Explore chapters and articles related to this topic
The Great Influenza
Published in Rae-Ellen W. Kavey, Allison B. Kavey, Viral Pandemics, 2020
Rae-Ellen W. Kavey, Allison B. Kavey
The WHO has been making annual recommendations for which viral strains to include in development of their annual vaccine since 1973, and from 1998 onwards, these have been made twice a year, for the Northern and Southern Hemisphere flu seasons. The WHO influenza network, now known as the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) has grown large and complex from its origin in 1947, with 143 institutions in 113 Member States, six Collaborating Centers and four Essential Regulatory Laboratories. GISRS monitors trends in circulating influenza strains year-round, collecting genetic data and identifying new mutations. The data are provided remotely by National Influenza Centers (NICs) of the GISRS and other national influenza reference laboratories collaborating actively with GISRS, or are uploaded from WHO regional databases.
Biodiversity, Pathogen Sharing and International Law
Published in Stefania Negri, Environmental Health in International and EU Law, 2019
Stephanie Switzer, Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani, Gian Luca Burci
Sharing of pathogens occurs in a number of ways; ‘ad hoc, bilaterally, as the need arises, or through existing networks of institutions and researchers.’3 The World Health Organisation (WHO) is often involved in pathogen sharing, performing a coordination or support role.4 The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN), coordinated by the WHO, is an example of an existing network through which collaborating laboratories share samples of poliomyelitis virus.5 The GLPN complements the work of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) launched in 1988, which aims to ‘complete the eradication and containment of all wild, vaccine-related and Sabin polioviruses.’6 The global incidence of polio has decreased by 99.9% since the inception of the GPEI programme.7 The public health context is similar in respect of influenza, for which ‘monitoring the evolution and spread of viruses, and responding to outbreaks, is a continuous process, requiring constant access to samples of circulating influenza viruses.’8 Accordingly, thousands of samples are shared each year among collaborating laboratories of the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), allowing for timely risk assessment as well as the development of measures of risk management such as vaccines.9
Health promotion and person-to-person disease outbreaks
Published in Glenn Laverack, Health Promotion in Disease Outbreaks and Health Emergencies, 2017
The international concern is that avian influenza will adapt quickly by acquiring genes from human viruses and then trigger one or more pandemics. The probability that an avian or another zoonotic influenza virus will result in a pandemic in the next few decades necessitates ongoing surveillance in both animal and human populations. Avian and other zoonotic influenza viruses are presently monitored through the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System involving a collaboration between the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to track and assess the risk from avian and other zoonotic influenza viruses to public health.
Interim seasonal influenza vaccine effectiveness estimates as proxy for final estimates: analysis of systematically identified matched pairs of interim/final estimates from test-negative design studies in outpatient settings from 2010/11 to 2018/19
Published in Expert Review of Vaccines, 2021
George N. Okoli, Tiba Abdulwahid, Florentin Racovitan, Christiaan H. Righolt, Salaheddin M. Mahmud
The Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System unit of the World Health Organization (WHO) is responsible for providing global recommendations on the influenza vaccine strain composition each season based on several factors, including circulating strains’ pathogenicity, speed and extent of spread, and current VE against the virus strains. This assessment requires robust global surveillance data collection from national influenza centers, laboratory testing of many influenza virus samples, and assessment of influenza vaccine performance in many jurisdictions [4]. There is a short period within which decisions have to be made to allow sufficient time for vaccine development and production for the following season. Vaccine composition for the coming season is usually decided in February for the Northern hemisphere and in September for the Southern hemisphere [5]. The WHO decision-making relies on interim (early-season) VE estimates, while influenza viruses are still in circulation.
Better, Faster, Stronger: mRNA Vaccines Show Promise for Influenza Vaccination in Older Adults
Published in Immunological Investigations, 2021
Jenna M. Bartley, Andreia N. Cadar, Dominique E. Martin
One of the main limitations of current influenza vaccines is their strain specificity. Today’s influenza vaccines generally contain three (trivalent) or four (quadrivalent) different strains. The World Health Organization (WHO) established the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, an organization which conducts year-round surveillance of influenza viruses, as well as isolates strains and analyzes patterns of infections. These are evaluated twice per year, in February for the Northern Hemisphere and September for the Southern Hemisphere, to make recommendations for vaccine composition (Rockman et al. 2020). The selected circulating strains are reassorted with a standard laboratory strain via coinfection of embryonated chicken eggs to create vaccine strains. These vaccine strains are then propagated in embryonated chicken eggs and either inactivated or attenuated for vaccine formulation (Figure 1a). The use of eggs in the production process causes some concern for those with egg allergies. Additionally, the virus can adapt and mutate during this egg propagation and cause reduced protection against the intended circulating strain (Barr et al. 2018). Moreover, the lengthy timeline from the start of vaccine production to influenza season itself allows time for mutations to occur and change the predominantly circulating influenza strains, resulting in a mismatch between the year’s vaccine and circulating strains. Indeed, there is substantial time needed for the continuous supply of fertilized chicken eggs and virus propagation for vaccine production. About 6 to 8 months is required to produce large quantities of the vaccine (Chen et al. 2020). This timeline makes it nearly impossible to recreate the vaccine if different seasonal or pandemic influenza strains arise.