China
Africa
Explore chapters and articles related to this topic
Biosecurity in the Life Sciences
Published in Kezia Barker, Robert A. Francis, Routledge Handbook of Biosecurity and Invasive Species, 2021
Limor Samimian-Darash, Ori Lev
On 17 October 2014, just a few weeks after the announcement of the government’s institutional oversight policy, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Department of Health and Human Services instituted a moratorium on funding for gain-of-function research that involves influenza, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) viruses while officials deliberated the risks and benefits associated with such research (Science and Technology Policy Office and the Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). The deliberative process behind this decision was conducted by the NSABB and the National Research Council, whose recommendations were submitted to the DHHS secretary (NSABB, 2016). Three years later, in December 2017, the funding moratorium was lifted. The end of the funding moratorium was enabled by the publication of a new review framework for studies that involve lab-enhanced pathogens that are highly virulent and transmissible in human populations (DHSS, 2017). The publication of this framework, together with the other policies created since 2013, seems to have closed most of the regulatory gaps that existed before the H5N1 controversy. However, it remains to be seen whether new cases, such as the artificially created horsepox virus mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, might highlight new gaps or alternatively show that the currently existing biosecurity policies are sufficient.
Cross-testing of direct-action antivirals, universal vaccines, or search for host-level antivirals: what will sooner lead to a generic capability to combat the emerging viral pandemics?
Published in Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy, 2022
Viral pandemics emerged as a major threat to social stability. In this editorial we address generic antiviral capability: host-level and direct-action antivirals (DAA) as well as universal vaccines. AA meta-analysis of the published literature in the field of cross-applicability of DAA was summarized. Weproposed systematic testing of the approved and parent DAA against all species causing ‘common colds.’ The viruses of 2019–2021 and 1918–2020 pandemics both belong to this outdated category. Variants of the ‘common cold’ viruses are the most likely candidates for pandemic emergence. We proposed co-formulation of the best DAA agents in taxon-specific combinations and pre-positioning of these cocktails for early population blanketing while the specific vaccineCampus is under development. The editorial addresses the ownership of the civilian biodefense and the urgent need to fill the existing gap in the times of uncontrolled gain-of-function research (Figure 1).
The CRISPR revolution and its potential impact on global health security
Published in Pathogens and Global Health, 2021
Kyle E. Watters, Jesse Kirkpatrick, Megan J. Palmer, Gregory D. Koblentz
Separate from natural evolution, the intentional manipulation of a pathogen’s genetic material could also pose a potential source of a biological outbreak. Given the risk of natural evolution generating viruses with increased virulence or transmissibility, ‘gain of function’ research purposefully generates such strains for the research and risk assessment purposes to contribute to global health preparedness. For example, two controversial studies in 2012 demonstrated that avian influenza could become transmissible between ferrets – the standard model for human infection and transmission in influenza research [12,13]. A pathogen could also be engineered with enhanced virulence, transmissibility, or resistance to medical countermeasures for use as a weapon.