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Practical nursing skills: a caring approach
Published in Nicola Neale, Joanne Sale, Developing Practical Nursing Skills, 2022
Courage is an important value in caring, as nurses must raise any concerns about people who may be at risk and speak out if they feel that care is compromised. The NMC Code (2018c) requires that registrants use their professional ‘duty of candour’ and raise ‘concerns immediately whenever you come across situations that put patients or public safety at risk’ (p. 13). It is really important as a student that you know how to raise any concerns you might have about practice. The NMC (2019) provides guidance on raising concerns, to supplement the Code: ‘Raising concerns: guidance for nurses, midwives and nursing associates’. Raising concerns may include a practice known as ‘whistleblowing’, which is defined as being where a person identifies ‘an incompetent, unethical or illegal situation in the workplace and reports it to someone who has the power to stop the wrong’ (Ahern and McDonald 2002, p. 303). The NMC (2019) guidance includes information about the legislation to protect ‘whistle-blowers’ and the organisations that can support whistle-blowers or people who raise concerns. Your university will also have information about how you can raise concerns, so make sure you are aware of how to access this.
Experiencing Joy and Beauty in Medicine
Published in Leanne Rowe, Michael Kidd, Every Doctor, 2018
We can practice positive psychology in small ways and find joy and beauty in medicine every day by recognising what we often take for granted. We can listen fully to our patients and colleagues with kindness. We can significantly influence junior doctors and medical students by modelling positive behaviours. We can learn from inspirational stories of our patients’ courage through adversity. We can take time every day to feel gratitude for our own health, our family and our ability to enjoy simple pleasures in life. We can experience deep satisfaction by persevering and caring.
Professional development
Published in Patrick Hutt, Sophie Park, A Career Companion to Becoming a GP, 2018
Professional development, as a necessary activity for GPs, is likely to have as many ways of being interpreted as there are people actively involved in doing it. I would propose that, in the pursuit of one plausible outcome for the process, learners at any stage in their development should construe the process as the means to the end of acquiring the courage to be able to exercise their clinical judgement. Courage is a necessary virtue for GPs to possess in the face of guidelines which may seem to conflict with what is the least harmful course of action for the patient.
Capacity for wonder among medical students: Assessment and educational implications
Published in Medical Teacher, 2023
Gail Geller, Seonho Shin, Harry Goldberg, Maria W. Merritt
Subsequent studies also should explore the relationship between the capacity for wonder and other important personality and character dispositions of medical students. In addition to empathy, tolerance for ambiguity, humility, curiosity, and leadership, one might think of virtues such as courage. There recently have been calls for the cultivation of courage in medical education (Karches and Sulmasy 2016; Reis-Dennis et al. 2021). We have suggested elsewhere that the capacity for wonder may support the development of courage (Geller et al. 2018). Armed with a valid and reliable CfW measure, future research could explore whether interventions designed to cultivate the capacity for wonder among aspiring and practicing health professionals do, indeed, support the development of these personal characteristics and virtues and, in turn, whether and how ethical decision-making, clinical practice, and patient experience are affected.
The Influence of Emotional Intelligence on the Work Engagement of Clinical Leadership: Resilience as a Moderator
Published in Hospital Topics, 2022
What can be considered the most important result of this study is the positive moderation influence of resilience on the association between emotional intelligence and work engagement. This influence implies that emotional intelligence improves work engagement in emergency settings more strongly in the light of increasing leaders' resilience. This result is again supported by Goleman's (1995) theory as the mixed emotional intelligence model includes abilities closely related to resilience. For instance, 'motivation' is a major skill within emotional intelligence that represents fortitude, tenacity, and the ability to withstand the devastating outcomes of work. In a clinical setting where extreme situations can pose daunting responsibilities and challenge leaders, this skill can interact with resilience to activate courage, persistence, and the ability and willingness to withstand challenging job tasks. Similarly, resilience qualifies as one of the skills that the job characteristic theory recognizes as an outcome of a variety of skills. Per Asiamah's (2017a) adaptation of this theory, therefore, resilience is an outcome of having emotional intelligence as a pro-performance ability.
Falling on One’s Sword for Truth: Deception by Ethicist Should Be Narrow
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2021
Paul J. Ford, Toni Nicoletti, Joseph P. DeMarco
Clinical ethics consultants should show bold moral courage in discharging their duties to patients, families, and healthcare providers. Given the corrosive impact on trust, and on the appropriate discharge of healthcare duties, deception should be undertaken only in rare instances. Unfortunately, the example used in the article “Deception and the Clinical Ethicist” highlights exactly the opposite of Christopher Meyers’ stated requirements (Meyers 2021). Meyers chooses a case of lying to a capacitated surrogate about the provision of resuscitation as presumably a paradigm for an ethicist’s support of deception instead of “falling on her sword.” Paradoxically this is the type of deception an ethicist should argue against, even to the point of personal sacrifice. Meyers’ advocacy of a slow code misses the narrower but important domain for which deception in clinical medicine is supportable by clinical ethicists: cases where a patient exhibits radically deranged or distorted realities, through memory disruption, delusion, psychosis, or other serious mental health symptoms. In such cases deception may be the best means to support the patient’s goals. These limited situations satisfy Meyers’ criteria in ways in which his own example does not. A more stringent framework highlights exactly when ethicists should sacrifice to support honesty and transparency, i.e. falling on ones sword if necessary, and when they are justified in supporting clinicians’ deception.