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IPD from a participant trust and commitment perspective
Published in Derek H. T. Walker, Steve Rowlinson, Routledge Handbook of Integrated Project Delivery, 2019
Peter Davis, Derek H. T. Walker
Figure 13.1 explains the dynamics of a risk event (the grey box content) and how the risk is perceived and the outcome result anticipated, based on the innate propensity-to-trust level. However, we argue that the trustor does not automatically perceive a risk and the outcome to automatically update the trustor’s propensity to trust, as is indicated in the Mayer et al. (1995, p715) model. We suggest that a more cognitive, intensive process takes place. Kahneman (2011) offers a model of two systems of thinking: thinking fast and slow. System-1 thinking operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control (p21), while System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration (p22). Figure 13.1 illustrates System-2 thinking at work as a more conscious effort although we also envisage how System-1 thinking could lead to similar inputs, as indicated in the figure, but the cognitive intensity is lower and more automatic and intuitive. The trustor’s willingness and ability to make an informed judgement in evaluating the risk-event outcome is subject to several influences. An explanation follows.
Contesting control: journeys through surrender, self-awareness and looseness of control in embodied interaction
Published in Human–Computer Interaction, 2021
Steve Benford, Richard Ramchurn, Joe Marshall, Max L. Wilson, Matthew Pike, Sarah Martindale, Adrian Hazzard, Chris Greenhalgh, Maria Kallionpää, Paul Tennent, Brendan Walker
A second relevant notion of dualism is to be found in dual-process theories from psychology that divide the mental processes that govern human behavior into two categories of thinking known as the ‘automatic mind’ (more formally called System 1) and the ‘reflective mind’ (System 2) (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). System 1 thinking has been characterized as being fast, parallel and automatic, requiring little or no effort, whereas System 2 has been described as effortful, slow, serial, and working in a controlled fashion. A planned decision is typically considered as System 2 thinking whereas an immediate reaction such as “disgust” corresponds to System 1. However, the two systems interact with each other, with System 1 suggesting feelings, impressions, and intuitions to System 2 that may be directly adopted with little modification (Kahneman, 2011). A widely studied technique for driving System 1 thinking is to deliver subliminal stimuli which fall below the level of conscious awareness (Dehaene et al., 2006). This dualism has been adopted by psychologists and behavioral economists who are exploring the challenges and possibilities for behavior change, and who have shown that subtle changes in behaviors can occur without the human being aware of them, leading to distinctions between mindful and mindless thinking (Langer, 2000). These theories have been taken up by HCI researchers who have incorporated them into the theoretical underpinning of persuasive computing (Pinder et al., 2018) and taken them as inspiration for the approach of ‘mindless computing’ in which persuasive technologies subtly influence behaviors without conscious awareness, for example, through plates whose lighting changes the color of food or gently pitch shifting people’s voices when they speak (Adams et al., 2015).