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The Training Programme Director *
Published in Ramesh Mehay, The Essential Handbook for GP Training and Education, 2021
Roger Burns, Ramesh Mehay, Mike Tomson, Brad Cheek
Most GP training schemes employ a heuristic approach to running their Whole-Day Release (WDR) or Half-Day Release (HDR) programmes. A heuristic approach is one that enables a person to discover or learn things for themselves; a sort of ‘hands on’ or interactive approach to learning – very much like the way things are in modern general practice.
The patient between statistical logic and clinical logic
Published in Silvia Bonino, Coping with Chronic Illness, 2020
Intensional thinking uses particular reasoning strategies, such as the heuristic of representativeness, which considers some events as better representative of a given category. The use of this heuristic process in paradigmatic thinking and probabilistic reasoning is in error, because the events that best represent a specific category are considered as more probable. In reality the opposite is true, since an event is all the more improbable when its distinctive features are numerous. For example, a man over 55 years old, a smoker and a heavy eater, with a family history of cardiac arrests, is a primary representative of the category with a greater risk of heart attack; people with all these characteristics, however, are less numerous on a statistical level, compared to the overall population, and it is therefore more unlikely to meet an individual with all these traits. On the contrary, the use of the representativeness heuristic is indispensable on a clinical level, because it allows the doctor to pay attention to those groups and individuals who are most at risk for their health.
Prior Elicitation
Published in Emmanuel Lesaffre, Gianluca Baio, Bruno Boulanger, Bayesian Methods in Pharmaceutical Research, 2020
Nicky Best, Nigel Dallow, Timothy Montague
There is diverse literature on the heuristics, or rules of thumb, that most people (including experts) employ to make judgments under uncertainty. Several common biases can be attributed to the use of these judgment heuristics. For example, when people are asked to estimate a certain quantity, they often start with an initial estimate (an ‘anchor') and then adjust up or down. This is known as the anchor-and-adjustment heuristic. Unfortunately, people tend to stick too closely to the initial anchor and do not adjust sufficiently, leading to anchoring bias in their judgments. See Chapter 3 of O'Hagan et al. (2006) and Kynn (2008) for further details of the main heuristics and biases that affect human judgments. Morgan (2014) observes that “because experts are human, there is simply no way to eliminate cognitive bias and overconfidence. The best one can hope to do is to work diligently to minimize its influence”.
Exploring Agreement Between Adolescent Self-Reported PTSD Symptoms and Clinical Diagnoses on a Psychiatric Inpatient Unit
Published in Evidence-Based Practice in Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 2022
C. Nicole White, Ana M. Ugueto
It is not uncommon for psychiatric diagnoses to be based on clinical judgment, which is susceptible to a range of failed heuristics, cognitive errors, and biases (Bhugra et al., 2011; Crumlish & Kelly, 2009; Ely et al., 2011; Galanter & Patel, 2005; Mendel et al., 2011). Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts used to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty and complexity (Crumlish & Kelly, 2009; Ely et al., 2011). These “shortcuts” reduce the time, resources, and cognitive effort to make a decision and are often used when information is limited and time to make a decision is short (Croskerry, 2002). Heuristics typically lead to quick diagnoses; however, they may also lead to cognitive errors or biases in the form of incorrect diagnoses. Inaccurate diagnoses can negatively affect psychosocial and psychotropic treatment during hospitalizations as well as discharge recommendations. While there are numerous heuristics used in decision-making, the heuristics of representativeness, availability, confirmatory bias, and diagnosis momentum are particularly relevant to admission and discharge diagnoses.
The Enigma of Reason
Published in Psychiatry, 2019
The authors cite several specific ways in which our reasoning process can fool us. One is the “availability heuristic.” This trickery, studied by Tversky and Kahneman, involves our tendency to give greater relative weight to whatever comes easiest into our minds. They cite how this may also work in bumble bees just as it does in humans! The experiment they cite, showing this in bumblebees, illustrates “ … the exquisite ways in which even relatively simple cognitive systems adjust the time and energy they spend on a cognitive task … ” (p. 209). This example is used to point out in more detail how our minds and the bees “automatically calculate” the relative costs of a false negative versus a false positive. This difference results in humans and bumblebees making more false positive mistakes, because this bias, although an error, “is beneficial” (p. 209).
Moving From Understanding of Consent Conditions to Heuristics of Trust
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2019
Michael M. Burgess, Kieran C. O’Doherty
Recognizing the operation of heuristic decision making might help make sense of the disagreement and tensions among Beskow and Weinfurt’s experts, and of research participants’ willingness to make decisions without a fulsome understanding of what that entails. Some authors suggest that heuristic decision making is deficient relative to decisions that take into account the complete set of relevant considerations (Kahneman 2003) and that decision makers either need to be stimulated to engage in a more comprehensive assessments of risks and benefits, or need to be nudged into decisions that are in line with their interests (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). But if heuristic decision making is accepted as normatively appropriate, then it is possible to reconcile the sense that full and intelligible disclosure is important with the acceptance of decisions to participate independent of good comprehension.