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Management of Distraction Risk from Mobile Phones in the UK Rail Industry
Published in Michael A. Regan, John D. Lee, Trent W. Victor, Driver Distraction and Inattention, 2013
Toni Luke, Jay Heavisides, Dan Basacik
One option assessed in Sotera (2006) was to allow the use of mobile telephones for operational communications by the driver when the train is in motion. The work concluded that this would increase risk by 0.12 FWIs per year due to increased risk of SPADs and other driver errors and this was not recommended to be taken forward. The need for mobile phones for operational communications is expected to reduce in future when a new system called GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications - Railway) is widely implemented. GSM-R will provide reliable in-cab voice communication between the train driver and signalling control centre.
The Application of Ergonomics to Standards Development for VDU-based Signalling Control Systems
Published in John R. Wilson, Beverley Norris, Theresa Clarke, Ann Mills, Rail Human Factors, 2017
Alerts management and design is a critical aspect of signalling control system development. It has a direct impact on workload and the ability to respond effectively in an emergency. The way that all indications and alerts are presented must be consistent with the user interface design model and interaction processes associated with each specific VSCS. A detailed analysis of the alerts generated and displayed to the signaller has allowed a set of requirements to be generated which should ensure that alerts and alarms are effective and allow the signaller to take any appropriate action as required.
Automated real-time railway traffic control: an experimental analysis of reliability, resilience and robustness
Published in Transportation Planning and Technology, 2018
Francesco Corman, Egidio Quaglietta, Rob M. P. Goverde
The framework is composed of two main interacting modules that are an optimal scheduler of train services and an accurate simulator of railway operations (called simulated operations). For all control schemes, we manage traffic by retiming and reordering while considering train routes as those scheduled. Figure 2 functionally describes the four control approaches, in terms of, how the modules and the input of our framework interact. Arrows represent information sharing, causal relation, input–output relations between the modules. Dotted arrows refer to the approximated inclusion of effects and information. Inputs of the scheduler and the simulator are all the characteristics regarding the infrastructure (e.g. block sections, speed limits, track length, gradients), the rolling stock (e.g. mass, length, number of coaches, tractive-effort speed curve), the signalling and the safety systems such as automatic train protection (ATP) and interlocking. Train entrance delays are known in their realized value only by the simulator, while only their expected value is known by the scheduler. Moreover, random dwell time extensions are considered in the simulator, whose realized values are unknown to the scheduler (which is only aware of their scheduled values). These assumptions reproduce what happens in real-life operations where the traffic control centre has only limited or even missing information on delays and traffic disturbances.