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The Theory of the Mind
Published in Niklas Hageback, The Virtual Mind, 2017
However, one of the key issues that still persist and need resolve is the mind's subjective experience of the information and perceptions that it acquires and processes, such as the manner in which two persons could describe a colour or a particular taste distinctively different, which a computer operating on Boolean logic cannot replicate; the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, the aforementioned qualia.21
Framing the Mind–Body Problem in Contemporary Neuroscientific and Sunni Islamic Theological Discourse
Published in The New Bioethics, 2018
Faisal Qazi, Don Fette, Syed S. Jafri, Aasim I. Padela
Despite its rich history of philosophical refinement, scientific development, and more recent calls for paradigm shifts, the mind–body(-soul) problem indeed remains what David Chalmers has been attributed to calling the hard problem of consciousness and subjective experience – one that faces a seemingly insurmountable explanatory gap or gaps in understanding the link between mental and physical substances (from the dualist perspective) and the link between the objective physical changes in the brain and the subjective experience of the individual feeling them (from a materialist perspective). Turning to other discourses such as modern neuroscience or Islamic theology may help to bridge this seemingly Gordian gap. Thus bringing the philosophical discourse on the mind–body problem into dialogue with other, more seemingly disparate, discourses that approach the problem with points of view that are disciplinarily different yet share a common thematic scaffolding for substance dualism is in order.
Comfort requirements versus lived experience: combining different research approaches to indoor environmental quality
Published in Architectural Science Review, 2020
S. Willems, D. Saelens, A. Heylighen
Still unexplained is ‘the hard problem of consciousness’, i.e. the question of how and why performing behavioural and cognitive functions has a phenomenal character, with intentionality and phenomenal properties (qualia) that characterize what it is like to be in that state (Chalmers 2003). As long as this hard problem is unexplained, IEQ research supports, but cannot take a fully reductive stance. Today rather a non-reductive stance has to be adopted: mental states depend on physical states, but supervene on and are thus not reducible to them (Stanton 1983). Conscious mental states with a phenomenal character (e.g. perceptual experience, bodily sensation, emotional experience and occurrent thought) are addressed in questionnaires.