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Published in Michael L. Madigan, HAZMAT Guide for First Responders, 2017
The concept of biocontainment is related to laboratory biosafety and pertains to microbiology laboratories, in which the physical containment of highly pathogenic organisms or agents (bacteria, viruses, and toxins) is required, usually by isolation in environmentally and biologically secure cabinets or rooms, to prevent accidental infection of workers or release into the surrounding community during scientific research. The term “biocontainment” was coined in 1985, but the concept stretches back at least to the 1940s.
Natural sources and experimental generation of bioaerosols: Challenges and perspectives
Published in Aerosol Science and Technology, 2020
Malin Alsved, Lydia Bourouiba, Caroline Duchaine, Jakob Löndahl, Linsey C. Marr, Simon T. Parker, Aaron J. Prussin, Richard J. Thomas
Aerosol research with pathogens requires appropriate biocontainment according to the biosafety classification of each microorganism. It is important to evaluate exposure risks of the laboratory personnel. It is recommended that the aerosol chambers are kept under negative pressure, and with HEPA filter exhausts, in case of system failure. Leakage tests should preferably be performed under high pressure to assess worst case leakage rates (Perrott et al. 2017; Verreault et al. 2014). When pathogens at Biosafety Level-2 and higher are nebulized in high concentrations, additional safety precautions are required to prevent exposure (Bohannon et al. 2016; Perrott et al. 2017). Whenever possible, the use of standardized and validated nonpathogenic surrogates is recommended to facilitate aerosol studies. Examples include bacteriophages or nonpathogenic bacteria as surrogates for human or animal pathogens (Turgeon et al. 2016; Bishop and Stapleton 2016).
Biosafety and biosecurity in Synthetic Biology: A review
Published in Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and Technology, 2019
Lucía Gómez-Tatay, José M. Hernández-Andreu
In order to ensure that synthetic organisms fulfill biosafety requirements, several biocontainment measures have been already developed. In this regard, Synthetic Biology itself can provide new effective mechanisms, such as synthetic auxotrophies, xenobiological firewalls or ingenious genetic circuits. However, these may be insufficient and research in this area must continue. Other biosafety measures are also believed to be necessary, and involve several improvements to current methodologies, e. g. characterization of the function of biological parts, standardization of information submission to risk assessors, revision and adaptation of worker protection measures, etc. In order for these improvements to take place, research in this area is urgent. Finally, biosafety education should be included in the interdisciplinary curricula of Synthetic Biology and measures to control and regulate the actions of biohackers should be taken.
‘That would break the containment’: the co-production of responsibility and safety-by-design in xenobiology
Published in Journal of Responsible Innovation, 2021
Members of the laboratory I studied worked on a diverse set of projects in xenobiology that followed the design principles of separation mentioned above. In a laboratory meeting, researcher Greta presented advances on the engineering of an orthogonal genetic replication system (OGRS) based on XNA, with the purpose of the providing a mechanism for biocontainment through a genetic firewall and auxotrophy (she showed a diagram of two cells, one using DNA and the other using XNA, without communicating with each other). In another meeting, James presented preliminary results of the engineering of an enzyme required for the development of the OGRS, stating in a slide that the ‘aim/purpose’ of the OGRS was achieving ‘biosafety, redundancy within the system.’ During the laboratory meetings, the importance of biocontainment as a research goal was taken for granted, questions were about what pathways would lead to it. Assumptions about responsibility are embedded in something apparently simple, or technical, as designing components of an OGRS. Design principles of separation anticipate consequences and ways to manage them, as well as what applications are enabled. This is aligned with a view of responsibility as consequentialist, common in emerging technologies. This raises the question of how researchers in the life sciences think about design and responsibility. During a discussion with participants of the laboratory in their weekly meetings, I asked them about their perspectives of responsibility in science. A participant replied, Responsibility is ambiguous. So, if you do something irresponsible, then something goes wrong, then it’s yours to blame. Which I know that is not the meaning that RRI is developing. […] Everything you do has a consequence, so you should be able to think or plan to the consequence before you do what you set yourself to do.Another participant commented, ‘the idea of blame is that something will happen that you haven’t thought of.’ Scientists seek to develop xenobiological systems that will not get out of control, and perform within a narrow set of possibilities – a rationale of containment. This was widely shared by scientists I interviewed, including Susan, who considered responsibility as ‘doing no harm to the environment.’ Although unusual in the responses I received, responsibility also meant for her the ‘broader sense of what is our input with this project to a good society,’ however these themes were not addressed in her research project.