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Substitution inconsistencies in Transparent Intensional Logic
Published in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 2021
Miloš Kosterec
The failure of substitution of intensionally equivalent terms in many philosophically relevant contexts (knowing, believing, thinking about, claiming, … ) led to the postulation of hyperintensional contexts and hyperintensional entities (e.g. structured propositions). A plethora of systems have been developed to investigate hyperintensional phenomena. These can be roughly divided into structuralist and non-structuralist accounts. Structuralists usually posit some hyperintensional entity to stand for the meaning of a language term. Although non-structuralists accept the existence of hyperintensional phenomena, they deal with the problems they present by using weaker logics with semantics that are often specified using the notion of impossible worlds.1