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Basics of Mine Safety Engineering
Published in Debi Prasad Tripathy, Mine Safety Science and Engineering, 2019
Safety engineering is an engineering discipline that ensures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety; it is a subset of system safety engineering. Safety engineering, like any applied science, is based upon fundamental principles and rules of practice. It supports risk management programming. It is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety. Safety engineering involves: (i) establishing context, (ii) hazard identification, (iii) risk evaluation, and (iv) control of hazards in man-machine systems that contain a potential to cause injury to people or damage to property (Nelson & Associates, 2007).
Model-Based Development of Automotive Embedded Systems
Published in Nicolas Navet, Françoise Simonot-Lion, Automotive Embedded Systems Handbook, 2017
Martin Törngren, DeJiu Chen, Diana Malvius, Jakob Axelsson
The overall aim of safety engineering is to identify hazards, to assess risks, and to carry out hazard control minimizing the risks. The analysis normally requires an understanding of possible component errors (i.e., in terms of failure modes) as well as their propagations within a system and their consequences. For automotive systems, a set of classical safety analysis techniques like FMEA and FTA are used in engineering practices. These techniques rely on analytical models capturing the error logics of a system (i.e., possible errors and error propagations). One challenge is that the error models as well as the analysis outcomes are often kept separately and may diverge from the actual design [60].
An approach to managing the operational safety of autonomous vehicle trials
Published in Safety and Reliability, 2021
Two separate approaches to assessing the risk are included; a Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment, and a ‘GAMAB’ approach, both of which are described subsequently. Rather than being viewed as duplication of effort, these approaches should be seen as complementary, with each providing a different perspective and hence provide an extra layer of protection against hazards remaining undiscovered or being inadequately mitigated. This multi-perspective approach is therefore analogous to the diversity of process provided by applying an FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis) and a fault tree analysis to the same system, the parallel use of such alternative approaches being well-established by safety engineering standards such as ISO 26262 (2018). As such, the two approaches advocated here use both a different method for identifying hazards and a different method for assessing the acceptability of the resulting risks.
Full-scale fire testing to collapse of steel stiffened plate structures under lateral patch loading (part 1) – without passive fire protection
Published in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2021
Jeom Kee Paik, Min Gyu Ryu, Kunhou He, Dong Hun Lee, Seung Yul Lee, Dae Kyeom Park, Giles Thomas
For fire safety engineering, structural failure characteristics must be identified by looking at how structures deform with time after fires start. They are a nonlinear problem associated with multiple physical processes, multiple scales and multiple criteria as similarity laws are unavailable to convert small-scale models to full-scale prototype structures. As such, full-scale or large-scale physical testing is highly demanding to capture fire physics and structural failure mechanism. Cong et al. (2005) performed a fire testing on the collapse of a large-scale steel I-girder. Whilst some fire tests on framed structure models in small or large-scales are reported in the literature (Wainman and Kirby 1987; ISO 1999; Rahmanian and Wang 2009; BS 2014), no full-scale fire testing on steel plated structures has previously been conducted.
Systems integration theory and fundamentals
Published in Safety and Reliability, 2020
Mohammad Rajabalinejad, Leo van Dongen, Merishna Ramtahalsing
Figure 6 shows the six fundamental aspects of safe integration in the six faces of the Safety Cube. The three-dimensional visualisation of the Safety Cube is presented in Figure 7. Safety Cube theory considers both the technical and non-technical aspects of integration. The Safety Cube can also capture both the hierarchical and behavioural aspects of integration. Its vertical and horizontal axes represent hierarchy and lifecycle (time), respectively. Furthermore, the hierarchical perspectives can be represented in the system or system-environment aspects, and the behavioural or operational perspective can be represented in the human-system and human-environment aspects. However, this requires further research. Nevertheless, the Safety Cube is an easy to grasp concept which visually supports system integration, not in isolation from but as a part of the human and/or environmental context required for optimal integration (Rajabalinejad, 2019c). The Safety Cube requires knowledge in the disciplines of systems engineering, risk management and safety engineering; prerequisites for safe and optimal integration (Rajabalinejad, Frunt, Klinkers, & van Dongen, 2019).