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Corrosion Management in Refining Assets
Published in Marcio Wagner da Silva, Crude Oil Refining, 2023
The corrosion phenomena in hydroprocessing units can be divided into phenomena associated with high temperatures and associated with low temperatures. The corrosive processes associated with high temperatures are as follows: Sulfide corrosionNaphthenic acid corrosionHigh-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)Hydrogen embrittlement
Basic Materials Engineering
Published in David A. Hansen, Robert B. Puyear, Materials Selection for Hydrocarbon and Chemical Plants, 2017
David A. Hansen, Robert B. Puyear
In addition to electrolytic corrosion, the selection of materials must also take into account various oxidation/reduction processes that can occur in the absence of an aqueous electrolyte. Examples include various forms of sulfidation, destructive oxidation of alloys in air or steam at high temperatures, carburization, nitriding, fuel ash corrosion and high-temperature hydrogen attack, all of which are discussed in Chapter 3, “Failure Modes.”
Innovative approach of damage mechanism identification for energy equipment – A case study of oil refinery
Published in Energy Sources, Part A: Recovery, Utilization, and Environmental Effects, 2020
Vladimir Pilić, Daniel Baloš, Aleksandar S. Anđelković, Višnja Mihajlović, Damir Đaković
Another important aspect of equipment management and damage mechanisms is the detectability of the damage extent using conventional/readily available techniques in the normal industry environment. Unfortunately, for a number of damage mechanisms the practical methods to measure the extent of damage do not exist, unless the damage already happened – typical for almost any type of cracking mode of failure. Other damage mechanisms require accumulation time before the damage becomes detectable, e.g. creep damage, high-temperature hydrogen attack, or any form of fatigue. Applied Nondestructive Examination methods (NDE methods, sometimes also referred as Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE), Nondestructive Inspection (NDI), or Nondestructive Testing techniques (NDT)) are rather based on inspection methods for detecting cracking with the expectation that cracking indeed did not take place. For this kind of equipment, it is therefore critical to be able to identify the parameters (IOWs) and applied barriers, as well as estimate the likelihood of the damage taking place, especially in the upset or start-up/shutdown conditions in order to minimize the susceptibility of the component to develop cracking damage, i.e., to minimize the probability of cracking.
Fuzzy evidence theory and Bayesian networks for process systems risk analysis
Published in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal, 2020
Complex chemical process industries contain varieties of hazardous chemicals and process zones, which are extremely congested with the existence of complex assets such as towers, furnaces, heat exchangers, and many other equipment for process operations. Such complex assets have enough capability to change rapidly from small mishaps into the catastrophic accident. It is obvious that fires and explosions have high frequency throughout all process accidents, which can be considered as loss-producing events. For example, a series of fire and explosion on April 2, 2010 at Tesoro Anacortes Refinery in United States of America, which was caused by a fracture in the heat exchanger at the catalytic Reformer/Naphtha Hydrotreater unit. Is has been recorded as the largest destructive accident ever after the BP Texas city accident of March 2005. This fracture occurred at the E-6600E heat exchanger due to surge in the high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA). The fractured heat exchanger released highly flammable hydrogen and naphtha of over 500 °F. The flammable hydrogen and naphtha sparked subsequently triggering an explosion and terrible fire that lasted for more than 3 h (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 2014). In this article, the proposed methodology was applied to release prevention barrier (RPB) among seven investigated barriers reported by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) on accident pathway prevention. A brief definition of the seven barriers provided by Adedigba et al. (2016b) demonstrated that failure of RPB is responsible for the release of material and consequently responsible for the spill of chemical substance that triggers the accident. The FT of RPB provided by Adedigba et al. (2016b) is modified in our study to quantify the probability of the prevention barrier and represent the effectiveness and viability of the proposed approach. As it can be seen from Figure 2, the TE of FT is the failure of RPB. Accordingly, to establish a causal relationship, the IEs are considered to represent all contributory factors for RPB. Their respective failure probabilities contribute to the failure probability of the TE while the BEs of accident contributory factors is denoted by circles and a combination of logic gates (AND/OR) was used to show the logical relationship between BEs and the TE.