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Combined contribution
Published in Olaf Dammann, Etiological Explanations, 2020
Moreover, mechanisms of how social factors are biologically linked to health outcomes have been documented in the basic science literature for quite some time. For example, Eisenberger and Cole have summarized evidence in support of the claim that “social connections reach deep into the body to regulate some of our most fundamentally internal molecular processes,” and they predict that “social neuroscience approaches will be important for deciphering both how and why social relationships are critical for health” (Eisenberger and Cole 2012:673).
Developmental Social Neuroscience and the Autism Spectrum of Disorders
Published in Christopher J. Nicholls, Neurodevelopmental Disorders in Children and Adolescents, 2018
Developmental social disorders are in many ways the poster child of dimensional thinking. Science has struggled to understand the child who doesn’t easily conform to the behavioral and interpersonal expectations of society. Initially we examined the children who were clearly “abnormal” and severely impaired; however, we are now increasingly aware of the nuances of social interaction and find differences among even the most highly intelligent and academically skilled. Far from wanting to pathologize such differences, modern clinicians seek to understand what it means to be different and how science can help those who experience distress to feel better, without needing to “fix” the underlying profile of an individual’s strengths and weaknesses. Developmental social neuroscience embraces this challenge through dimensional analysis of an organism’s interaction with its social environment.
Overview of self-identity after brain injury
Published in Tamara Ownsworth, Self-Identity after Brain Injury, 2014
Research investigating changes to self in the context of brain injury has only emerged in the literature over the past few decades, stimulated largely by the seminal work on self-concept by Tyerman and Humphrey (1984). The interface between social psychology and cognitive neuroscience (i.e., social neuroscience) allows for a more advanced understanding of how sense of self emerges as a product of our neurobiology, culture and their interaction (Feinberg, 2011a; Jetten, Haslam & Haslam, 2012; Rochat, 2011; Walsh, Fortune, Gallagher & Muldoon, 2012). Neuropsychological models offer accounts of how cognitive and emotional subsystems of the brain work together to create an ongoing sense of self that actively constructs meaning in our day-to-day experiences (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Damasio, 1999; LeDoux, 2000).
Affective, Social, and Informative Gestures Reproduction in Human Interaction: Hyperscanning and Brain Connectivity
Published in Journal of Motor Behavior, 2021
Michela Balconi, Giulia Fronda, Angela Bartolo
In the last decades, research in social neuroscience deeply investigated the neural basis of human ability to generate and understand verbal communication by exploring human ability to create, recognize, and understand both literal and figurative language (Balconi & Pozzoli, 2005; Bohrn et al., 2012). The role of non-verbal systems in communication is, instead, still object of notable debate. While the contribution of prosody and paralanguage, mimicry, gestures, haptics and proxemics in defining meanings and social roles, as well as in modulating the development of social dynamics, is widely recognized (Wang et al., 2018); to date, most of studies aimed at exploring the neural correlates of the human ability to decode or encode such non-verbal signs by asking people to listen or observe pictures, audio clips or video clips representing socially-connoted sounds or gestures, or to produce them.
Phantom Penis: Extrapolating Neuroscience and Employing Imagination for Trans Male Sexual Embodiment
Published in Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 2020
Brugger et al. (2013) promote a model of “social neuroscience” that “unifies neurological, psychological, and sociological approaches to bodily self-consciousness” (p. 1). What Case and Ramachandran (2012) have named alternating gender incongruity (AGI) calls for such methodology. They interviewed a subgroup of bigender-identified individuals who experience involuntary (and sometimes distressing) swinging between gender states. These gender states include a feeling of being male or female. When occupying a transgender state (that is out of alignment with their birth anatomy), some persons with AGI experience phantoms of the (transgender) parts that are expected but missing. For example, when an AGI person assigned male at birth (AMAB) switches into a female gender, they can experience phantom breasts; when an AGI person assigned female at birth (AFAB) swings into male gender, they can experience a phantom penis. AGI suggests cortical (or other brain) generation (or disruption) of identity or unstable plural identities (in contrast to nonbinary, queer, or gender-fluid identity). The authors suggest that a biological basis for AGI might relate to the coexistence of two (differently sexed) body images or of one body image with both male and female parts that are turned on and off with shifting hemispheric dominance. They expect this will be identified as a neuropsychological condition. It requires no great leap to add sociology to the mix. The subjective experience of AGI would certainly differ in social environments open to versus stigmatizing of nonbinary expression.
The Quest for Personal Significance and Ideological Violence
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2020
Arie W. Kruglanski, Molly Ellenberg
In light of humans’ perennial proclivity for ideologically motivated violence, understanding its neural substrate is an important imperative for social neuroscience, as it is for behavioral science more generally. In recent years, we have been addressing these issues from a motivational-cognitive perspective (Kruglanski et al. 2019, 2020). Our purpose in the present paper is to consider Workman et al.’s (2020) interesting results and comment on them from our unique theoretical perspective. Basically, our approach to ideological violence is contained in two interrelated theoretical models, our extremism model that explains violence and our significance model that examines its moral underpinnings. Both models assume that to understand human behavior it is incumbent to understand the motivations that drive it. To cut to the chase, we propose that moral values aren’t the ultimate motivational basis for violent behavior, but rather the means to personal significance, which is.