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Substation Automation and Control
Published in Ramesh Bansal, Power System Protection in Smart Grid Environment, 2019
Adeyemi Charles Adewole, Raynitchka Tzoneva
The Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) was initially developed as a proprietary protocol by Westronic Inc., (now GE Harris) in 1990 for client stations communications between RTUs and other IEDs. In 1993, it became a public domain protocol. It was originally designed for SCADA applications for the acquisition of information and sending of low- to medium-speed control commands between devices. DNP3 has been widely accepted for use in the electrical, water, oil and gas, and security sectors. The purpose of DNP3 is to transmit relatively small packets of data in a reliable manner, with the messages involved arriving in a deterministic sequence. It is a layered protocol with three layers (physical, data, and application layers) and one pseudo layer (pseudo transport layer). Application data may be any size, even zero (e.g., for a command signal). This is broken into multiple application protocol data units (APDUs), or fragments, with a size limit of 2048 bytes. Breaking longer messages into multiple packets helps optimize error control.
Capacitor Application
Published in T. A. Short, Electric Power Distribution Handbook, 2018
DNP 3.0 (Distributed Network Protocol) is the most widely used standard protocol for capacitor controllers (DNP Users Group, 2000). It originated in the electric industry in America with Harris Distributed Automation Products and was based on drafts of the IEC870-5 SCADA protocol standards (now known as IEC 60870-5). DNP supports master–slave and peer-to-peer communication architectures. The protocol allows extensions while still providing interoperability. Data objects can be added to the protocol without affecting the way that devices interoperate. DNP3 was designed for transmitting data acquisition information and control commands from one computer to another. (It is not a general-purpose protocol for hypertext, multimedia, or huge files.)
Communication Infrastructure for Smart Microgrids
Published in Sasi K. Kottayil, Smart Microgrids, 2020
DNP3 provides multiplexing, data fragmentation, error checking, link control, prioritization, and physical addressing services for user data and also defines a transport function and an application layer that defines functions and generic data types appropriate for normal SCADA applications. The DNP3 protocol supports time synchronization with a RTU and has time stamped variants of all point data objects so that it is still possible to reconstruct a sequence of events to know what happened in between the data polls from the master (Figure 3.49).
Novel resilient compensator design for FDI attack mitigation on AGC system
Published in International Journal of Modelling and Simulation, 2023
In a power plant, frequency regulation is conventionally enforced through the set-point control of governors. Using the distributed network protocol DNP3, which is part of IEC-60870-5, the standard protocol for the control and protection of electrical power systems using SCADA, the area control centres calculate set points on the basis of received frequency and tie-line power measurements. Communication between different elements and entities is designed, while adhering to the IEC-60870-5 protocol, by means of a customisation specific to the utility.
Integration of SCADA and Industrial IoT: Opportunities and Challenges
Published in IETE Technical Review, 2023
A. Nechibvute, H. D. Mafukidze
Traditional SCADA systems are designed as fairly centralized systems which are not well integrated with ordinary corporate networks. In fact, the stand-alone nature, isolation from corporate networks and limited functionality have not been a critical concern in the past. However the landscape has since changed, and a record number of serious attacks on SCADA systems have been reported post-1990 [47,48]. When it comes to security in general, traditional SCADA systems have some notable challenges, namely: SCADA systems are designed without security as a priority; SCADA protocols (i.e. MODBUS and DNP3) are inherently insecure. SCADA systems have an over-reliance on the physical security of nodes at the expense of the real security of the entire system. Detailed presentation of the security challenges in SCADA and critical–infrastructure is presented elsewhere [49–52]. The security vulnerabilities of conventional SCADA systems primarily emanate from limited security considerations of systems, particularly around safety-critical engineering, as well as technical limitations. Some of the weak security features of SCADA are effectively mitigated by integration with an IIoT solution that allows for a significant reduction in the chances of data breaching. With the industry 4.0 vision in mind, cybersecurity has become one of the most important dimensions especially when it comes to the digital smart plant concept and data-driven production management. The proliferation of a wide range of IoT technologies and devices may attract some vendors whose products have compromised security communication protocols [9]. Hence, there is a need to continuously address the emerging IoT security issues and their deployments in critical industries [53]. Table 3 summarizes some highlighted IIoT/SCADA challenges and proposed solutions.
SCADA Research Lab Kit for Educational Institutes
Published in IETE Journal of Education, 2019
Lagineni Mahendra, Rajesh Kalluri, R.K. Senthil Kumar, B.S. Bindhumadhava, G.L. Ganga Prasad
To achieve interoperability among all the devices in the SCADA system, all devices should follow the standard communication protocols like IEC 60870-5-101[3], IEC 60870-5-104 [4], MODBUS serial, MODBUS TCP [5], DNP3, etc. These protocols are widely used to communicate among IEDs, PLCs, RTUs, and control centre in industries like Oil, Gas, Water, Transportation, Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution, etc.