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Optimising the Organisational Aspects of Deployment: Learning from the Introduction of New Technology in Domains Other than Road Transport
Published in Michael A. Regan, Tim Horberry, Alan Stevens, Driver Acceptance of New Technology, 2018
Correct operation of systems is important to ensure the safety of the workers, the public and the environment. During the development of a safety critical system, the implications of its use are assessed and, where necessary, measures are determined to meet safety needs. Careful attention to safety issues then builds up trust in the system which is shared by those who work in it and those who use it. Reason (2004) argues that in the medical domain, some organisational accident sequences could be thwarted at the last minute if those on the frontline had acquired some degree of error wisdom and appropriate mental skills. In a similar way, knowledge of dangerous situations and safe driving behaviour can do a lot to reduce the number of vehicle and pedestrian accidents. Various documents are produced by organisations, for example BVRLA (2012) and ROSPA (2012), which give guidelines on safe driving and imploring employers to disseminate them to their employees on the road.
The Safety-II case
Published in Erik Hollnagel, Jeffrey Braithwaite, Robert L. Wears, Delivering Resilient Health Care, 2018
In safety-critical industries, such as the oil and gas industry and the nuclear industry, there has been a shift in regulatory regimes over the past 20 years from prescriptive towards goal-based approaches. Under a prescriptive regulatory regime, the regulator specifies the technical and organisational provisions that need to be in place in order to operate a safety-critical system. This approach has proven to be ineffective due to the fast evolution of technology, and the complexity of modern systems (Hawkins et al., 2013). With the goal-based regulatory approach, the regulator specifies goals that need to be achieved, but leaves the specific ways in which the goals are met to the manufacturers and operators of systems (Sujan, Koornneef and Voges, 2007). This provides flexibility, but also shifts the responsibility of demonstration that a system is safe to the duty holders. In the UK and several other countries this demonstration is fulfilled through the development and submission of a safety case (Sujan et al., 2016).
Digital Transformation and the Cybersecurity of Infrastructure Systems in the Oil And Gas Sector
Published in Edward Ochieng, Tarila Zuofa, Sulafa Badi, Routledge Handbook of Planning and Management of Global Strategic Infrastructure Projects, 2020
Shin et al. (2017) define cybersecurity as “actions required to preclude unauthorised use of, denial of service to, modification to, disclosure of, loss of revenue from, or destruction of critical system or informational assets.” In this section, the determinants of cybersecurity in oil and gas infrastructure systems are discussed from technological, organisational, and environmental perspectives.
A sliding mode observer-based robust fault-tolerant control allocation for descriptor systems
Published in Journal of Control and Decision, 2023
Ariful Mashud, Manas Kumar Bera
Any safety-critical system, such as a spaceship, an aircraft, a chemical factory, or a nuclear power plant, requires increased dependability and safety to avoid hazardous or emergencies resulting from actuator faults or failure. Fault-tolerant control (FTC) techniques are essential in any safety-critical system to prevent the controlled system from failing or stalling. The FTC scheme can be classified into two broad terms: passive and active FTC. The passive FTC scheme employs a fixed control structure to maintain satisfactory system performance despite system uncertainties and failures. The faults are estimated using a reliable fault detection and identification mechanism in the active FTC, and the information is used to reconfigure the underlying controller structure (Gao et al., 2015; Zhiwei et al., 2015).
An integrated and dynamic framework for assessing sustainable resilience in complex adaptive systems
Published in Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure, 2020
Katherine Nelson, Leslie Gillespie-Marthaler, Hiba Baroud, Mark Abkowitz, David Kosson
Following risk identification, the contextual vulnerability of critical system components to a hazard scenario is assessed. Contextual vulnerability is a static interpretation of vulnerability at a specific moment in time and operationalizes the concept of vulnerability by focusing on pre-hazard characteristics of sub-systems/components that describe the extent to which they may be expected to experience negative impacts of a hazard (Cutter et al., 2008; Gallopin, 2006). Assessment of contextual vulnerability should include evaluation of the exposure, sensitivity, and anticipatory coping capacity for each sub-system/component of the system (e.g., city block, road segment, social group and business sector). This static scale of vulnerability assessment makes use of the ability of vulnerability analyses to identify intra-system disparities and areas of critical concern.
Graceful degradation for reducing jitter of battery life in fault-tolerant embedded systems
Published in International Journal of Systems Science, 2018
Salim Kalla, Riadh Hocine, Hamoudi Kalla, Abderrezak Chouki
Embedded systems are increasingly preferred as a platform to implement public domain applications as well industrial applications. Critical real time, low cost (due to constraints of size, weight, price and power consumption) and distributed architecture are the main characteristics. Tolerating faults in embedded systems is a difficult task because reducing cost and improving system reliability are considered as a contradictive goals (Girault & Kalla, 2009), if we improve the one, we loss the other. Fault tolerance is the main mechanism to achieve the reliability of such critical system. A system is fault tolerant if it continues to operate with its specifications in the presence of faults.