China
Africa
Explore chapters and articles related to this topic
Strategy Learning
Published in Hamidou Tembine, Distributed Strategic Learning for Wireless Engineers, 2018
Example 2.3.8.6. An n–player congestion game is a game in which each player’s strategy consists of a set of resources, and the cost of the set of strategy, say, depends only on the number of players using each resource, i.e., the cost takes the form ce(ξe(a)), where ξe(a) is the number of players using resource e and ce is a nonnegative increasing function. A standard example is a network congestion game on a directed graph (e.g. road or transportation network [21]), in which each player must select a path from some source to some destination, and each edge has an associated delay function that increases with the number of players using the edge. It is well known that this game admits potential function, Vn(ξ)=−∑e∫0ξe(a)ce(y)dy.
Setting production capacities for production agents making selfish routing decisions
Published in International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing, 2018
H. Blunck, D. Armbruster, J. Bendul
Congestion Games (Rosenthal 1973) are a particular type of game, where every player has to choose a combination of facilities. The payoff for each player is a function of the number of players who choose this strategy, meaning that players experience congestion whenever they concentrate on certain facilities. Rosenthal (1973) already suggested to use congestion games to model the behaviour of road users and the interplay of supply and demand of production capacity (c.f. Holzman and Law-Yone 1997; Meyers and Schulz 2012). In particular, we may equate strategies with path choices in a network and attain a network congestion game (c.f. Meyers and Schulz 2012). By studying these games, we can bring the advantages of game theory to the study of interactions between players and queuing networks.