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Implications for the Design Process
Published in Alfred T. Lee, Vehicle Simulation, 2017
These two brief examples of tasks have identified each of the task goal or objective, the criterion for successful task completion, and the perceptual cues that are needed to achieve that criterion. For the simple case of switch positioning, task definition is relatively straightforward because the goals and actions are readily definable. In the case of more complex behaviors, such as landing an aircraft, task definition is more difficult. The landing of an aircraft is really just the endpoint of a long series of actions that begin with the initial approach to the runway, followed by the final approach, the initiation of prelanding flare, the landing itself, and finally the roll out of the aircraft on the runway. Failure to execute any one of these cases of approach and landing will have a negative effect on the ultimate outcome. Thus, for many complex tasks there are often many components that are needed to be defined separately.
Modelling Transport Systems—II
Published in Milan Janić, Transport Systems, 2017
In the former case, the distance UKRIM - RWY12L is 11.4 nm (nautical mile) and WP PEDOV-RWY12R is 11.5 nm. In the latter case, distances between WPs SEDPO and LOVOL and corresponding RWYs (thresholds) 30L/30R are 11 nm. The approaching and landing aircraft on RWY12R/12L, after leaving the holding pattern, fly between WPs PEDOV and PUDGA, and WPs UKRIM and UMALI, respectively, at a constant altitude of 2000 ft (600 m). The WPs [Way-Point(s)] PUDGA and UMALI represent the FAGs [Final Approach Gate(s)] for starting the final approach and landing, always along the ILS (Instrument Landing System) 3-D defined trajectory. The procedure is similar for approaches and landings on RWYs30L/30R, where WPs MODUS and WP LADGA, respectively, are the FAGs. The holding procedure of 4 min. is performed around all WPs at altitudes between 2000 ft and 4000 ft (Jeppsen 2007).
Situation Awareness and the Cognitive Management of Complex Systems
Published in Eduardo Salas, Aaron S Dietz, Situational Awareness, 2017
Marilyn Jager Adams, Yvette J Tenney, Richard W Pew
Using experienced pilots as subjects, Busquets et al. (1994) presented several special scenarios involving final approach and landing into which they had introduced subtle or anomalous information. In their traffic scenario, an aircraft flying an opposing heading inexplicably initiated an altitude maneuver that, if continued, would put it on a collision course with the subject’s aircraft. In their runway blunder scenario, an aircraft landing on a parallel runway slightly ahead of the subject’s aircraft inexplicably left its landing pattern and crossed in front of the subject’s flight path during final approach. The experimental measures in both cases were the time to detect the anomaly and the nature of the actions taken to correct it.
Qualitative Analysis of General Aviation Pilots’ Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Narratives Using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
Published in The International Journal of Aerospace Psychology, 2023
Lakshmi Vempati, Sabrina Woods, Robert C. Solano
A summary review of the last three Nall reports (23rd, 24th, and 25th, respectively) indicated human error, often exacerbated by either environmental, technological, or human factors, remain a key finding of significance in post-mishap analyses (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA], 2014, 2015, 2016). The categorical grouping of these findings is consistent with the framework of the HFACS model. Therefore, narratives from 2015 pertaining to Cessna 172 incidents were queried directly from the NASA ASRS database. This resulted in a set of 48 narratives that highlighted human elements as having a role in the incident. In order to further refine the data and keep the focus on human error, narratives involving mechanical failure of the aircraft and those reported by individuals other than the primary or secondary operator of the aircraft were eliminated from the study. The final set of narratives comprised of 38 incidents, limited to those that occurred during final approach or landing phase under visual meteorological conditions.
Design Factors of Guiding Aircraft Through Continuous Descent Operations: Pilot and Controller Perspectives
Published in The International Journal of Aerospace Psychology, 2019
Lateral path designs are the routes that guide aircraft during CDO procedures. Davison Reynolds, Reynolds, and Hansman (2005) classified prevailing CDA procedures into two types: basic CDAs and area navigation (RNAV) CDAs. Basic CDAs retain the lateral control flexibility associated with using heading vectors. Controllers, unlike in step-down approaches, must estimate the track distance to be flown by an aircraft. Pilots use the track distance estimates to determine the appropriate descent rate and speed. RNAV CDAs predefine the lateral trajectory in terms of waypoints with altitude and speed targets. The aircraft equipped with RNAV, such as the flight management system (FMS), follows a narrow navigation path until final approach clearances. Anderson and Warren (2002) presented the capabilities of the FMS to allow idle thrust descent from about 8,000 to 2,000 ft based on a simulation for a 737–700 aircraft. Flight management techniques could tailor the final descent paths for aircraft conducting CDAs. Communication and coordination between flight crews and ATC controllers were also highlighted by this study. However, Weitz, Hurtado, Barmore, and Krishnamurthy (2005) evaluated airborne precision spacing techniques to merge and space the aircraft flying CDA arrival routes. The results revealed that the benefits retained from both techniques might be unachievable because of sensitivities to spacing errors.
Safety assessment of ‘RNP parallel approach transitions’: a new air traffic management operational concept. Part 1 – safety specification
Published in Safety and Reliability, 2018
Derek Fowler, Douglas Meyerhoff
Around 35 abnormal scenarios can be identified, across the various stages of flight. They include the following undesired events in the OE:missed approach on LH runway, or RH runway or both runways;aircraft emergency—either runway;sudden closure of LH or RH runway, or both runways;military and UAV traffic in the vicinity of the airport;various adverse weather events;windshear on final approach;aircraft responding to an airborne-collision warning;unusually high peak in traffic-arrival rate;aircraft requesting additional separation.