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Capgras Syndrome (and Other Delusional Misidentification Syndromes)
Published in Alexander R. Toftness, Incredible Consequences of Brain Injury, 2023
Other types of delusional misidentification syndrome include duplications of locations, of body parts, and of the self (Joseph, 1986). This duplication is known as reduplicative paramnesia (Ardila, 2016). As an example, the person may believe that there are multiple hospitals that they have been admitted to recently, even though there is only one. Another type is called intermetamorphosis, which occurs when a person believes that someone has transformed physically into someone else (Joseph, 1986). That is, they believe that a person has actually become someone else, as opposed to merely disguising themselves as in Frégoli syndrome.
Neuro-Ophthalmic Literature Review
Published in Neuro-Ophthalmology, 2021
David A. Bellows, Noel C.Y. Chan, John J. Chen, Hui-Chen Cheng, Peter W. MacIntosh, Jenny A. Nij Bijvank, Michael S. Vaphiades, Sui H. Wong, Xiaojun Zhang
Capgras syndrome (CS) is a delusional misidentification syndrome characterised by a false belief that an identical duplicate has replaced someone significant to the patient or replaced an inanimate object or an animal. It is named after Joseph Capgras, a psychiatrist of French origin. In 1979, Alexander et al. proposed that CS correlated with a combination of right hemisphere damage causing problems with visual recognition and frontal lobe damage-causing difficulties with familiarity. Another study found possible correlations between CS and prosopagnosia in brain-injured patients. It occurs in both genders and is widely regarded as the most prevalent of the delusional misidentification syndromes appearing in both psychiatric and non-psychiatric cases, including patients with brain damage, especially the bifrontal, right limbic, and temporal regions. This brain damage leads to aberrant memory functions, self-monitoring, and reality perception. Such neurophysiological deficits cause an inability to integrate emotional information processing and facial recognition correctly. Besides schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders, Alzheimer's disease, dementia, Lewy body dementia, epilepsy, cerebrovascular accident, pituitary tumours, and advanced Parkinson’s disease patients can experience CS. The propensity for violence in CS patients requires its speedy recognition and timely intervention.
Cotard's Syndrome Triggered by Fear in a Patient with Intellectual Disability: Causal or Casual Link?
Published in Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 2018
Fabrizio Sottile, Rosaria De Luca, Lilla Bonanno, Giuseppina Finzi, Carmela Casella, Rocco Salvatore Calabrò
Emotions are cognitive representations of body states, fear being a state of apprehension and physiological arousal that is triggered by the presence of a specific and imminent threat to well-being (Myruski, Bonanno, Gulyayeva, Egan, & Dennis-Tiwary, 2017). The state of fear helps us to prepare for danger, by focusing attention on the threat and boosting physical readiness to respond. Fear is one of the most basic human emotions, and can be considered an adaptive response that starts rapidly when the threat appears and ends when the threat goes away. Fear has three dimensions that are closely intercorrelated: (i) the physiological arousal: the fight-or-fight response to an acute stressor, which includes a racing pulse, clammy hands, and rapid breathing; (ii) the cognitive response, which includes appraising the situation and considering its possible outcomes; (iii) the behavioral response, such as avoiding or escaping whatever is inducing the fear (Robinson et al., 2013; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Delusional misidentification syndrome includes a variety of disorders characterized by delusions about oneself, others, places, and objects (Kunert, Norra, & Hoff, 2007). Although delusional misidentifications were initially reported as rare conditions, recent studies have demonstrated that they occur more frequently than estimated (Mann & Foreman, 1996). The coexistence of some of these syndromes has been reported in the literature (Gardner-Thorpe & Pearn, 2004; Sottile et al., 2015; Ulzen & James, 1995).
Is it psychiatry or the psychiatrist that is changing? Outcome of the psychiatrist’s evolution*
Published in International Review of Psychiatry, 2018
Therefore, this modern psychiatrist follows the latest manual of the American Psychiatric Association and considers it to be a treatise. Whatever does not fall within its framework tends to be suppressed, ignored or even—if we prefer—denied. He is familiar with terms such as spectrum, double diagnosis and multiple diagnosis, although in the long-term he tends to tire and run dry, so that his diagnoses tend to dwindle to just a few and to become preferential and repetitive and he easily falls into the habits of diagnostic banalization. There is an increased use of terms like borderline, double diagnosis, bipolar, and delusional disorder, while terms like disorganized or catatonic schizophrenia are less used. None of these psychiatrists will ever talk about De Clérambault’s erotomania or the delusional misidentification syndrome of Sérieux and Capgras, given the flight from the eponym and even if it remains it is shortened and trivialized, so that Gilles de la Tourette becomes a very bourgeois Tourette in the DSM-IV TR.