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Illness and Illusion
Published in Marc D. Feldman, Gregory P. Yates, Dying to be Ill, 2018
Marc D. Feldman, Gregory P. Yates
There is on-going debate as to whether factitious patients engage in self-deception in addition to deceiving others. Some of the cases I will discuss in Chapter 4 seem to hint at this possibility. Yet even these patients are far from delusional; perhaps they have lied so often that they have nearly convinced themselves. They certainly do not hallucinate.
Deception, dissociation and malingering
Published in John C. Gunn, Pamela J. Taylor, Forensic Psychiatry, 2014
John Gunn, John Gunn, David Mawson, Paul Mullen, Peter Noble, Paul Mullen
Self-deception is in part about how information is interpreted and what aspects are acknowledged but, more important, it is about self-presentation; it is about what we avow as our motivations and what we accept has been our behaviour. The simplest model of self-deception is of holding two incompatible beliefs, one of which is not noticed or acknowledged. Self-deception is not just persisting in beliefs in the face of contrary evidence, nor merely holding incompatible beliefs, for it implies an active engagement which strives to maintain ignorance. The characteristics of self-deception as viewed from the vantage point of an observer include:activities which appear incompatible with the individual’s previous claims or behaviour;the refusal of the self-deceiver to give adequate (or at least acceptable) justifications for his or her activities;a refusal to accept responsibility for activities and their consequences which appears to stem not from disregard of those responsibilities, but from an inability to recognize the transgressions;an adherence to the deception which persists even when it becomes personally disadvantageous.
Developing Education and Treatment Protocols for Substance Use Disorders That Are Socially Responsible, Accountable, and Integrated
Published in Sahar Swidan, Matthew Bennett, Advanced Therapeutics in Pain Medicine, 2020
Other factors that can contribute to the appearance of addiction, leading to its characteristic bio-psycho-socio-spiritual manifestations, include: The presence of an underlying biological deficit in the function of reward circuits, such that drugs and behaviors which enhance reward function are preferred and sought as reinforcers.The repeated engagement in drug use or other addictive behaviors, causing neuroadaptation in motivational circuitry, leading to impaired control over further drug use or engagement in addictive behaviors.Cognitive and affective distortions, which impair perceptions and compromise the ability to deal with feelings, resulting in significant self-deception.Disruption of healthy social supports and problems in interpersonal relationships which impact the development or impact of resiliencies.Exposure to trauma or stressors that overwhelm an individual’s coping abilities.Distortion in meaning, purpose, and values that guide attitudes, thinking, and behavior.Distortions in a patient’s connection with self, with others, and with the transcendent (referred to as God by many, the Higher Power by 12-steps groups, or higher consciousness by others).The presence of co-occurring psychiatric disorders in patients who engage in substance use or other addictive behaviors.
Assessing Deception Differences with Mimicry Deception Theory
Published in Journal of Personality Assessment, 2022
Melissa S. de Roos, Daniel N. Jones
Narcissism, like Machiavellianism, consistently correlated in a positive direction with long-term deception. This finding was not predicted like it was for Machiavellianism. Although strategic deception is not part of the definition of narcissism, there are several possible reasons for this correlation that are worth exploring. First, individuals high in narcissism are extraverted and open to experience (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These two Big Five factors were also related to long-term deception and may be a driving force behind the positive correlation between narcissism and facets of long-term deception. Second, individuals high in narcissism deceive through self-deception (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), which means that they convince themselves of their entitlement or superiority, and that self-deception leads to the deception of others. Thus, self-deception may lend itself to long-term deception because it is more deeply rooted in an individual’s psychology. Future research should explore the link between self-deception and long-term deception.
A Psychodynamic View of Action and Responsibility: Clinical Studies in Subjective Experience
Published in Psychiatry, 2019
Shapiro then writes about the psychology of self-deception, which is an active disavowal of personal responsibility that forestalls anxiety in a way that is reminiscent of psychological defense but without reliance on biological drives. Phenomenologically, self-deception is evident when, as Shapiro writes, a person experiences knowing something “in a way” yet actively not “really” knowing. In psychotherapy, self-deception is revealed when a patient clearly articulates something that he has known but has never said aloud previously. Another way to understand self-deception is the difference between what one believes one should think or believe and what one actually thinks or believes (but actively keeps out of the sharp focus of awareness). The clinical evidence for self-deception comes from the clinician-observer being sensitive to how the patient speaks about a situation, especially when the manner of speech suggests a disparity between the words spoken and the tone in which they are said. Shapiro follows a line of psychodynamic theorists—Hellmuth Kaiser and, ultimately, Wilhelm Reich—in emphasizing the patient’s attitude toward what she is saying and to the idea that the patient is active and engaged in creating understanding or lack of understanding (Kaiser, 1955; Reich, 1949). Reich’s well-known dictum for clinicians, which Shapiro expands upon, is “[t]he how of saying things is as important ‘material’ … as is the what the patient says” (Reich, 1949, p. 45).
In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2018
J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, Peter A. Ubel
Although many scholars have written about these concepts2 and define them in slightly different ways, we present the common threads among the various definitions. Hope occurs when a person has a desire for a certain outcome, believes the desired outcome is possible (probability is greater than zero), and engages in certain behaviors related to it such as praying for it, thinking or fantasizing about it, or even planning for it—what is described in some theoretical models as “pathway thoughts” about how to get to the desired outcome and “agency thoughts” about the ability to traverse the pathways (Snyder 2000). Unrealistic optimism occurs when a person has a desire for a certain outcome and overestimates the probability of the desired outcome. Denial occurs when a person has a desire for a certain outcome and fails to think about or “face” the high probability of the undesired outcome. Self-deception occurs when a person has a desire for a certain outcome and actively lies to herself or tells herself a narrative about the probability that is in tension with the actual evidence but in line with the desired outcome.