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When are groundwater data enough for decision-making?
Published in Jude Cobbing, Shafick Adams, Ingrid Dennis, Kornelius Riemann, Assessing and Managing Groundwater in Different Environments, 2013
J.J.P. Vivier, I.J. Van Der Walt
To determine the effect of data and information on the decision-making process, data from a field site were evaluated. The depth-to-groundwater level was used as the required variable on which information was required. The change in the average depth-to-groundwater level was evaluated against the increase in the number of data points. Information was gained based on the change that a data point provides against the previous value. If the average depth-to-groundwater level after e.g., 3 data points is 8 m and after e.g., the fifth data point is 10 m, then the fifth data point provided information as there was a change. This process was done for all 715 data points collected for the Middelburg Site. It indicated that the information process is logarithmic. The percentage error in the average becomes small at <5% after 30 points and very small at 0.6% after 100 data points and eventually 0.08% after 715 data points. Although it approaches zero, it is asymptotic and will never reach it. The concept of perfect data (does not exist, but was used in the same way that an ideal gas is defined in physics) is defined as data with a standard deviation of zero. In the case of perfect data, perfect information can be obtained by using one data point. Perfect information would therefore amount to 100% certainty and would idealistically allow the decision-maker to make the perfect decision.
Game Theory
Published in Paul L. Goethals, Natalie M. Scala, Daniel T. Bennett, Mathematics in Cyber Research, 2022
Nash games are, therefore, defined as games of imperfect information. Perfect information states that all knowledge available at the start of the game is still known at the end of the game. In this context perfect information relates specifically to knowing the strategy of the other player. Since a player in a Nash Game cannot be certain of the strategy another player is using, only predict their likely course of action, a Nash Game is, therefore, a game of imperfect information.
Game Theory
Published in Robert H. Chen, Chelsea Chen, Artificial Intelligence, 2022
In the board games of checkers, chess, and Go, the players know the exact state of all the pieces at every point in the game in perfect information competitive settings. In contrast, poker is an imperfect information game where there are hidden cards unknown to both the player and his opponent.
Search for parking: A dynamic parking and route guidance system for efficient parking and traffic management
Published in Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2019
Huajun Chai, Rui Ma, H. Michael Zhang
For future research, one possible extension to the current work is to study the effects of different pricing schemes. In the real world, parking garage usually employs different parking charge policy during a different time of day to regulate the incoming flow to the parking garage, which can be further studied with the proposed destination switching algorithm. In addition, in this work, we did not distinguish and examine the effects of dynamic pricing and dynamic re-routing separately. In the next step, those two parts will be studied separately. Analysis and evaluations will be performed to see whether those two can benefit each other or there are some canceling effects, and how significant the effects are. Another interesting extension topic is to study the effects of incomplete information on the performance of the proposed system. The assumption in the current research assumes that perfect information is available to re-routing vehicles. Perfect information means every detailed information is available, which is not realistic in real-world application. It is an interesting but also challenging problem to study how to use partial information to make reliable and efficient parking guidance. One last interesting topic is to consider both short term and long term parking reservation behaviors in dynamic parking and route guidance system. Overall, the implementation and expansion of the proposed system may benefit urban travelers in the long run and thus merit more future research.
Making the most of game theory in the supplier selection process for complex items
Published in Production Planning & Control, 2021
Miguel Mediavilla, Kepa Mendibil, Carolina Bernardos
Game theory often refers to a set of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact, assuming that decision-makers pursue well-defined exogenous objectives (they are rational) and take into account their knowledge or expectations of other decision-makers’ behaviour (they reason strategically) (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Dutta 1999). These interactions are also called ‘games’ and are a ‘description of strategic interactions that includes the constraints on the actions that the players can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players do take (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Games are played by a set of rules (Dutta 1999), which specify who is playing (players), what they are playing with (strategies or choices available), when each player gets to play (what is the order) and how much they stand to gain or lose (payoffs). The games can be classified depending on three dimensions (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Dixit and Skeath 1999):Non-cooperative vs. Cooperative games: the unit of decision is an individual player (non-cooperative games) or a coalition of individuals (cooperative games). During cooperative games individual participants collaboratively work of activities. On the contrary, when collaboration between participants cannot be enforced and individual participation must be allowed so that participants act solely based on the own interest, then these games are called non-cooperative.Strategic vs. Extensive games: this relates to the timing of decision making, with players making decisions simultaneously (strategic games) or consecutively (extensive games). The choice of sequential or simultaneous decision making when designing the game has an important impact on the type of interactive thinking required (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Dixit and Skeath 1999). For example, in a sequential game player’s decisions are governed by assumptions of the future consequences (If I do this, how will my opponent react?). On the other hand, simultaneous decision-making forces players to concurrently figure out their opponents’ potential decisions.Perfect vs. Imperfect information: players could have full information about each other’s decisions (perfect information) or not (imperfect information). Perfect information exists when there are no internal or external uncertainties in the game. If any uncertainty exists, the players will make decisions based on imperfect information.