China
Africa
Explore chapters and articles related to this topic
Accident Causation and Investigation Techniques
Published in W. David Yates, Safety Professional’s Reference and Study Guide, 2020
Based on Human Factors Theory, accidents are entirely the result of human error. These errors are categorized broadly as: Overload The work task is beyond the capability of the worker – Environmental factors (noise, distractions, etc.),– Internal factors (personal problems, emotional stress),– Situational factors (unclear instructions, risk level).
In Search of Safety
Published in James Reason, The Human Contribution, 2017
There will probably be some relationship between an organisation’s position along the resistance-vulnerability dimension and the number of bad events it suffers during a given accounting period, but it is likely to be a very tenuous one. If, and only if, the system managers had complete control over all the accident-producing conditions within their organisations would we expect their accident and incident rates to bear a direct relationship to the quality of their efforts. But this is not the case. Chance also plays a large part in accident causation. So long as operational hazards, local variations and human fallibility continue to exist, chance can combine with them in ways that breach the system’s defences.1 Thus, even the most resistant organisations can still have bad accidents. By the same token, even the most vulnerable organisations can evade disaster, at least for a time. Luck works both ways: it can afflict the deserving and protect the unworthy.
Accident Causation and Investigation Techniques
Published in W. David Yates, Safety Professional’s, 2015
On the basis of the Human Factors Theory, accidents are entirely the result of human error. These errors are categorized broadly as Overload The work task is beyond the capability of the worker – Environmental factors (noise, distractions, etc.)– Internal factors (personal problems, emotional stress)– Situational factors (unclear instructions, risk level)
Design and construction of an Unintentional Injury Risk Index (UIRI) to measure frequency and severity of accidental injuries in Europe
Published in International Journal of Injury Control and Safety Promotion, 2018
To the extent that it reveals the existence of risk factors that increase the probability of being the victim of an accident, and measures of prevention that reduce and/or limit the severity of the consequences (Baker & Haddon, 1974; Melinder & Andersson, 2001), we cannot consider an accident to be a random event. We have to think in terms of the probability of the occurrence of the event and severity of its consequences (injuries). The concept of risk is operationalized as the probability of the event multiplied by the severity of the injuries. The data refer specifically to unintentional injuries to distinguish these from other injuries produced by external causes, but of an intentional nature and that tend to appear together in databases on deaths.
Research on effective recognition of alarm signals in a human–machine system based on cognitive neural experiments
Published in International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics, 2023
Yun Teng, Yuwei Sun, Xinlin Chen, Mei Zhang
In the human–machine system, there is a ‘surface’ of interaction between human and machine, and all human–machine information exchanges occur on this surface, which is usually called the human–machine interface. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the problem of the human–computer interface has attracted people’s attention. Many major safety accidents are caused by improper human–machine interface design. Many experiences and lessons have shown that unreasonable human–machine interface design will lead to operator errors and reduce system operation. It can even cause major accidents and cause physical or psychological damage to operators. Many occupational diseases also stem from unreasonable operating environments or work postures [5,6]. Wiggles Worth [7] proposed a human error accident model based on human information processing in 1972. Human error in response to alarm signals is caused by human error in response to stimulus information. Human error is the basis of all types of accidents. Human error means that a person responds to an external stimulus incorrectly or inappropriately. In the process of production operation, all kinds of information constantly act on the operator’s senses and stimulate the operator. If the operator can make a correct response to the stimulus, the accident will not occur. If the operator makes a wrong or improper response, there will be danger [8,9]. The highly automated human–machine interface requires humans to quickly and accurately perceive and recognize visual, auditory and tactile signals. However, the transition from performing tasks to monitoring tasks inhibits the ability of humans to detect key signals and detect warning signals, resulting in human cognitive load increases.
Risk analysis on Beijing metro operation initiated by human factors
Published in Journal of Transportation Safety & Security, 2019
Wenying Chen, Yifan Zhang, Mohammad T. Khasawneh, Zhao Geng
It is a well-known fact that human errors contribute to most safety accidents (Reason, 1990). When the metro network expands, its operational complexity also increases. Due to these increasing complexities in the metro network, any operator errors or unsafe passenger behaviors can lead to cessation of metro network's operations resulting in even catastrophic failures in the network. For example, in the 2003 Daegu metro accident, a fire is triggered by an incendiary. The operator failed to evacuate passengers on time when the power went off, and the dispatcher did not stop the second train from entering the fire zone, causing a death toll of more than 198 people (Wang & Fang, 2014). Xu (2012) stated that 19.02% of the total 510 Metro incidents that occurred in China in recent years were caused by passenger behaviors and 2.16% by staff errors. In Beijing, between 2008 and 2011, there were 28 incidents that were caused by passengers falling from the platform to the tracks, resulting in eight deaths and two injuries. The historical incident data show that the number of delay incidents resulting from passengers, operators' behavior (over 5-minute delays), have increased during 2012 to 2015, causing negative effects such as cessation of metro lines and rectification, and increased the risk of incidents. As shown in Table 1, the rates of driver violations that caused 5-minute delayed incidents in 2014 and 2015 are 3.03% and 2.65%, respectively, that is, almost three times more than in 2012 and 2013. Similarly, the rates of passenger behaviors that caused 5-minute delayed events in 2014 and 2015 are 20.2% and 22%, respectively. Hence, it is necessary to determine the causal relationship between human factors and metro operation events to identify the metro's risk management actions.