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Safety Certification of Mixed-Criticality Systems
Published in Hamidreza Ahmadian, Roman Obermaisser, Jon Perez, Distributed Real-Time Architecture for Mixed-Criticality Systems, 2018
I. Martinez, G. Bouwer, F. Chauvel, Ø. Haugen, R. Heinen, G. Klaes, A. Larrucea Ortube, C. F. Nicolas, P. Onaindia, K. Pankhania, J. Perez, A. Vasilevskiy
IEC 61508 [56] defines requirements that safety-related items, components, devices and systems must fulfill in order to reduce risks and to assure their safety functions. Essentially it focuses on risk consideration where items are assessed in qualitative and quantitative terms in relation to probability of failure of a ‘function’ or in terms of systematic integrity. There are four different levels of ‘Safety Integrity’ covering a qualitative Systematic Capability (SC) 1 to 4 rating and a quantitative Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 to 4 rating. These ratings actually classify the safety level / risk reduction of a product or system. As a rule of thumb, the highest the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) the highest the certification cost
Organization Safety Procedures
Published in Dhananjoy Ghosh, Safety in Petroleum Industries, 2021
IEC 61508 is used by the suppliers of safety-related equipment; it also defines a set of standards for functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems. So, a supplier should be IEC 61508 certified; also it needs to manufacture the equipment in accordance with IEC 61511. In IEC 61511, formally collected best practices in safety applications have been defined.
Holistic View on the Charm and Challenge of CENELEC Standards for Railway Signaling
Published in Qamar Mahboob, Enrico Zio, Handbook of RAMS in Railway Systems, 2018
Attilio Ciancabilla, Stephan Griebel
According to IEC 61508-1 [3], functional safety is that “part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs. Functional safety is achieved when every specified safety function is carried out and the level of performance required of each safety function is met.”
Analyzing execution path non-determinism of the Linux kernel in different scenarios
Published in Connection Science, 2023
Yucong Chen, Xianzhi Tang, Shuaixin Xu, Fangfang Zhu, Qingguo Zhou, Tien-Hsiung Weng
The diversity of function paths generates uncertainty in the execution of the application because the path that the application will follow in the execution is randomly decided. This feature is called path variability, which reflects the change degree in the system call execution path. Software must undergo rigorous testing and certification in safety-critical domains such as aviation, nuclear, and autonomous driving (Baron & Louis, 2021; Cummings & Britton, 2020; Jenn et al., 2020; Novak & Gerstinger, 2010). IEC 61508, a standard for the overall safety life cycle of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems(E/E/PE), required software testing techniques, such as “test coverage” (Bell, 1999; Fowler, 2022; Smith & Simpson, 2020). When performing test coverage-based verification of Linux, the uncertainty of the execution path will challenge the work because Linux has not been developed initially with safety applications in mind. Furthermore, it is impossible to force the execution of a certain path. Therefore, this becomes a critical factor in different industrial domains requiring exhaustive testing, such as the safety-critical domain (Allende, 2022; Allende et al., 2019; Enabling Linux in Safety Applications (ELISA), 2020; Open Source Automation Development Lab contributors, 2019; Platschek et al., 2018; Procopio, 2020; Vágó, 2022).
Safety and reliability analysis for butterfly valves in the offshore oil and gas industry
Published in Safety and Reliability, 2022
There are two common approaches to safety and reliability estimation and analysis of industrial valves: failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and safety integrity level (SIL). FMEA is an engineering technique that can be used to identify known and potential problems and errors from a system or design, thus allowing them to be removed before supplying it to the customer (Huang et al., 2018; Sotoodeh, 2020b). The main advantage of this system is that it increases customer satisfaction by improving safety and reliability as well as reducing the risk of malfunction (Sotoodeh, 2020b). The FMEA was developed by the American military at the end of the 1940s (Sotoodeh, 2020b). SIL is a component of standards such as IEC 61508 that provides suppliers and end-users with a common framework for designing safety-related products and systems. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has published IEC 61508 as an international standard that addresses the functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic safety systems (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2010; Sotoodeh, 2019b). SIL provides a scientific and numeric approach to specifying and designing safety systems, enabling risk of failure to be quantified (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2010; Sotoodeh, 2019b).
Cross-acceptance of fire safety systems based on SIL equivalence in relation to IEC 61508 and EN 50129
Published in Safety and Reliability, 2022
Peter Okoh, Hyun Soo Dong, Yiliu Liu
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is one of four possible discrete levels of reliability performance with respect to safety, measured in terms of the probability of an Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related system satisfactorily performing the specified safety function under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time (IEC 61508, 2010; Rausand, 2014; Rausand & Høyland, 2004). An Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related system, according to Rausand and Høyland (2004), is ‘a designated system that implements the required safety functions necessary to achieve or maintain a safe state for some equipment’. Safety integrity levels according to IEC 61508 (2010) and EN 50129 (2018) are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.