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Internal Mechanism and Quality of CSR Disclosure
Published in Karen Wendt, Green and Social Economy Finance, 2021
Interestingly, current CSR literature excessively focuses on the legislative environment (Becchetti et al. 2008, Fernandez et al. 2012, Becchetti et al. 2016), firm characteristics (Brammer and Pavelin 2004, Becchetti et al. 2008), or executive features, such as gender, age, education, etc. (Fernandez et al. 2012). Other studies either discuss voluntary disclosure in general or other aspects of CSR rather than the quality of CSR disclosure (Barako et al. 2006, Barako et al. 2008, Jo and Harjoto 2012, Liao et al. 2018). Firm internal mechanisms, such as CG, are often ignored. Governance defines the power distribution and decision-making within the firm (Jamali et al. 2008). Good CG may reduce agency cost and improve communication between firm executives and stakeholders (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001, Shan and Xu 2012). Through high-quality CSR information, firms with stronger CG may be more responsive to investors and other stakeholders (Gong et al. 2018). Reciprocally high-quality CSR disclosure may reduce information asymmetry and aid the supervision and control of managers. The new CG Code (CSRC 2018) require that listed firms fulfill CSR and integrate ecological and environmental protection requirements into firm strategy and CG.
Cooperation: Conflict Resolution during Interactions
Published in Changliu Liu, Te Tang, Hsien-Chung Lin, Masayoshi Tomizuka, Designing Robot Behavior in Human-Robot Interactions, 2019
Changliu Liu, Te Tang, Hsien-Chung Lin, Masayoshi Tomizuka
A more flexible approach is to let the agent’s behavior evolve during interactions [131]. The designer only needs to specify a cost and a logic for each agent following the behavior system discussed in section 1.3 and shown in Fig. 1.2a. In this way, the multi-agent system can be self-organized [140]. The cost function determines the behavior of each agent, which can be understood as the agent’s character. In certain cases, the cost function of an agent may not be clear to other agents (as a natural situation during HRI). This scenario is called information asymmetry [175]. The problem of interest is how to design the logic so that the desired behavior will evolve even in the case of information asymmetry. This is not only important from the control point of view, but also essential in understanding how cooperation evolves among humans and how robots may cooperate with humans.
The measurement and characteristics of construction firms in theory and practice
Published in Rick Best, Jim Meikle, Describing Construction, 2023
TCE became an active research stream (reviewed by Aziz 2021). Firms mini-mise transaction costs by choosing either internal production or external supply, the make-buy decision investigated by Murray and Kulakov (2019) for international construction firms. This added another explanation for subcontracting to the flexibility and minimizing fixed costs explanation already established by Stinchcombe (1959), where specialisation by subcontractors results in lower cost of supply under specific contract conditions. The extension of TCE to construction introduced issues like the hold-up problem on required investment (Winch 2006), incentives and contracts (Ive and Chang 2007), and reframed information asymmetry between participants as a principal-agent problem (Cerić 2014).
Fiscal Risk Management of Public–Private Partnership Projects: A Multidimensional Identification and Assessment Framework
Published in Engineering Management Journal, 2023
LiPing Xu, Ning Liu, Linyu Zhou, LanQi Lu
First, standardize project operation process to improve management efficiency. Engineering managers play an important role in the operation of PPP projects. To improve the high-efficient operation of the project company, during the inception of the PPP project, the engineering managers should build up a normative and effective operation management system and a robust system of corporate governance, according to the project characteristics and equity structure. Improve the communication between parties to reduce information asymmetry. Engineering managers should effectively coordinate the relationship between the parties, and try to avoid various communication frictions. Improve management efficiency by simplifying the approval process simplify approval process. As there are many design changes in the project, it requires the project to establish a full suite of management process to reduce program redundancy in the process, so as not to affect the construction schedule.
Testing an open app-based water management information system and its uptake among stakeholders in the Upper-Comoé river basin (Burkina Faso)
Published in Water International, 2021
Sié Palé, Joost Wellens, Farid Traoré, Carla Roncoli, Abdoul-Hamid Mohamed Sallah, B. V. C. Adolphe Zangré, Bernard Tychon
For this study we adopted a principal–agent theoretical framework. This is a component of the agency theory that focuses on the ‘agency relationship’, whereby one actor – defined as the principal – ‘delegates work to another party’ – defined as the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Two areas of conflict often occur in agency relationships: divergences in principal and agent goals, and divergences in their risk perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989). Even when goals align, there is still the potential for conflict because all those involved have their own interests at heart (Ceric, 2012, p. 3). Information asymmetries, as well as the delegation of tasks, are the fundamental features of the principal–agent theory (Kim, 2020). Principal–agent relationships may involve several principals and agents (Gordon et al., 2019). This complex set of relationships is known as multilayered principal–agent dynamics or multiple principal–agent relationships (Ceric, 2012). Information asymmetry is the situation in which some of the parties are better informed than the other (Ceric, 2012, p. 2). Because of self-interest, parties may not always be willing to fully share information, thereby leading to information asymmetries and communication risk (Ceric, 2012). In the context of common pool natural resources with a multiplicity of stakeholders, such as in the Upper-Comoé river basin, these ambiguities and disconnects often lead to conflicts.
A review on supply chain contracting with information considerations: information updating and information asymmetry
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2019
Bin Shen, Tsan-Ming Choi, Stefan Minner
Information updating is an important process for supply chain learning (Silbermayr and Minner 2016). Information updating has two aspects: one is using information to update the prior knowledge to the posterior one, and the other is using one member’s private information to update another member’s information. More specifically, demand information updating refers to the case in which the retailer uses information to revise previous demand or forecast information to the next one and make more accurate demand forecast. Supply information updating implies that the supplier or manufacturer uses supply information to update its prior knowledge to the posterior one. Information asymmetry refers to the scenario in which some information (e.g. cost information, demand information, supply information, etc.) is private and not public to all supply chain members. As a result, information asymmetry exists within the supply chain. Information updating or sharing can overcome or mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. Information updating is commonly examined by methods such as Bayesian updating (e.g. the use of conjugate pairs, Wu 2005), forecast evolution (Güllü 1997) and rolling horizon planning (Tsay and Lovejoy 1999).