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Moral Reasoning
Published in L. Syd M Johnson, Karen S. Rommelfanger, The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics, 2017
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) have supplemented prototype theory by arguing that much if not all of moral reasoning and prototype construction relies on metaphors. Continuing the Darwinian-like idea that moral reasoning develops more as a survival mechanism for regulating human interactions than as a quest for philosophical wisdom, the metaphorical account of morality looks to certain sociobiological structures of experience to explain how humans comprehend morality. For example, Johnson (1998) argues that we understand morality on the basis of physical health and immorality on the basis of sickness: “moral well-being is understood as health… . Bad deeds are sick. Moral pollution makes the soul sick. We must strive for purity by avoiding dirty deeds, moral filth, corruption and infection from immoral people” (57). Johnson (1998) claims that other metaphorical features of morality are being upright, experiencing strength, balance, direction, obedience, and light (rather than darkness). Just like casuistry, connectionism, and motivated reasoning (as discussed in what follows), the metaphorical account of morality does not provide us with a template to resolve our moral dilemmas, but it does speculate about the conceptual structures or frameworks humans inevitably use in reasoning. For example, moral resolutions should be informed by aspirations that foster human flourishing, preserve the social order, advance individual freedoms and liberties, refrain from cruelty, and so on because they have strategically coevolved with our welfare needs. On the other hand, moral principles “must never be allowed to solidify into absolute rules, for then the opportunity for moral growth and progress is undermined” (67).
Scepticism of the gentle variety: interview with Derek Bolton, PhD
Published in International Review of Psychiatry, 2021
Bolton: I never approached philosophy of psychiatry with Wittgenstein in mind, his texts are too distinctive and in a way abstract, and there is no way of reading from them to philosophy of psychiatry. However, the emphasis on action which I took from Wittgenstein I apply whenever I think. So, for example, I was entirely at home seeing that Spitzer and his colleagues had put in the DSM a conceptualisation of mental disorder which turned crucially on impairments in action (as opposed to e.g. false beliefs). As to the second part of your question, ‘mental disorder’ would lend itself to being seen as part of a language game involving health problems and health care, much as for example the social scientists would study the practical effects of self or professional labelling. And yes, probably mental disorder is a family resemblance term, and to some respects this approach would be similar to the prototype theory of concepts which has indeed been applied to the concept of mental disorder.