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A neurophysiological data driven framework for assessing mental workload of seafarers
Published in C. Guedes Soares, T.A. Santos, Trends in Maritime Technology and Engineering Volume 2, 2022
To demonstrate the generic conceptual framework, a case study using a ship bridge simulator to investigate seafarers’ mental workload in ship collision avoidance was conducted (Fan et al., 2021). The case aimed at investigating how mental workload influences neurophysiological activation and decision making of experienced and inexperienced deck officers concerning collision avoidance. It was developed with simulated watchkeeping tasks in a ship bridge simulator. The mental workload was induced by a voyage along a North/South axis and participants were required to keep watch over 180° field-of-view of the open sea. This watchkeeping period was terminated when participants spotted a “target” vessel. The decision-making period was from the end of watchkeeping period to the action made for collision avoidance. There were non-distraction and distraction groups. Here, the participants in the distraction group were required to report vessel positions and answering questions at specific points of time, which is the common task requiring temporal mental workload in the real world. During the process, fNIRS data and subjective questionnaires were collected to measure the neurophysiological activation. The time and distance of two ships in encounter were recorded to evaluate the human performance given such situations, when participants made manoeuvres for collision avoidance.
Interacting with technology
Published in Michelle Rita Grech, Tim John Horberry, Thomas Koester, HUMAN FACTORS in the MARITIME DOMAIN, 2019
Michelle Rita Grech, Tim John Horberry, Thomas Koester
Finally, the work provided an indication of the relative frequencies of various causal factors associated with SA errors in the maritime domain. The majority of SA errors were due to failure to monitor or observe data. In most cases these errors were due to momentary task distractions or high workload. However, high workload has also featured in other SA errors such as memory loss and misperception of data/information. If requirements are moderately excessive, there may be a measurable degradation in performance of simple, supportive tasks associated with the navigation and safe handling of the vessel, such as routine communications, watchkeeping, navigation, and engine room monitoring.
MASS Design and Engineering
Published in R. Glenn Wright, Unmanned and Autonomous Ships, 2020
The last part of this first criterion, the ability to create useful and actionable information based upon sensor data, is wholly limited by the imagination and innovation of researchers and the tools they create to detect objects and events relevant to seafarers and their missions. This includes all areas of engineering and deck operations and individual maritime tasks such as watchkeeping, engine operation, ship maintenance and navigation. The solution to much of this problem lies in part in success in automation of onboard systems and proper verification of development practices, validation of operational outcomes, and extensive testing to detect frailties of implementation.
Beyond the ISM code: a conceptual proposal for an integrated system within the Seven C’s approach
Published in Maritime Policy & Management, 2021
Sedat Baştuğ, Ender Asyali, Turgay Battal
The Paris MOU Statistics (2018) suggest that deficiencies are decreasing, which might indicate that the ISM Code is being quite successfully implemented within Europe. However, the European Maritime Safety Agency (2016) reports that maritime casualties and accidents have increased dramatically, with ISM-related deficiencies being the most frequent. Størkersen, Antonsen, and Kongsvik (2017) also note that ship accidents have increased although the frequency of personnel injuries has decreased. This paradox explains how safety management regulations seem to work when they include knowledge and routines that appear rational to maritime personnel, who therefore devote sufficient resources to abide by the procedures. On the other hand, the ISM Code distract navigators from focusing fully on navigation because they are forced to follow a multitude of distracting safety procedures during watchkeeping on the bridge. Thus, companies could reduce ship accidents by simplifying procedures and minimizing disturbances for navigators.
Operator’s skills and knowledge requirement in autonomous ships control centre
Published in Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Shipping, 2021
Mohammadreza Bachari-Lafteh, Abbas Harati-Mokhtari
Dybvik et al. (Deling et al. 2020) studied the challenges of designing and developing SCCs through semi-structured interviews with the research and industry community. They discussed the tasks, functions and interactions expected in the SCC along with unknown skill requirements of SCC operators. They stated that the skill requirement for operator has remained largely unknown. Although research is currently underway to develop SCC curricula, it has emphasised on learning framework hypothesis rather than the development of a tested and validated curriculum. Undoubtedly, the skills required for SCC operators are quite different from the skills of traditional seafarers. During the early stages of development, a trained seafarer with the necessary certifications in navigation and watchkeeping should be employed. Operators are trained in the basic skills required for the job only in the legal and regulatory adjustments for SCC competence needs.
The international convention for the safety of life at sea: highlighting interrelations of measures towards effective risk mitigation
Published in Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Shipping, 2021
Anish Joseph, Dimitrios Dalaklis
SOLAS 1974 is the principle Instrument by the IMO, which focusses on human life protection during shipping activities (Vassalos et al. 2010). SOLAS 1974 applies to all passenger ships and cargo ships over 500 GT engaged on international voyages (unless provided otherwise in the Convention). The MSC (and its six sub-committees3The MSC sub-committees consist of Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW), Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III), Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR), Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC), Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) & Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC).) of IMO deal with matters on maritime safety and the amendments to SOLAS 1974 (Beckman and Sun 2017). The structure of the SOLAS 1974 leads from Chapter one, which includes the specifications of types of vessels on which the Convention applies and follows by providing necessary definitions used with the Instrument. Chapter 1 also contains the details on the requisite inspection and survey regime towards maintenance of statutory certificates on-board vessels. These elements are followed by the chapters elaborating on various risks addressed by SOLAS 1974. The structure and a brief overview of salient features of SOLAS 1974 are summarized in Figure 1.