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Basics of Mine Safety Engineering
Published in Debi Prasad Tripathy, Mine Safety Science and Engineering, 2019
A hazard is defined as any source of potential damage, harm, or health effects to workers. Generally, a hazard when combined with some initiating event, will lead to harm. Therefore, the identification of hazards is the first and most important step in the risk assessment process. In hazard identification, all the hazards and risk factors that have the potential to cause harm are identified using system safety techniques. The most basic technique for identifying hazards is “energy analysis.” The damage or harm in any workplace cannot happen without the presence of some form of hazardous energy. Using the energy analysis technique, all the hazards related to the various forms of energy of an activity or task can be identified by identifying the types of energies present. The energy analysis technique simplifies the task of hazard identification, as it allows the identification of hazards by means of a finite set of search paths, recognizing that the common forms of energy that produce the vast majority of accidents can be placed into only ten descriptive categories as shown in Figure 1.1.
The 1950s, 1960s, and Onward
Published in Sidney Dekker, Foundations of Safety Science, 2019
The purpose of system safety is to maintain or, as far as possible (or practicable) assure normal operations by preventing disruptions or disturbances. Abnormal operations are putatively prevented by barriers, regulations, procedures, standardization, elimination, and other controls. But as we have already seen in the section on reliability and safety, the normal operation of some parts can actually contribute to the abnormal operation of the system. And not only that, but the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ turns out not to be so clear at all. The next chapter will introduce you to the work of Barry Turner, who was the first to describe the banal and unexciting life of an organization that was about to have a spectacular accident: while unwittingly on the way to something very abnormal, organizations are pretty much tied up in their usual, utterly normal, everyday preoccupations. As Vaughan (1996) later described with respect to NASA in the wake of the 1986 Challenger Launch decision, the ‘messy interior’ of an organization is pretty much the same—whether it has had an accident or not (yet). Abnormal operations are normal operations. And normal operations always are somewhat abnormal.
Fuzzy Reasoning Approach and Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process for Expert Judgment Capture and Process in Risk Analysis
Published in Qamar Mahboob, Enrico Zio, Handbook of RAMS in Railway Systems, 2018
The purpose of hazard identification is to systematically identify all potential hazardous events associated with a railway system at each required level, e.g., hazardous event level and hazard group level, with a view of assessing their effects on railway system safety. Various hazard identification methods, such as a brainstorming approach, check-list, “what if?,” hazard and operability, and failure mode and effect analysis, may be used individually or in combination to identify the potential hazardous events for a railway system (HSE, 2001; Chen et al., 2007). The hazard identification can be initially carried out to identify hazardous events and then progressed up to hazard group level and finally to the system level. The information from hazard identification will then be used to establish a risk tree.
Operational risk assessment of railway remote driving system
Published in Safety and Reliability, 2023
Abderraouf Boussif, Abhimanyu Tonk, Julie Beugin, Simon Collart Dutilleul
A safety demonstration must consider two interdependent concepts of safety: systems safety and operational safety. Systems safety concerns functional safety, technical safety, and cybersecurity of the system and its components. In general, the demonstration of the systems safety begins with a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) based on an exhaustive list of accidents/hazardous events, together with a (cyber)risk analysis (EBIOS)4 for the cybersecurity part. Unlike functional safety which focuses on the system and its functions, operational safety aims to ensure safe operations of the system within its operational environment (Yang et al., 2018). Thus, concentrated on all system interactions with other technical actors, human and environmental, the objective of operational safety demonstration is to ensure that the system will evolve in its operational domain (i.e. its Operational Design Domain—ODD) with an acceptable safety level (UL4600, 2019) (for more details regarding the concept of ODD, the reader may refer to Tonk et al., 2021).
A fuzzy causal relational mapping and rough set-based model for context-specific human error rate estimation
Published in International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics, 2021
Suprakash Gupta, Pramod Kumar, Gunda Yuga Raju
The proposed model is capable of capturing the embedded uncertainty in data and subsequent classifications. It estimates the HER with reasonable accuracy that can be readily used to assess the safety status of a mine or any system. The safety scenario and HER of a mine can be predicted after the CDF status is evaluated. The error rate for different types of error in various mining activities will guide mine management to develop interventions. This will implement a future course of action for enhancement of safety and achieving the target of zero fatalities and lost-time accidents. The proposed model may be used to verify the adequacy of the ongoing safety enhancement programme. It could prove to be a guiding tool for management to address the shortcomings in safety-related issues. It will help in decision-making and implement effective control and remedial measures for enhancing system safety. The problem of experimental and observational data limitation can be managed successfully through retrospective analysis. The developed model can guide the prospective analysis. This method is based on the error type of a generic nature that removes industry-specific domain restrictions. However, the validity of the results depends heavily on the experts’ judgements and their beliefs and knowledge about human error. Judicial selection of experts and a large volume of accident data will fine-tune the reliability of the results. The refinement of the set of CDFs will increase the model’s credibility and applicability domain.
Enhancement of FMEA risk assessment with SysML
Published in Australian Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Engineering, 2019
F. Shirvani, W. Scott, G.A.L. Kennedy, A.P. Campbell
The Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (INCOSE 2018) describes system safety engineering as an initiative that ‘focuses on identifying hazards, their causal factors, and predicting the resultant severity and probability. The ultimate goal of the process is to reduce or eliminate the severity and probability of the identified hazards, and to minimise risk and severity where the hazards cannot be eliminated’. Safety assessments should be integrated within a system development lifecycle and used at various appropriate points in historical, current and future predictive manners. As systems become more complex, so does development and management of these systems (including safety activities) also become more complex; uncovering and understanding the hazards systematically becomes more time-consuming and difficult, additional risks emerge, and managing these hazards and risks can become challenging (Ericson 2015).