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Network Security
Published in Mário Marques da Silva, Cable and Wireless Networks, 2018
It is worth noting that the digital signature ensures authenticity (which is an attribute), while not comprising authentication (which is a process). Note that even though if a third party sends a previously recorded message (replay attack), the receiver is not able to detect it, as authenticity was not violated (i.e., the claimed author of the message is its legitimate). In order to avoid such nonlegitimate operation, an authentication process such as the previously described CHAP needs to be implemented. Note that combined cryptographic protocols, such as the SSL or the TLS, incorporate their own authentication processes, in addition to the authenticity provided by the digital signature.
Blockchain-based Light-weight Authentication Approach for a Multiple Wireless Sensor Network
Published in IETE Journal of Research, 2022
The study of cryptography examines methods for private communication while outside observers are present. A cryptographic protocol establishes a set of guidelines for inter-entity communication while offering certain security assurances. Initial, reaction, and completion needs are some of these. Security protocol design often abstracts the execution of cryptographic operations and makes a fantastic cryptography assumption. Either symmetric or asymmetric encryption may be used to protect the confidentiality of information submitted over an unsecured model. However, asymmetric encryption is far cheaper and more reliable in practice than the encryption process. However, creating a shared secret key is an issue that must be avoided [31]. Exponential key transfer, as defined by Diffie-Hellman, may be utilised if a passive attacker can be considered. Key generation, however, typically necessitates the implementation of a protocol that utilises asymmetric encryption and a public-key management infrastructure because this is not the norm (such as one that uses certificate authorities). The validation of authentication and secret key methods is the main topic of this thesis. As a result, the verification procedure must provide proof that authentication cannot be concealed and that an enemy could see or change the secret keys. We have decided to employ the Proverif symbolic model checker. One of Proverif's intriguing capabilities is that it enables verification of protocol operations over an essentially unlimited number of sessions. Another appealing aspect of this modelling tool is the applied pi calculus on which it is built. We employ function Object () [native code] and destructor functions defined by the user in Proverif for activities like encryption and decryption. We can define functions as equivalence relations in Proverif. The Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and other features can be represented in this way. There is no need to model the attacker because it is implicit in ProVerif.