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Message Authentication Codes
Published in Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Introduction to Modern Cryptography, 2020
Two common techniques for preventing replay attacks are to use sequence numbers (also known as counters) or time-stamps. The first approach requires the communicating users to maintain (synchronized) state, and can be problematic when users communicate over a lossy channel where messages are occasionally dropped (though this problem can be mitigated). In the second approach using time-stamps, the sender appends the current time T (say, to the nearest millisecond) to the message before authenticating, and sends T along with the message and the resulting tag t. When the receiver obtains T, m, t, it verifies that t is a valid tag on m║T and that T is within some acceptable clock skew of its own current time T′. This method has its own drawbacks, including the need for the sender and receiver to maintain closely synchronized clocks, and the possibility that a replay attack can still take place if it is done quickly enough (specifically, within the acceptable time window). We will discuss replay attacks further (in a more general context) in Section 5.4.
Security and Privacy in Vehicular Networks Challenges and Algorithms
Published in Anna Maria Vegni, Dharma P. Agrawal, Cognitive Vehicular Networks, 2018
Yi Gai, Jian Lin, Bhaskar Krishnamachari
[27] presented two approaches to prevent replay attacks: (1) using a globally synchronized time for all nodes and (2) using nonce. The first option will require a lot of efforts on the organization, so the second one is preferred. [28] proposed another solution to use the GPS information come with the vehicles. [29] presented a new scheme for malicious behavior prediction. Based on that, a reliable intrusion detection and prevention scheme was proposed for VANETs within a game theoretical model. A set of detection and identification rules were proposed for identifying malicious behavior, and thus preventing from the most dangerous attacks.
Observer-based H ∞ PID control for discrete-time systems under hybrid cyber attacks
Published in Systems Science & Control Engineering, 2021
Pengyu Wen, Nan Hou, Yuxuan Shen, Jiahui Li, Yi Zhang
In this paper, we mainly focus on two types of cyber attacks, namely, the false data-injection (FDI) attack and the replay attack. The FDI attack is known as one of the most dangerous attacks, where the attacker replaces the transmitted information in order to tamper the completeness of data (Yuan & Xia, 2018). Recently, the control problem for networked systems under FDI attack has received interest from researchers. For example, in Jin et al. (2017) and Zhao and Yang (2020), adaptive secure control schemes under the FDI attack have been designed. In Bai et al. (2017) and Ding et al. (2018), the control problems under the randomly occurring FDI attack have been studied. As for the replay attack, the attacker records the past transmitted information and injects the recorded information into the system, which leads to extra difficulty in detecting the attack. Up to now, the control problem for systems under the replay attack has also received attention from researchers. For example, a recording-horizon control scheme has been designed to tackle the replay attack in Zhu and Martínez (2014). In Mo et al. (2014), in order to detect whether the system is under replay attack, additional Gaussian signals have been injected into the system. It is worth mentioning that, in most of the existing literature concerning control problems under cyber attacks, only one type of cyber attack has been considered. Nevertheless, in real world, the system may be subject to more than one type of cyber attacks. As such, it is of practical significance to investigate control problem for systems under hybrid cyber attacks.
A novel out-of-band biometrics authentication scheme for wearable devices
Published in International Journal of Computers and Applications, 2020
Manmeet Mahinderjit Singh, Ke Wan Ching, Asrulnizam Abd Manaf
Besides that, replay attack is an attempt to threaten security by recording legitimate communications and repeating them to try to impersonate a valid user. It occurs when an unauthorized user captures network traffic and then sends the communication to its original destination, acting as the original sender. It is similar to an active MITM attack, whereas an active MITM changes the contents of a message before sending it on, a replay attack only captures the message and then sends it again later. For instance, Nymi Band [47] is a small bracelet equipped with a sensor that reads the electrocardiogram (ECG) of the person wearing it. Once it has verified that the heart signature belongs to the person who registered it, it provides a means of authentication that can in theory be used to access a virtually endless supply of electronic devices, including airport kiosks, hotel room doors, and sensitive computer networks. However, replay attack might be used to compromise the security assurances of the device. If the attacker is able to obtain a person’s unique ECG signal and bracelet, the attacker may be able to hook it up to a simple circuit that replays the heartbeat. A variation on this attack is to capture the data packets that the person's bracelet sends during the authentication procedure and use another set of hardware to resend that data. Replay attacks are similar to obtaining a copy of the key to a target's home or office. If the attacker can clone the secret data the user beams to the device he’s logging in to, the security of the system can be undermined.
Secure control for discrete-time hidden Markov jump systems subject to replay attacks via output feedback
Published in Journal of Control and Decision, 2022
Lei Su, Shinian Fang, Zijun Liu, Hao Shen, Tian Fang
To sum up, the issues discussed in this paper are summarised as follows: first, a detection algorithm is designed for replay attacks. Then, with the help of detection information, the SOF controller is designed by receiving secure output data, so that the CLS (6) is still stochastically stable and satisfies a specified index r under replay attacks.