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The COVID-19 pandemic and development of drugs and vaccinations
Published in Edward M. Rafalski, Ross M. Mullner, Healthcare Analytics, 2022
Contact tracing is used to quickly identify individuals who have been exposed to infectious disease (COVID-19, measles, Ebola, TB, and Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs)) and alert their contacts of their potential exposure7. The goal of contact tracing is to help prevent the further spread of infection, to identify hotspots of infection, and to protect friends, families, and communities from potential infection. The Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of the individuals who test positive (+) are kept confidential as per the guidelines under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The public health staff works with the individuals who are tested positive to help identify all those who came in contact with them while they were infectious so that the exposed individuals could be alerted via phone and directed to appropriate medical facilities for getting tested. The individuals would be instructed to self-quarantine to prevent the spread of the disease and follow appropriate social distancing practices. The individuals would be asked to check their temperature twice daily and monitor for symptoms and schedule a COVID-19 test before the end of their quarantine period.
Challenges of Managing Cybersecurity at COVID-19
Published in Kenneth Okereafor, Cybersecurity in the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2021
Value-based classification associates healthcare data with Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Protected Health Information (PHI), two components that represent valuable information about the health status of a patient. They both require special protection to prevent unauthorized access and illegal modification, both of which have severe medical impacts on healthcare beneficiaries.
PHP Instructor Materials: Overview of the Healthcare “Problem”
Published in Rebecca Mendoza Saltiel Busch, Patient’s Healthcare Portfolio, 2017
Identity theft is the crime of stealing someone’s so-called Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Such information includes your social security number, driver’s license number, credit card data, birth date, telephone number, health insurance identification, employment identification information, and so on.
Prevalence of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), United States, 2016
Published in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Frontotemporal Degeneration, 2022
Paul Mehta, Jaime Raymond, Reshma Punjani, Theodore Larson, Frank Bove, Wendy Kaye, Lorene M. Nelson, Barbara Topol, Moon Han, Oleg Muravov, Corina Genson, Bryn Davis, Thomas Hicks, Kevin Horton
In the U.S., ALS patients can receive their care from a number of sources such as government-funded (Medicare, VHA, and VBA) and through private insurance. Patients may also receive their insurance through Medicare Advantage (Part C), which includes private insurance companies approved by Medicare (27). Part C data were requested by the Registry but not received from Medicare and are not included in this analysis. Those who receive their care from employee-sponsored private insurance are not captured by the Registry. These data are fragmented between datasets and do not have personal identifiable information (PII). While private insurance companies capture PII data, the federal government typically is not granted access to these data, especially on a national scale. Without PII such as name, date of birth, or social security numbers, private insurance cases cannot be matched with cases in the Registry. Eventually, some of these patients may move away from private insurance and seek care solely through government sponsored care, increasing the chances of capturing the case. Regardless, due to the variability and fragmented health care delivery model in the U.S., when compared to countries with a single-payer system, determining complete case counts is not possible as it is may be with ALS registries in Europe (28–30).
Latent Epstein–Barr virus infection status and prognosis in patients with newly diagnosed Hodgkin lymphoma in Southeast China: a single-center retrospective study
Published in Hematology, 2021
Chang Wang, Si-Ping Zou, Dao-Guang Chen, Jie-Song Wang, Yan-Bin Zheng, Xiu-Rong Chen, Yu Yang
In this retrospective study, data of all 166 consecutive patients with HL diagnosed and treated in Fujian Cancer Hospital from December 2012 to September 2019 were collected through the electronic medical record system. All patients were confirmed by the Pathology Department of Fujian Cancer Hospital to meet the WHO diagnostic criteria of HL and had complete efficacy evaluation records. 28 patients were excluded because there were not enough specimens for EBV detection. 4 patients were excluded because of the second primary tumor. A total of 134 patients were eligible for our study. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Fujian Cancer Hospital (No. 2017-067-01). Ethics Committee of Fujian Cancer Hospital agreed to apply for exemption from the signature of informed consent, because all interviews were conducted on the phone and the risk of the study to the subjects was not greater than the minimum risk, and if the background of ‘research’ was separated, the behavior or procedure under the same situation did not require the signing of written informed consent. The baseline demographic characteristics and clinical information of the participants were obtained from the electronic medical record system. For the sake of confidentiality, the data is deprived of any personally identifiable information. Participants or family members were contacted on the telephone to obtain verbal consent and follow up information. All of the participants or family members who can be contacted provided verbal consent and received telephone interviews.
Furthering Discussion of Ethical Implementation of HIV Cluster Detection and Response
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2020
CDC’s National HIV Surveillance System does not contain individuals’ name or address, and CDC data protections prohibit data release for uses other than public health purposes and release of data is governed by strict data release policies. However, health department data do contain personally identifiable information, and state policies vary widely regarding protection and release of data for nonpublic health purposes. State HIV criminalization statutes are not generally science-based, have not been shown to prevent HIV transmission, and may cause harm by, for instance, increasing stigma and mistrust. Until a national standard for protection of public health data is adopted, uneven state level protections pose risks for individuals, public health data, and the public’s trust (Lee and Gostin 2009). Molldrem and Smith note scientific debate about the ability to determine directionality of transmission using molecular data. Given the lack of agreement among experts in this field, the risks to individuals, and known gaps in data, we agree about the limitations of these data to infer transmission direction.