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A preliminary study of the characteristics of the psychological dissection techniques applied on the minimally conscious state
Published in Artde D.K.T. Lam, Stephen D. Prior, Siu-Tsen Shen, Sheng-Joue Young, Liang-Wen Ji, Smart Science, Design & Technology, 2019
To assist with trauma diagnosis, Giacino et al. (2002) published the definition of minimally conscious state (MCS) in medical research on brain injury (Giacino et al. 2002). MCS is mainly used to distinguish between coma, vegetative state (VS) and full-consciousness in the locked-in syndrome. In Giacino’s article, coma refers to a person who is unconscious with no spontaneous eye opening and unable to be awakened under strong stimulation. A person in a vegetative state is characterized by no identifiable behavioral evidence for self or environmental awareness, but is capable of spontaneous or stimulus-induced arousal, evidenced by sleep–wake cycles. A person with locked-in syndrome has preservation of cognition but is almost unable to express himself. Individuals in MCS are in a fluctuating state of consciousness. Although MCS is the result of serious neuropathology, behavioral evidence of consciousness is still discernible except that these behaviors occur inconsistently. As such, this person does not meet the criteria of vegetative state, and is therefore regarded as being in the minimally conscious state (Giacino et al. 2002).
Mental Workload, Stress, and Individual Differences: Cognitive and Neuroergonomic Perspectives
Published in Christopher D. Wickens, Justin G. Hollands, Simon. Banbury, Raja. Parasuraman, Engineering Psychology and Human Performance, 2015
Christopher D. Wickens, Justin G. Hollands, Simon. Banbury, Raja. Parasuraman
A BCI is a system to allow those with physical disabilities interact more easily with devices or other people. Neural activity is sensed while the user thinks, imagines, or performs some other cognitive operation. For users who are incapable of speaking or moving their limbs-as in patients with “locked-in syndrome” (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) & #x2014;such a device can allow for communication with the outside world and a degree of social interaction with other people where neither existed previously. With a BCI a user can interact with the environment without engaging in any muscular activity (e.g., without the need for hand or eye movements). Instead, the user is trained to engage in a specific type of mental activity that is associated with a unique brain “signature.” The resulting brain potentials (if EEG is used) or hemodynamic activity (if NIRS is used) are processed and classified so as to provide a control signal in real time for an external device.
Can’t you Read the Signs?
Published in John Flach, Fred Voorhorst, A Meaning Processing Approach to Cognition, 2019
The French movie “The Diving Bell and the Butterfly”1 describes the experiences of the writer Jean-Dominique Bauby with Locked-in Syndrome that resulted from a stroke. Locked-in Syndrome refers to a condition where a person has normal mental functioning but has limited or no means to communicate due to impairment of motor systems (e.g., as a result of stroke, degenerative muscle diseases like ALS, or damage to the spinal cord). The movie depicts how Bauby was able to learn to communicate with his therapist using only eye blinks. In fact, they laboriously write the book that the movie is based on via this method.
SSVEP-based brain–computer interface for music using a low-density EEG system
Published in Assistive Technology, 2022
Satvik Venkatesh, Eduardo Reck Miranda, Edward Braund
Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) for musical applications aim to interface brain waves directly with composition tools, instruments, algorithmic composers, and music players, to name but a few (Eaton et al., 2015; Grierson & Kiefer, 2014; Miranda, 2014). It is beneficial for patients who are suffering from locked-in syndrome, which is the loss of all or most motor abilities, because it provides a means of creative expression, which is shown to have positive effects on mental well-being (Leckey, 2011). It also allows creative practitioners to communicate with musical applications through a novel mechanism of control. Steady-state visually evoked potential (SSVEP) has been widely adopted by BCIs due to its ease of use and high communication rates (Vialatte et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). However, several challenges arise when trying to translate such BCIs from laboratories to real-world scenarios. These include bulky equipment to detect neural activity, poor signal quality among commercial sensors, and environmental factors like light and sound, to name but a few.
Exploration of Assistive Technologies Used by People with Quadriplegia Caused by Degenerative Neurological Diseases
Published in International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction, 2018
Wenxin Feng, Mehrnoosh Sameki, Margrit Betke
Communication methods that are based on feature analysis in electroencephalograms (EEG) and cursor–control systems that use implantation of electrode arrays (Keirn & Aunon, 1990; Pregenzer & Pfurtscheller, 1999; Wolpaw, Birbaumer, McFarland, Pfurtscheller, & Vaughan, 2002; Wu, Shaikhouni, Donoghue, & Black, 2004) have shown promise in lab-setting experiments. Brain interfaces are appropriate choices for individuals with locked-in syndrome, who cannot even control their eye movement (Mappus IV, Venkatesh, Shastry, Israeli, & Jackson, 2009). Visual and auditory brain–computer interfaces that show high speed and accuracy have been studied in recent years (Gao, Wang, Gao, & Hong, 2014). Electromyography (EMG) signals are generated by muscle activity, which can be measured by intramuscular or surface electrodes. Surface EMG (sEMG) sensors do not require implantation and can be placed on multiple muscle sites, including the face, neck (Williams & Kirsch, 2008), and forearm (Choi et al., 2013).
Revisiting embodiment for brain–computer interfaces
Published in Human–Computer Interaction, 2023
Barış Serim, Michiel Spapé, Giulio Jacucci
Embodied approaches to cognition commonly state that cognition is dependent on the body. Yet various claims within embodiment emphasize different aspects, ranging from the body’s role as a constraint on cognition to a mediator between the brain and the environment (R. A. Wilson & Foglia, 2017). Thus, a standing challenge for embodied cognition has been to determine this dependence. Patients with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS), who have severely restricted motor capabilities but are often cognitively intact,6Although there is evidence that motor imagination, which is frequently used in BCIs, is impaired in LIS patients (Conson et al., 2008). provide a good opportunity for confronting the question (Kyselo & DiPaolo, 2015). The case of LIS patients presents a challenge for accounts of embodiment that present body movements as a prerequisite for cognition. It can, however, be accommodated by other accounts that expand the scope of embodiment to encompass simulations of motor action in the brain as well as non-motor interaction with the environment.7Prior work (Kyselo & DiPaolo, 2015) in particular underlined the ability of the enactivist tradition (Varela et al., 2017) in defining embodiment without delimiting its scope to the standard definitions of the body. Body movements—when available—play a role in cognition, but are not a prerequisite for it (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).