China
Africa
Explore chapters and articles related to this topic
A secure ambulance communication protocol in VANET
Published in Artde D.K.T. Lam, Stephen D. Prior, Siu-Tsen Shen, Sheng-Joue Young, Liang-Wen Ji, Smart Science, Design & Technology, 2019
Chin-Ling Chen, Yong-Yuan Deng, Kai-Wen Zheng, Ting-Lun Yang, Jian-Zhi Huang
Even if the session key PSK between the ambulance and the hospital server is compromised at any point in time by malicious people, the system still satisfies forward and backward secrecy. The attackers may use the session key PSK to make a future communication or use it to get the previous message. In the proposed scheme, the session key PSK is randomly chosen by the ambulance and the hospital server, and can only be used in the current round. The attacker can’t use the same session key PSK to make a future communication, or use it to get the previous message. Thus, a secure ambulance communication protocol achieves forward and backward secrecy.
Single Server Authentication
Published in Chintan Patel, Nishant Doshi, Internet of Things Security, 2018
So after the authentication phase, server is ensured of identity of users and session keys Sk1, Sk2, Sk3, …., Skn will be generated for n users. Both user and server will make use of this session key for the further communication. After the completion of communication, both the server and user destroy the session key, and for the next communication they need to regenerate the session key. Device authentication also follows the same procedure in which device sends its identity to the gateway devices and gateway devices make use of this identity to generate session key or temporary secret key to communicate with device. Next phase is the updating phase in which if user want to change its password or any device wants to change its security parameters. So let us discuss the password update phase in which user is motivated to update its password stored in smart card.
Authentication in Wireless Networks
Published in Yang Xiao, Security in Distributed, Grid, Mobile, and Pervasive Computing, 2007
Saikat Chakrabarti, Venkata C. Giruka, Mukesh Singhal
In the WPA protocol, the clients in the wireless network do not use the same symmetric key for both authentication and message encryption/decryption purposes. Instead, the clients use their own unique credentials (identities) for authentication and derive a cryptographically strong session key after the successful run of the authentication protocol. The session key is used to encrypt/decrypt subsequent messages. Moreover, every successful initiation of the authentication protocol generates a unique session key. This provides the known-key security. Also, the separation of the authentication protocol and the message protection makes the WPA scalable, allowing dynamic-key management.
Certificateless pairing-free authentication scheme for wireless body area network in healthcare management system
Published in Journal of Medical Engineering & Technology, 2020
Philemon Kasyoka, Michael Kimwele, Shem Mbandu Angolo
If a past session key is compromised, an adversary will have a negligible advantage in compromising future session key. A unique will always be generated every time the authentication algorithm is executed. The session key is composed of value which is generated using secret key and value . Value is always unique with every authentication process while to recover an adversary with the knowledge of public key will need to solve Discreet Logarithm Problem (DLP) which is a hard problem.
Guarded dual authentication based DRM with resurgence dynamic encryption techniques
Published in Enterprise Information Systems, 2019
Neha Agarwal, Ajay Rana, J.P. Pandey
Sandhu and Bhathal (2016) discussed about a symmetric key understanding algorithm to tackle the issue of Key management and Key Sharing because it decreased the unwavering quality. To deal with that issue, measured design for key sharing and key management in completely Homomorphic Encryption plan was created. In their method, Diffie Hellman symmetric key algorithm was utilized to create session key between two groups and HMAC was utilized to create OTP (One Time Password) for greater security. Their approach shared session key among client and cloud. For each process, new key was created between two preceding correspondence selected node assume user1. Because of this, the issue of dealing with the key was ousted and information was more secured. Results showed that completely homomorphic encryption system was more effective than full disk encryption.
A lightweight D2D security protocol with request-forecasting for next-generation mobile networks
Published in Connection Science, 2022
Daniel Gerbi Duguma, Jiyoon Kim, Sangmin Lee, Nam-Su Jho, Vishal Sharma, Ilsun You
Despite their broad uses and rising popularity, IoTs have been associated with a slew of security and privacy issues, according to several researches (Caputo et al., 2020; He et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2020; Schafer & Edwards, 2017; Wong & Yiu, 2020). D2D communication, which is expected to be utilized by resource constrained IoT devices, should consider the appropriate security and privacy requirements for the aforementioned possible concerns. The following are the security criteria for D2D communication as identified in Zhang and Lin (2017). Lightweight cryptographic operation: an authentication and key agreement protocol should fully acknowledge the limited resources concerning power, processing, storage, and communication posed on D2D communication.Anonymity: it should be difficult, if not impossible, to reveal the information, location, and identity of devices through messages sent and received during the device discovery process.Mutual Authentication: the devices participating in the D2D communication should know whom they are talking to and vice versa.Confidentiality: after a successful key exchange, the attacker should not obtain the key and the plain data protected by it.Integrity: an unauthorized user should not modify the protected message transmitting between the D2D users.Perfect Forward Secrecy: an attacker should not obtain the D2D session participants’ current session keys from the previous session key.