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Toward a General Logicist Methodology for Engineering Ethically Correct Roborts
Published in Wendell Wallach, Peter Asaro, Machine Ethics and Robot Ethics, 2020
Selmer Bringsjord, Konstantine Arkoudas, Paul Bello
Our answer to the questions of how to ensure ethically correct robot behavior is, in brief, to insist that robots only perform actions that can be proved ethically permissible in a human-selected deontic logic. A deontic logic formalizes an ethical code—that is, a collection of ethical rules and principles. Isaac Asimov introduced a simple (but subtle) ethical code in his famous Three Laws of Robotics:3A robot may not harm a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.A robot must protect its own existence, as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
Arguing about constitutive and regulative norms
Published in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 2018
Gabriella Pigozzi, Leendert van der Torre
The first requirement is representing violations by distinguishing ‘is’ from ‘ought’. A violation is represented as a conflict between what is the case and what ought to be the case. David Hume introduced the so-called is–ought problem, which roughly means that there is a fundamental difference between positive statements and prescriptive or normative statements. The is–ought problem can be considered in two directions. First, what is the case cannot be the basis for what ought to be the case. This is related to G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy using natural properties as the basis of moral properties. Second, what ought to be the case cannot be the basis for what is the case. This is related to the fallacy of wishful thinking: an agent may desire to win the lottery, but from that desire he should not deduce that he will win the lottery. Likewise, in a kind of deontic wishful thinking, an agent should not deduce from the mere fact that he is obliged to review a paper, that he will actually do it. We call agents realistic if they do not make such fallacious inferences. The fundamental distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is the main reason why deontic logic is normally formalised as a branch of modal logic. It distinguishes brute facts like p from deontic facts like obligations Op and permissions Pp, and it represents violations by mixed formulas like .