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Responsibilities to the Public—Professional Engineering Societies
Published in Diane P. Michelfelder, Neelke Doorn, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Engineering, 2020
Joseph Herkert, Jason Borenstein
Traditionally, “dual use” is defined as information or technology that has both civilian and military applications (Stowsky 1997). The US NIH (n.d.) discusses a similar concept referred to as “dual use research of concern”; the phrase captures the notion that certain types of research may have been intended to serve a beneficial purpose but could be maliciously misused to cause widespread harm. Much of the conversation on dual use research has emerged in the life sciences, particularly in connection with biological weapons potentially deployed by nations, terrorist groups, or even disgruntled individuals. For example, global governments and organizations considered blocking the publication of avian flu studies, or at least redacting essential details about them, in anticipation of malicious actors trying to exploit the research findings (Yong 2012).
The military use of outer space
Published in Francis Lyall, Paul B. Larsen, Space Law, 2017
There are two main aspects to the question of the lawfulness of military control of outer space or its militarisation. On one side there is the straightforward stationing and potential use of clearly military equipment in space. The other side is that almost all space activities can have a military aspect.7 Basic technologies such as launch vehicles, their guidance systems and operation are dual use, carrying the potential for civil or military use. Satellite technologies are the same. Remote sensing is usable for intelligence gathering and the acquisition of relevant meteorological data. GPS/GNSS systems are used to direct bombs or cruise missiles.8 Telecommunication satellites transmit both civilian and military messages. Other satellites may monitor and intercept telecommunications traffic whether carried on terrestrial radio systems or passing through satellite transponders. Solar power satellites could be used to fuel powerful space-based lasers and could cause havoc were their download footprint deliberately diverted. The unstated fact is that states find possession of space technologies an advantage in their relationships with other states.9
Export Control and ITAR
Published in Douglas M. Marshall, R. Kurt Barnhart, Eric Shappee, Michael Most, Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2016
Nonmilitary export controls on “dual-use” items (commercial items that could also be used for a military, terrorist, or weapons proliferation purpose) are administered principally by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), principally under the Export Administration Act (EEA) of 1979†† and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended.‡‡ BIS uses the Export Administration Regulations§§ (the EAR [properly pronounced “E” “A” “R”, not the thing you use to hear]) to administer dual-use exports, including exports of certain UASs, software, know how, and numerous pay-loads, among other items. The dual-use controls emphasize protecting national security, while also trying to ensure that legitimate commercial activity is allowed to proceed without undue disruption. We will see that this is quite challenging because the level of export controls on dual-use UASs are higher than you might expect, and so many exports of commercial systems require export licenses.
Experimentation, learning, and dialogue: an RRI-inspired approach to dual-use of concern
Published in Journal of Responsible Innovation, 2023
Inga Ulnicane, Tara Mahfoud, Arleen Salles
Dual-use and misuse are among the key societal and ethical issues raised by the neurosciences (Butorac, Lentzos, and Aicardi 2021; Giordano and Evers 2018; Global Neuroethics Summit Delegates et al. 2018; Ienca, Jotterand, and Elger 2018; Mahfoud et al. 2018; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2013; OECD 2019; The Royal Society 2012; Tennison and Moreno 2012; Ulnicane 2020; Voarino 2014; Whitby and Dando 2019). More specific dual-use concerns raised by the neurosciences include: brain inspired neuro- and ICT technologies that are already in use or in advanced stages of development, for example, in warfighter ‘enhancement’, intelligence gathering, image analysis, threat detection, manipulation of emotional states, incapacitation of adversaries, and the development of autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons, or weaponized robots using artificial intelligence technologies and machine learning algorithms for target detection an elimination. (Aicardi et al. 2018a, 5–6)The concept of dual-use has many definitions and connotations which have changed over time and which vary across different fields (Aicardi et al. 2018a). Traditionally, research and technology have been considered to be dual-use when they have current or potential civilian and military applications (see, e.g. Molas-Gallart 1997). This definition of dual-use focusing on the civil–military dichotomy is still used in the EU Framework Programme (European Commission 2019). However, dual-use experts have recognized the limitations of the traditional civil–military dichotomy and highlighted the need to understand dual-use research and technology more broadly as having beneficial as well as harmful purposes (see e.g. Ienca, Jotterand, and Elger 2018; Kavouras and Charitidis 2019; Oltmann 2015; Ulnicane 2020) in a broad range of domains such as political, security, military, and intelligence (Giordano and Evers 2018; Mahfoud et al. 2018).
Uncovering illicit supply networks and their interfaces to licit counterparts through graph-theoretic algorithms
Published in IISE Transactions, 2023
Rashid Anzoom, Rakesh Nagi, Chrysafis Vogiatzis
The study of illicit supply networks is a broad and multi-disciplinary research domain. Researchers from diverse backgrounds have sought to demystify the clandestine supply chain from their respective viewpoints (readers interested in a deeper understanding of these works are encouraged to study the review article by Anzoom et al. (2022a)). Our research endeavor for this article falls under the subcategory of discovering or detecting illicit supply networks. The existing literature on this issue is largely focused on specific components of the supply network, e.g., identification of illegal products, money laundering, smuggling route detection, among others (Sin and Boyd, 2016; Magliocca et al., 2019; Farrugia, 2020). In comparison, few works have aimed to analyze the whole supply chain. A reason behind this phenomenon could be the extreme difficulty associated with tracking the affiliated facilities/entities. A limited number of research works have attempted to characterize illicit facilities (Crotty and Bouche, 2018; Zhao, 2019) for specific trades, whereas others have addressed the issue by considering regions as network vertices (Meneghini et al., 2020; González Ordiano et al., 2020). Another important aspect that has not received sufficient attention is the sourcing operations of illicit traders. As mentioned, not much information is available on the characteristics of the supplier facilities (Zhao, 2019). However, researchers have focused on the parts/materials that are sourced, especially in the case of fire arms trafficking. Their interest is specifically focused on parts with dual-use characteristics, i.e., ones that can be used for both military and civilian purposes (Micara, 2012). Criminals use corruption and treachery to procure these commodities (Albright et al., 2010). There exist trading restrictions on some raw materials to prevent such incidents, but others are legally tradable and thus vulnerable to illegal sourcing. This also opens up the possibility of tracking or shortlisting the supplier entities (interface points) in the illicit supply network. Our research addresses this issue by utilizing BOMs of the illicit product to identify these organizations.