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Thinking as an Especially Complex form of Behavior
Published in L.S. Vygotsky, V.V. Davydov, Silverman Robert, Educational Psychology, 2020
However, careful self-observation performed under experimental conditions and subject to precise measurement has already demonstrated that the composition of a mental event is incomparably more complex and that it encompasses numerous components that are inherent to it alone. It is because of these components that thinking cannot be reduced to the simple and free flow of images. In parallel with these subtle self-observations, suggested and developed chiefly by the Wiirzburg school of psychology, studies have also been made of the motor nature of mental processes, i.e., the perception of those objective manifestations of thinking that are accessible to external check and assessment. Both types of investigation have arrived at the same results, though from different directions, and both have led to a new approach to the study of thinking from which present-day psychology proceeds, as if from a starting point.
Application of the Cognitive Behavioural Approach to Enhancing Emotional Outcomes Following Acquired Brain Injury (ABI)
Published in Giles N. Yeates, Fiona Ashworth, Psychological Therapies in Acquired Brain Injury, 2019
Fergus Gracey, Peter Smits, Pieter du Toit, Jessica Fish, Kate Psaila
There have been a number of published reviews of psychological therapies including CBTs covering treatment or prevention of depression (Gertler, Tate, & Cameron, 2015; Hackett, Anderson, House, & Halteh, 2008; Stalder-Lüthy, Messerli-Bürgy, Hofer, Frischknecht, Znoj, & Barth, 2013), anxiety (Soo & Tate, 2007) and other common emotional consequences across ABI (Ownsworth & Gracey, 2017; Waldron, Casserly, & O’Sullivan, 2013). The diversity of findings suggests no clear, robust evidence for ‘CBT’, from which conclusions about ‘what works for whom’ can be drawn. Some individual studies do appear to show positive effects (e.g., Simpson, Tate, Whiting, & Cotter, 2011; Arundine et al., 2012; Bédard et al., 2014; Hsieh et al., 2012; Thomas, Walker, MacNiven, Haworth, & Lincoln, 2013). Waldron et al. (2013) concluded that CBT appears most effective when the treatment model/approach and primary outcome are specific and aligned. A tentative conclusion can be made that, depending on intervention targets and goals, it may be better to: attend carefully to neuropsychological needs and adapt sessions as necessary (Bradbury, Christensen, Lau, Ruttan, Arundine, & Green, 2008); address coping, meaning making and hope for the future (Simpson, Tate, Whiting, & Cotter, 2011); and foster stress reduction, mindful noticing of mental events, disruption of ruminative thinking, and compassionate acceptance of oneself (Bédard et al., 2014).
The disruption model of suffering
Published in David Bain, Michael Brady, Jennifer Corns, Philosophy of Suffering, 2019
Some of what the mind does is not agential: perception, emotions and unconscious processes are outside our direct control, or at least only available for control in a very limited way. Other mental processes are agential: there are acts of attention, acts of evaluation, acts of contemplation and so on. The extent to which our mental life is agential is hotly contested (see Soteriou and O’Brien 2009), but it is fair to say that at least some mental events are indeed mental actions. The disruption model states that the process constitutive of suffering encompasses all facets of our conscious mental life. This includes not just the non-agential mental events but the agential ones, which implies that suffering is to some extent agential.
The evaluation of metacognitive beliefs and emotion recognition in panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder: effects on symptoms and comparison with healthy control
Published in Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 2019
Orkun Aydın, Kuzeymen Balıkçı, Fikret Poyraz Çökmüş, Pınar Ünal Aydın
Metacognition consists of a broad range of mental activities including thinking about thinking, recognizing feelings, thoughts, intentions and their interconnections for creating composite representations. Accordingly, robust metacognitive abilities provide expeditious and accurate remedies for psychological and social challenges in life [1]. Metacognitive models have become prominent in psychological vulnerability with regard to growing body of literature [2–5]. One of the most considerable metacognitive models was self-regulatory executive function (S-REF) [6]. This model was generated for worry and worry related mental illnesses such as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder (PD), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD) [4,7]. The S-REF model explains cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS) which is comprised of activation of dysfunctional beliefs, elevated self-focused attention, threat monitoring and ruminative processing [6]. Up to date, five domains of metacognitive beliefs were commonly used in studies which focus on mental disorders: (1) positive metacognitive beliefs about worry (2) negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger (3) beliefs about need to control thoughts (4) cognitive confidence and (5) cognitive self-consciousness, respectively [8]. The S-REF model states that the negative metacognitive beliefs particularly reinforce the CAS. This relationship, which is associated with losing mental control due to threatening misinterpretations of mental events plays a substantial detrimental role in mental well-being [9].
Sealing-over in a Therapeutic Community
Published in Psychiatry, 2019
Thomas H. McGlashan, Steven T. Levy
In the process of sealing-over, psychotic experiences and symptoms are isolated from nonpsychotic mental events and then made unavailable by both suppression and repression. Resistance to influence is both an intrapsychic and an interpersonal characteristic of sealing-over. Recovered persons who have sealed-over are reluctant to discuss thoughts and feelings they experienced while actively psychotic. They often appear to lack awareness of the details of their psychotic episodes, and fail to place their psychotic experiences into meaningful perspective with their problems and struggles prior to psychosis. Such individuals see their psychosis as an encapsulated, circumscribed event which is alien to, and distinct from, that part of their mental life which they experience as evolving in a continuous, causally related manner. They rarely treat their psychotic experience as a source of new information about themselves, and they seek-often with considerable success-to return to their premorbid opinions and behavior.
The Persisting Problem of Precedent Autonomy Among Persons in a Minimally Conscious State: The Limitations of Philosophical Analysis and Clinical Assessment
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2018
Some philosophers try to solve these problems by positing identity as a function of “successive selves” (Halles 2013). They argue that in order to be identical “enough” as a self, a tight psychological continuity of my mental events needs to occur over small segments of time—such that these contents and functions do not change dramatically from moment to moment despite the fact that they will from decade to decade. Unfortunately, though, this notion does not help us in the case of minimally conscious persons whose injury causes an abrupt rupture with the psychological abilities, functions, and continuities that constituted the prior self. Psychological continuity still leaves open the argument that the pre- and postinjury selves are essentially different, so that honoring precedent autonomy remains contentious.