China 
Africa 
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Overloading Disks onto a Mind: Quantity Effects in the Attribution of Mental States to Technological Systems
Published in Kay M. Stanney, Kelly S. Hale, Advances in Cognitive Engineering and Neuroergonomics, 2012
O. Parlangeli, S. Guidi, R. Fiore Farina
In addition, some recent studies (Steinbes and Koelsch, 2009) in the field of neuropsychology have shown that when people believe that they are interacting with an artifact, that is with a human product, it is possible to record a cortical activity that is in the same cortical network (anterior medial frontal cortex – superior temporal sulcus – and temporal poles) that is usually activated during processes of mental states attribution. And other studies have shown that the bias to attribute mental states is enhanced when anthropocentric knowledge may be applied to the systems, when there is a high motivation to understand the behavior of other agents and when, for many different reasons, there may be the desire for social contacts (Epley et al., 2007).
Genius Loci
Published in Mário S. Ming Kong, Maria do Rosário Monteiro, Maria João Pereira Neto, Creating Through Mind and Emotions, 2022
This psychological analysis has recently been complemented by amazing evidence from the field of neuroscience. Since 1996, with the discovery of mirror neurons, evidence has been collected about mirror processes, pervasive in brain activity (for a global perspective, consider Rizzolatti et al., 2001; also Hirstein, 2005, p. 106). These mirror processes work by simulating, in the perceiving self, the same attitudes, intentions, thoughts, and feelings they imagine the other, whom the self is with, is having. This is not a rational and conscious inference process but an automatic, unconscious process (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004; Iacoponi et al., 2004). Paradoxically, mirroring others’ emotions requires less brain effort than resting (measured by less blood flux) – it is the human brain’s default mode (Iacoponi et al., 2004). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography (PET), Mu-wave analysis2, and other imagological procedures have shown that the majority of these processes occur in primordial parts of the brain (limbic and paralimbic), meaning that this kind of mental process originated with the beginning of our species; the part of the brain responsible for mimicking others’ gestures exists even in primates (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Singer, 2006; Oberman, 2007; Shanton & Goldman, 2010; Kilner & Lemon, 2013). The mirror system (despite some disagreement between neuroscientists [cf. Geiger, 2019 and Behmer & Fournier, 2016; Cook et al., 2014]) typically considers three subsystems (Hirstein, 2005, pp.104-105). First, the subsystem responsible for duplicating actions – the Mirror-neuron system – which includes, according to Geiger (2019), the left and right dorsal premotor cortex, the inferior parietal lobule, the anterior part of the left and right intraparietal sulcus, and the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus. The Mirror-neuron system enables one to mimic facial expressions, hand expressions, and body stance (consequently collaborating with the following subsystems). Secondly, the Mentalizing system (also known as Theory-of-Mind, ToM) – which is responsible for duplicating intentions, beliefs, goals, hopes, thoughts, and other mental states (this one is difficult to situate precisely, but activation happens repeatedly in the “the right superior occipital gyrus and the left parietal lobe” according to Kawata [2012], and “in the medial frontal area of the cortex, corresponding to the anterior paracingulate cortex, and the supramarginal gyrus neighboring the posterior superior temporal sulcus,” according to Fukui et al., [2006]). Finally, the Empathic system, considered by some a subpart of the brain’s Mentalizing system, but located in a more interior stratus (and therefore more ancient phylogenetically), based on limbic and para-limbic structures as well as on somatosensory cortices (partially located in the anterior cingulated cortex and bilateral anterior insula). The Empathic system is responsible for duplicating others’ emotions (Singer, 2006: Damásio, 2020). [Figure 1]
The Neurostructure of Morality and the Hubris of Memory Manipulation
Published in The New Bioethics, 2018
Some fMRI studies report inferior parietal lobe activation during moral processing (Fumigalli and Priori 2006, p. 2011). Together with the posterior area of the superior temporal sulcus (STS), it perceives social information crucial for making inferences about the beliefs and intentions of others, including the representation of personhood. In other studies, the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) plays an integral role in moral intuition and belief attribution during moral processing. Along with the precuneus, the TPJ is involved in encoding and integrating beliefs with relevant features of action, including outcome (Pascual et al. 2013, p. 4). A further important structure of moral behavior is the temporal lobe. Among the main temporal sub-regions involved in moral judgment is the STS, which activates during the delineation of moral dilemmas (insofar as it is associated with emotion), during processing of social cognition mechanisms, and in making decisions about complex ethical problems (Fumigalli and Priori 2006, p. 2009). A further temporal region activated during the moral evaluation of dilemmas, agency, and responsibility is the anterior/middle gyrus. Similarly, angular gyrus engagement has been observed in the evaluation of personal moral dilemmas (Pascual et al. 2013, p. 5).