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Rehabilitation engineering across the lifespan
Published in Alex Mihailidis, Roger Smith, Rehabilitation Engineering, 2023
Developmental systems theory is an approach that integrates heredity (genetics and epigenetics), human development, and evolution. The approach goes beyond traditional perspectives of development in biology and psychology with their attribution of behaviors as arising from either primarily genetic or primarily environmental and experiential factors (Johnston 2010, 12–29). Several perspectives on developmental systems theory are actively being explored and debated, though some overarching tenets to describe the approach can be summarized (Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001, 1–11; Johnston 2010, 12–29). In developmental systems theory, development involves multiple, interacting inputs that together determine behavior or behavioral patterns. Another important contributor to behaviors is the context in which development is occurring, which takes into account the current status of the system and all possible interacting inputs at the time. The notion of “extended inheritance” is also described, whereby a variety of transmittable resources beyond genes are available to support the development of behaviors. The mutual interactions between individuals and environments are developing and are additional inputs to development.
Human Embryos, Human Beings: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach
Published in The New Bioethics, 2021
Subsequent chapters examine developmental systems theory (DST), which argues that multiple interacting factors control developmental activity, as opposed to a gene-centric view. The Condics note that DST is closer to the Aristotelian view that development is not driven by a single part, but express concern that the blurring of the distinction between environment and organism is opposed to the self-directed hylomorphic view. This ‘fuzzy’ organism view is ambiguous, resulting in arbitrary definitions of organisms that the Condics refer to as organisms by fiat – definitions that are constructed to serve pragmatic interests. As an example, they cite bioethicist Robert Baker’s declaration that it is too burdensome to acknowledge very early embryos as being human beings. The answer, they suggest, is to neither reduce the human organism to its DNA nor to ignore the distinction between organism and environment – but to return to the Aristotelian notions of substance and accident. Substances can only be known indirectly, by observations of their accidents – their attributes, which are caused by their substance. Those accidents that are so connected with their substance that it is never found without them are known as proper accidents or properties. A related concept is that of formal cause, which is inseparable from the thing of which it is the form – for living things, the soul. The task, then, is threefold. We must determine what are the proper accidents of human beings, and whether they can be observed in the human embryo, and secondly, observe a ‘determinate, uniquely human developmental trajectory’ that is ‘initiated and sustained by the embryo’ – evidence for a human final cause in operation (pp. 178–179). Finally, the embryo must be identical with the future rational being – there cannot be discontinuity.