, empirical evidence linking patience and future-oriented mind wandering is still lacking (Barragan‐Jason & Atance, 2017).
A critical review of the effects of wearable cameras on memory
Published in Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 2018
A. R. Silva, M. S. Pinho, L. Macedo, C. J. A. Moulin
For wearable cameras, we are interested in recollection, since it is the focus on the retrieval of “something more” rather than the mere assessment of a prior occurrence (Moulin, Souchay, & Morris, 2013). This is a particularly important point when considering the effects of re-presenting a previously encountered stimulus to a person with memory difficulties. We are interested in how such a recognition prompt may promote recall of associated information. It is this process of recollection which we are targeting, since otherwise we are only considering the passive and relatively limited retrieval of something that is already identified in a stimulus. In turn, when we consider recollection we also emphasise the personal experience of the information to be recollected (Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009), and this is proposed to be the “mental time travel” system responsible for our self-identity (James, 1890). Thus, the rehabilitation of memory, in our view, encompasses a strong episodic character, and the goal must be to focus not only on the ability to recognise a specific and meaningful personal event, located in time and space, but also the ability to travel back into the past and relieve specific details of that event, distinguishing it from any similar one. According to this argument we should see the rehabilitation of memory as reinstating recollection of a prior event. Of course, there is a long tradition of memory improvement through repeated recall and retrieval practice (e.g., Sumowski, Coyne, Cohen, & Deluca, 2014; and see Wilson & Glisky, 2009, for a full discussion), and we are not claiming wearable cameras would replace these techniques, but they may possibly offer new materials to be used with such techniques, rather than verbal materials, for instance.