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Cyber-resilience
Published in Stavros Shiaeles, Nicholas Kolokotronis, Internet of Things, Threats, Landscape, and Countermeasures, 2021
E. Bellini, G. Sargsyan, D. Kavallieros
Furthermore, games can be also classified in types (based on different game theories) as follows:Cooperative/non-cooperative: in cooperative players are creating groups due to external enforcements while in non-cooperative players are mainly competing with each other individual or they are creating groups based on their interests.Symmetric/asymmetric: In symmetric games, the payoff a player relies on the strategies used while in the asymmetric the players do not have identical strategies.Zero-sum/non-zero-sum: In zero-sum games, the gain of one player is equal to the losses of another player. In non-zero-sum games, the losses and gains do not sum to zero. This means that the gain of one player does not mean the loss of another or vice versa.Simultaneous/sequential: In simultaneous games, the players either move simultaneously or the last player that moves each time does not have knowledge regarding the actions made by previous players.In sequential games, the last player that moves each time has knowledge (not perfect) regarding the actions made previously.Perfect information and imperfect information: In perfect information, all players know the previous moves other players did (e.g., chess) while imperfect implies that the players are moving simultaneously [82].Complete information and incomplete information: In complete information games, the payoff functions of all players alongside with their strategies are known while in the incomplete information game, at least one player cannot monitor either the strategies or the payoffs of the other players [85].Evolutionary game theory: In the evolutionary model the number of players in the game is changing over long periods. The rationality is not so strict which means that a group of players can make employ irrational strategies while at the same time players do not have the same level of knowledge regarding the game.Stochastic: In stochastic games, the progress of the game is based on transition probabilities [86].
Interaction between innovation choice and market-entry timing in a competitive fashion supply chain
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2023
Qiao Zhang, Jing Chen, Jun Lin
Unlike the results in Wang, Thomas, and Rudi (2014), in which the first-to-market value is always positive under a quantity competition, even if (no market-share loss), we show that the first-to-market value of Firm 2 depends on its innovation choice and δ. It can be negative if δ is sufficiently high. The reason is that as compared to the situation in a simultaneous game, the first-mover's quantity decision will negatively impact the second-mover's quantity decision in a sequential game, under quantity competition. Thus, when Firm 2 chooses a late-entry strategy, it allows Firm 1 (which has the first-mover advantage) to set a high quantity, which pushes Firm 2 to set a low quantity. Firm 2, therefore, is more willing to enter the market early to generate a relatively high quantity. Although it has to face intense competition, the profit loss due to the competition can be offset by the first-mover advantage.
Effects of different resource-sharing strategies in cloud manufacturing: a Stackelberg game-based approach
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2023
Xiaoning Cao, Hongguang Bo, Yongkui Liu, Xiaobing Liu
Strategy C: Sharing by cooperating with the operatorPlayers: The operator and two suppliersStrategies: The operator and two suppliers jointly decide the number of tasks and prices.Payoff: The objective of all players is We present the timeline of events in Figure 3. Initially, each supplier simultaneously determines their sharing strategy (i.e. Strategy A, B or C). Subsequently, if the two suppliers choose Strategy A or B, the operator and suppliers engage in a sequential game in which the operator is the Stackelberg leader. The operator announces the commission fee the suppliers must pay. It is worth noting that in the sequential game where the operator enters early and the suppliers wait, the commission fee is public information for the suppliers. Finally, if the two suppliers choose Strategy A, they engage in a simultaneous subgame because we assume that they are perfectly symmetric with an identical cost structure.
Inter-firm partnerships – strategic alliances in the pharmaceutical industry
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2018
Jiho Yoon, Claudia Rosales, Srinivas Talluri
Companies interested in developing and commercialising new drugs typically need to consider whether to develop partnerships with other companies or seek acquisition opportunities. Furthermore, if strategic partnerships are more desirable than acquisitions, companies need to determine the type of contract agreement and specific contract terms that provide greatest benefits. In this paper, we seek to provide insights into the benefits of using different types of inter-firm R&D contracts. Based on examples from the pharmaceutical industry, we explore three types of inter-firm R&D licencing agreements: (a) licencing agreement with milestone payment and the option to include an upfront payment, (b) licencing agreement with royalties and the option to include an upfront payment and (c) acquisition contract. Using a sequential game-theory approach, we provide optimal contract conditions for each licencing agreement analysed. In addition, using numerical examples, we identify system conditions that favour the use of each type of contract.