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Self-love
Published in Stephen Buetow, From Loneliness to Solitude in Person-centred Health Care, 2023
As the great Jewish sage Hillel the Elder reputedly said in the last century of the Common Era,69 “If I am not for myself, who will be for me?” Self-interest rejects selfishness because the needs of the self do not negate others’ needs. As Hillel added, “if I am only for myself, who am I?” Thus, self-love is a structural precondition for offering and receiving love. Persons can only love others by loving themselves, which they cannot do by not loving others.70 Self-love is modelled when persons sacrificially demonstrate selfless altruism or at least practise self-interested altruism and generalized reciprocity for the common good.71
New Public Management in Healthcare
Published in Rui Nunes, Healthcare as a Universal Human Right, 2022
Second, and equally as important as the first issue, is the lack of sustainability of several public services due to many factors, such as inefficient resource allocation policies (allocative inefficiency). This inefficient use of public resources (gathered through taxation) is associated both with complex structure of public services administration and with the self-interest of politicians and of some public officials that frequently regard the public interest as a second choice.
On Drug Prices
Published in Mickey C. Smith, E.M. (Mick) Kolassa, Walter Steven Pray, Government, Big Pharma, and the People, 2020
Pharmaceutical companies are placing a great deal of faith in the ability of pharmacoeconomic studies to overcome Price resistance. As Horn’s recent experience demonstrates, even unbiased and well-balanced studies that conflict with the views (and self-interest) of those in charge of budgets cannot single-handedly overcome this mentality, and firms that believe their own studies will be more influential than academic studies will be sorely disappointed (728). As long as individuals within the system are charged with controlling Drug expenditures, this silo approach to budgeting will continue. The way to overcome this myopic approach to the control of pharmaceutical costs is to establish and promote the value of pharmaceuticals in relation of other Health Care resources. In this endeavor, many related obstacles must be overcome, including the lack of appreciation for the value of pharmaceuticals. Although patients think little of spending several hundred dollars for physician office visits and diagnostic procedures, they (and others) recoil at the thought of a Drug costing as much. This is due, in part, to the failure of the industry to promote the value of pharmaceuticals and to sell the end result (lack of disease) instead of the chemical itself.
Unilateral ECMO Withdrawal and the Argument From Distributive Justice
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2023
If one recognizes that the scope of distributive justice extends far beyond what Childress and colleagues presume (which, again, most theorists do), the fairness view of the justice argument in support of unilateral withdrawal deserves much more consideration. But saying the argument deserves more consideration is not the same as saying it is sufficient to justify unilateral withdrawal. Childress and colleagues note that it is not just their doubts about the applicability of distributive concerns that are motivating their dismissal of the argument from distributive justice. The authors also note that clinicians’ role-specific fiduciary obligations require them to “prioritize patients with whom they have an existing therapeutic relationship” (Childress et al. 2023, 8). This priority takes two forms. First, clinicians must efface self-interest when it conflicts with patient interests; second, clinicians must favor patient interests over third-party interests (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). It is this second iteration of the fiduciary obligation that arguably would preclude clinicians from unilaterally withdrawing ECMO from one patient like Mr. J (with whom they have an existing therapeutic relationship) in order to provide a greater benefit to another potential patient.
Towards a feminist global ethics
Published in Global Bioethics, 2022
But if self interest is not a proper motive for the practice of care, what about a sense of duty? Philosopher Immanuel Kant’s duty of beneficence is sometimes pointed to as a possible motivator for getting people to engage in Held’s practice of care, albeit “imperfectly” (Kant, 2008).4 However, Kant's duty of beneficence is an act of the will, generated by rational powers that resist the interference of the emotions. In contrast, for Held, going through the motions of a caring act without feeling anything in the way of love, affection, compassion, or sympathy is not actually engaging in the practice of care. Convinced that sensitivity to the feelings of others plays an essential role in ethical behavior, Held wondered whether it is at all possible for someone “thoroughly unaware of what others are feeling and thinking, and grossly unable to read the moods and intentions of others. . . to sustain caring relations or [engage] in practices of care” (Held, 2006). Hence it is incumbent on society to raise children’s Emotional Quotient (EQ). All but true sociopaths can learn how to care. Unfortunately, the drive for profit, power, and prestige can deafen one to the cries of others.
Virtue Theory for Moral Enhancement
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2021
Kohlberg’s model of Moral Development has six stages of which most normal adults reach only the first four or five stages. The stages are characterized, respectively, by obedience and avoidance of punishment, instrumental self-interest, conformity to norms and approval-seeking, maintaining authority and social order, following social contracts, and finally, universal principles. Empirical studies seem to confirm these stages are sequential, distinct and increase with age; that is, people follow the stages without skipping any, they are in only one stage at a time and the likelihood of being in later stages increases as people age (Kohlberg and Hersh 1977; Rest et al. 2000; Snarey 1985; Walker 1982). People at higher Kohlberg stages are less likely to be criminals or delinquents (Chandler and Moran 1990).