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An approach for an operational vulnerability assessment for naval ships using a Markov model
Published in Pentti Kujala, Liangliang Lu, Marine Design XIII, 2018
A.C. Habben Jansen, A.A. Kana, J.J. Hopman
In (Kim & Lee, 2012) a vulnerability assessment methodology is proposed that identifies several critical components, and then calculates the probability of their availability based on the vulnerable area. Several probabilistic tools are compared, such as a Poisson process and a Markov chain. Both the physical and the logical architecture are considered in this methodology. Another method where physical and logical architecture are combined, is described in (van Oers et al., 2012). The ship is divided in compartments bounded by decks and bulkheads, and system components are assigned to compartments (physical architecture). In addition, a routing algorithm is added to connect the different system components (logical architecture). The routings are represented as a network. A genetic algorithm is used to minimize the total number of disabled systems after hits and the total length of all networks, which can both be seen as a metric for the system vulnerability.
FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL SERVICES
Published in Fred Hall, Roger Greeno, Building Services Handbook, 2011
minimal. The enclosure itself should be gas tight and there must be no access from a stairway. Where access panels or doors are provided they should be rated at not less than half the fire resistance of the structure, and have an integrity rating of at least 30 minutes (see BS 476-22). Fire doors should be fitted with self closers. Where ventilation ducts pass from one compartment to another or into a services enclosure, the void made in the fire resisting construction must be made good with a suitable fire stopping material. Automatic fire dampers are also required in this situation to prevent fire spreading between compartments.
Introduction to Port Security Management
Published in Kenneth Christopher, Port Security Management, 2014
In its 2002 guidance to ship owners, operators, shipmasters, and crews, the IMO published advisory information on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The IMO advisory outlined risk prevention measures and alternative responses to acts of piracy and robbery and emphasized the need to report such attacks, even the unsuccessful ones. In addition to the hijacking of ships, and the theft of cargo, the main targets of the Southeast Asian attacker, predominant at the time, appeared to be cash in the ship’s safe, crew possessions, and any other portable ship’s equipment, even including coils of rope. In South America, some piracy and armed robbery attacks were observed as being drug related. Regarding evidence of tampering with containers, it has been suggested that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry. A thorough checking of ships’ compartments and securing them before leaving ports is therefore recommended (International Maritime Organization 2002, p. 3). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the worst case of international terrorism in modern times, the IMO obviously raised concerns for maritime interests that the threat of terrorism could be extended to threats against shipping at sea and in ports around the world. Of note, the IMO discourages seafarers from carrying firearms, citing varying laws of flag states, hazards to persons and cargo, and risks of attackers using and targeting ship personnel with firearms. The IMO does not specifically endorse the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships, leaving it to ship owners, operators, companies, and flag states to decide (International Maritime Organization 2013a, par. 15).
Numerical investigation into motion responses of the intact and damaged DTMB 5415 based on the AMR method in regular waves
Published in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2023
XinLong Zhang, Ping Li, Simone Mancini
As shown in Figures 12–15, the symmetric flooding processes of the damaged ship in different sea conditions are presented respectively. It can be found that the transient water ingress simultaneously floods the damaged compartment and the bottom compartment. The flooding water accumulated in these two compartments will temporally form asymmetric flooding. When the subsequent flooding water flows from the openings on the longitudinal bulkhead and the internal deck to the adjacent intact compartment, the previously formed asymmetric flooding will be gradually offset to generate the final symmetric flooding. This also explains why the roll motion curves in Figure 16 always increase firstly and then decrease. It can also be found from the roll motion curves in Figure 16 that the flooding process in head waves always lags behind the flooding process in still water. This is because when the damaged ship is in still water, with the sinking of the damaged ship, the hydrostatic pressure at the damaged opening section is increasing, and the flooding volume is increasing until the flooding process finishes. However, for the flooding process of the damaged ship in head waves, the height of the free surface at the damage opening section is changing periodically as the waves advance. Some flooding water can exit from the damaged opening due to the pressure difference between the inside and outside of the damaged compartment.
Allowable differential air pressure during offshore transportation of composite bucket foundation
Published in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2023
Xinyi Li, Jijian Lian, Zhaolin Jia, Han Wu, Shuaiqi He, Xiaoxu Zhang, Qixiang Zhao
Because the differential air pressure between compartments required for leveling the eccentric load during the floatation test is 1.48 kPa, the conditions of 1 and 2 kPa differential air pressure between compartments were selected for analysis. Figure 6 shows that the stress of the bulkhead structure is 78.59 MPa because of the differential air pressure of 1 kPa between compartments. The maximum stress occurred at the welds between the bulkhead and bucket skirt and the mid-compartment bulkhead; the maximum deformation of the bulkhead structure reached 11.99 cm at the middle and upper parts of the bulkhead structure. Figure 7 shows that the differential air pressure of 2 kPa between compartments causes the maximum stress of the bulkhead structure to reach 152 MPa, and the maximum displacement of the bulkhead reaches 23.85 cm. Although the stress of the bulkhead structure did not exceed its plastic damage value, the differential air pressure had an excessive effect on the deformation of the bulkhead structure, which in turn affected the penetration installation of the CBF. Hence, the influence of the differential air pressure on the bulkhead deformation is crucial for controlling the differential air pressure.
Integrating vulnerability analysis into the early stage distributed naval ship system design process
Published in Journal of Marine Engineering & Technology, 2022
M. F. van Diessen, E. A. E. Duchateau, A. A. Kana, J. J. Hopman
The algorithm requires several types of input. First of all the constraining physical architecture needs to be defined. The relations between spaces can be defined using network graphs as used in Duchateau et al. (2018). Different kind of relations are defined in the subdivision network (which spaces are physically adjacent), routing network (which spaces are adjacent and can contain a path, i.e. excluding tanks and exhaust) and a damage adjacency network (can spaces transfer damage to adjacent spaces, e.g. preventing damage to transfer to adjacent spaces when separated by a blast bulkhead). Besides the relations between spaces, physical properties of each space such as the Centre of Gravity (COG), dimensions and position relative to the outer hull (i.e. is the space located on port/starboard or at the bow/aft) are defined. The spaces do not necessarily need to represent actual spaces and are more likely subdivisions of a compartment, due to the early design stage (e.g. a compartment subdivided in forward and aft part, and port/centre/starboard side). The physical dimensions of the spaces limit the damage extents which can be considered, as will be discussed below.