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The Dematerialization of Information
Published in Jannice Käll, Posthuman Property and Law, 2023
In a similar theme, Foray also argues that knowledge is not subject to the same “tragedy of the commons” logic that may be attributed to physical goods if too many actors (over) utilize a physical resource (2006: 14–19). In brief, the tragedy of the commons is generally told as a story about why property is needed since common resources would otherwise be overexploited. For example, those who believe in these ideas have argued that if several herds all have access to a specific grazing area, they would all attempt to reap the most benefits from it. This would also lead to a situation in which the resource is destroyed due to overuse and no one would be better off in the long term as no one would be able to use the resource. The tragedy of the commons therefore implies that resources cannot be held in common as this produces overuse of such resources, since everyone with surplus would be prone to maximising their own use of such a resource. This idea builds upon several assumptions but probably most prominently that the people that jointly resides on a surface consists of a group of humans that are all so-called homo oeconomicus, or individual well-fare maximizers. Also, the idea that a “tragedy of the commons” emerges if property ownership is not designated to a joint resource as it otherwise would be subject to over exploitation, builds upon the idea that all resources are limited in use.
Taking Responsibility for Our Actions: Why It Is Time to Think About Stewardship
Published in Darren Dalcher, Rethinking Project Management for A Dynamic and Digital World, 2022
Indeed, if only one individual were to deposit a padlock on a single bridge, the overall impact of a relatively harmless action would be negligible. However, if everyone starts to behave in that same manner, impacting overall resources or common assets, it is no longer harmless. Ecologists, economists and social scientists refer to this effect as the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), as a shared resource is destroyed as a result of mass action and exploitation by many individuals all acting independently according to their self-interest. The combined effect of many such collective actions is to erode, deplete, spoil and destroy the common resource. In this context, ‘the commons’ is taken to mean any shared and unregulated resource, ranging from the natural atmosphere, beauty spots, open space, rivers, oceans, lakes, energy, trees, oil, coal and animals, bird and fish stock, to the artificial, man-made artefacts including roads, highways, bridges, parks and monuments.
Ethics and the Environment
Published in Rebecca Mirsky, John Schaufelberger, Professional Ethics for the Construction Industry, 2022
Rebecca Mirsky, John Schaufelberger
When many people share a common resource, such as the earth’s atmosphere, minerals, trees, or the fish in the ocean, there is a risk of severely depleting that resource if each individual believes he or she is entitled to an amount deemed necessary for his or her own short term, personal gain or best interest. In the absence of regulations that place limits on how much each person can take for their own benefit, there is no incentive or motivation for individuals to preserve the resource for the common good. This phenomenon is referred to as the “tragedy of the commons.” Many environmental regulations that are in place today attempt to prevent the tragedy of the commons and subsequent resource depletion.
Socio-environmental management of reclaimed asphalt pavement (RAP) through a socio-ecological system approach: governance, adaptation, and long-term stability
Published in Australian Journal of Civil Engineering, 2023
Mateus Valdevino de Siqueira, Osires de Medeiros Melo Neto, Anelise Martins de Azevedo, Ana Letícia Ramos Bezerra, Lara Pereira Tavares Mendes, Márcia Maria Rios Ribeiro
In his classic work ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Hardin (1968) argues that individuals acting independently tend to deplete a commonly shared resource as personal interests take precedence over collective ones. However, Ostrom (1990) presents a contradictory perspective by demonstrating the potential for successful management based on principles of community ownership. Ostrom (1990) identified eight principles of good governance: well-defined boundaries (1), coherence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions (2), collective decision-making arrangements (3), monitoring (4), gradual sanctions (5), conflict resolution mechanisms (6), minimal recognition of organisational rights (7), and alignment and intersectoral coordination in management (8) (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás 2010; Ostrom 2009).
Cheating in a public good game: river waste density and the impact of settlement zones on two of Indonesia’s river basins
Published in International Journal of River Basin Management, 2023
Puspita Insan Kamil, Harry Susianto, Muhammad Azmi, Luh De Dwi Jayanthi
First coined by Garrett Hardin (1968) and inspired by William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852), ‘tragedy of the commons’ refers to a natural condition in which a single human seeks to consume resources for their own personal gain; when these single actions are multiplied countless times over many thousands of individuals in a society, the cumulative impact on resources leads to their extinction. This also causes environmental conflicts in which only some parties exploit natural resources, but cause the suffering of all. For example, privileged groups such as industries burn a disproportionate amount of carbon, yet their actions directly impact members of society with a comparatively small carbon footprint. We argue that this theory is also able to explain water debris phenomena. As we question in this study, acknowledging that human settlements are more dense in downstream areas, is it possible that people who live in upstream, transition and downstream areas react differently towards communal benefit? Will people who live in more densely populated areas (downstream) give more because they tend to share with others, or give less because they are afraid of running out of resources? Will people’s reactions be affected by the varying effort required in obtaining these resources? To what extent will responses from downstream areas be determined by a knowledge of upstream activities that affect water quality?
Megaprojects: a meandering journey towards a theory of purpose, value creation and value distribution
Published in Construction Management and Economics, 2022
According to Garrett Hardin (1968), who first identified the “tragedy of the commons”, managing a common-pool resource would require a hierarchical form of governance, either through government regulation or private ownership. Olson (1965) was similarly pessimistic about the ability of individuals to maintain collective goods. Without some form of compulsion, Olson argued, individuals will not voluntarily pay their proportional share of the cost of maintaining or building a shared good but will instead free ride. Against the backdrop of claims that in collective-action situations, individuals choose to free ride and thus do not to pull their weight in the expectation others will do, Ostrom began to study the actual management of shared resources from community-owning pastures in the Alps and irrigation channels in Sri Lanka to underground water basins in California (Ostrom 1990, 2005). And her research encountered many cases of sustainable commons where the claimants had succeeded to self-organize themselves on a day-to-day basis and adapt to changing circumstances.