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Loopholes in IoT Security Services
Published in Syed Rameem Zahra, Mohammad Ahsan Chishti, Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things, 2020
Shafalika Vijayal, Salim Qureshi
This does not mean that nothing can be done; consider the earlier statistics from CyberX which has studied over 3000 networks of IoT. The risk of exposure of personal information through implementation of smart homes, smart cars, smart healthcare, etc. increases by the expansion of IoT domain. Some IoT security issues include:Abla El Bekkali et al.[2] state that in 2014, Stuxnet attack affected the Iranian Nuclear Project.In 2016, the Jeep SUV hack was listed listed by Abla El Bekkali et al. [2] state [2].In 2016, a malevolent botnet was featured by the security specialists of Sucuri stated by Abla El Bekkali et al. [2].
What Is Cybersecurity?
Published in Wayne Patterson, Cynthia E. Winston-Proctor, Behavioral Cybersecurity, 2019
Wayne Patterson, Cynthia E. Winston-Proctor
In addition to these actions by individuals or small organizations, in early 2010, an extremely sophisticated worm called Stuxnet was launched (Nakashima and Warrick, 2012). Spread via Windows, it targeted Siemens software and equipment. It only attacked Siemens Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA) computers. It successfully infected five Iranian organizations related to the Iranian government's processing plants for the enrichment of uranium (either for nuclear power or nuclear weapons, depending on your political perspectives). The result was that the Iranian government indicated that the damage to the enrichment infrastructure cost was the equivalent of $10 million and set the Iranian nuclear program back by an estimated 2 years. The Stuxnet virus was sufficiently sophisticated that most studies of this virus concluded that it could only be built by government levels of organization and investment. It was later discovered that in fact Stuxnet was a joint operation of the United States National Security Agency and Israel's Mossad.
Intelligent Software-Defined Security
Published in Dijiang Huang, Ankur Chowdhary, Sandeep Pisharody, Software-Defined Networking and Security, 2018
Dijiang Huang, Ankur Chowdhary, Sandeep Pisharody
StuxnetStuxNet is a malware that was discovered in 2010; it targets SCADA systems and is believed to have caused substantial damage to Iran's nuclear program. Stuxnet specifically targeted programmable logic controllers (PLCs)programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which are used for automation of machinery on factory assembly lines, adventure parks, and nuclear facility centrifuges. The malware used by Stuxnet targeted Microsoft Windows OS, network software, and Siemens Step7 software. Stuxnet collected critical information from the PLCs situated in Iranian nuclear facility and caused a fast spinning of PLC controlled centrifuges, causing centrifuges to tear themselves apart. The worm affected 200,000 computers in the nuclear plant, causing 1000 machines to physically degrade.
A survey on the recent development of securing the networked control systems
Published in Systems Science & Control Engineering, 2019
In 2010, the first nuclear power station in Iran was attacked by Stuxnet which was a malicious computer worm targeting industrial computer systems. The nuclear program of Iran was delayed seriously by the Stuxnet attack (Langner, 2011).In April 2016, a nuclear power plant in Germany was attacked by ‘Conficke’ and ‘W32.Ramnit’ viruses which were discovered at the nuclear power plant's Block B Information Technology (IT) networks that handled the fuel handling system.In November 2016, San Francisco's Municipal Railway was hacked, which seriously resulted in the unavailability of the railway fare system.In December 2016, Ukraine Electric Grid was attacked simultaneously at three regional power firms, which led to electricity black-out for 225,000 Ukrainian power customers. Before attacks, adversaries prepared for six months of reconnaissance, then they broke into the utility's networks via attack.
Enhancing cyber-physical security in manufacturing through game-theoretic analysis
Published in Cyber-Physical Systems, 2018
Zach DeSmit, Aditya U. Kulkarni, Christian Wernz
A notable example of a cyberattack exploiting the autonomous nature of cyber-physical systems was the Stuxnet virus, which targeted the Iranian uranium enrichment facility in Natanz [9]. The Stuxnet virus caused close to 1000 centrifuges to spin out of control while relaying normal process data to the operator. Since the normal process data were used to monitor the state of the centrifuges instead of physical inspections, the Stuxnet virus caused a significant reduction in the lifetime of the centrifuges [10]. The Stuxnet virus attack demonstrated the significant impact of a successfully executed cyber-physical attack within a cyber-physical system.
Security of networked control systems subject to deception attacks: a survey
Published in International Journal of Systems Science, 2022
Zhong-Hua Pang, Lan-Zhi Fan, Haibin Guo, Yuntao Shi, Runqi Chai, Jian Sun, Guo-Ping Liu
On the other hand, the presence of communication networks in NCSs also brings several new challenges. One of them is that malicious adversaries can utilise public and vulnerable natures of networks to launch cyber attacks to achieve their destructive intentions on NCSs (D. Ding et al., 2021; D. Ding & Han et al., 2018; W. He et al., 2022; Y.-G. Li & Yang, 2022; X. Wang et al., 2022; Y. Xu et al., 2021; X.-M. Zhang et al., 2022). The earliest cyber attack event occurred in 1982, which led to the explosion of a Siberia pipeline (Onyeji et al., 2014). In recent years, cyber attack incidents on NCSs frequently appeared around the world. Several typical cases are listed as follows. In 2010, Stuxnet severely damaged Iran's nuclear facilities and ultimately delayed the operation of the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran, which was seen as the first destructive virus designed specifically for industrial control systems (T. M. Chen & Abu-Nimeh, 2011).In 2011, five global energy and oil companies suffered from a series of attacks including social engineering, trojans and Windows-based exploits (Cherdantseva et al., 2016).In 2012, Flame attacked the industrial systems in Iran, Israel, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (Miller &Rowe, 2012).In 2013, Havex emerged to spy on critical infrastructures primarily in Europe and the United States, which was a backdoor malware and affected critical infrastructures by compromising communication protocols (Makrakis et al., 2021).In 2015, a power grid in Ukraine was attacked by a Black Energy virus that caused power outages lasting for several hours. After nearly one year, the power grid in Kiev was intruded again in 2016, which resulted in about 225,000 customers without electric power (Hemsley & Fisher, 2018).In 2017, WannaCry was a ransomware that encrypted the storage files in attacked computers and demanded ransom from victims, which hit many companies, universities, hospitals and governments with over 200,000 victims (Mohurle &Patil, 2017).In 2019, the hydroelectric power plant in Venezuela, Guri was hacked by a cyber attack that disrupted the power supply of 18 states including the capital, Caracas, causing massive traffic congestion (Cao et al., 2021).In 2020, the MailTo ransomware attacked Australian Shipping and Logistics Company Toll Group for three consecutive months, which forced it to provide many of its customer services off-line (Chowdhury et al., 2022).