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Nuclear Terrorism
Published in Robert A. Burke, Counter-Terrorism for Emergency Responders, 2017
DHS has made important strides in improving the detection technologies, strengthening the international partnerships, and increasing the number of law enforcement personnel trained in detection-related equipment. DHS also continues to build upon its substantial expertise in nuclear forensics, the ability to trace nuclear materials and weapons to their source. Radiation Portal Monitors: DHS has worked with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to deploy Radiation Portal Monitors and other radiation detection technologies to seaports, land border ports, and mail facilities around the world. Today, these systems scan 100% of all containerized cargo and personal vehicles arriving in the United States through land ports of entry, as well as over 99% of arriving sea containers.Securing the Cities: DHS plans to expand the Securing the Cities (STC) initiative, designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in the highest risk cities, to include additional urban areas while continuing to support efforts in existing STC regions. For example, through STC, approximately 19,450 personnel in the New York City region have been trained in preventive radiological and nuclear detection operations and more than 8,800 pieces of radiological detection equipment have been funded. The program expanded to Los Angeles/Long Beach in 2012 and to the National Capital Region in 2014.
Nuclear weapons and radiation
Published in Michael L. Madigan, First Responders Handbook, 2017
Graham Allison makes a similar case, arguing that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material. “After a nuclear bomb detonates, nuclear forensics cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin.” The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints. “The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their own weapons; second, to give leaders every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials.”
Energy and Environmental Markets
Published in Anco S. Blazev, Power Generation and the Environment, 2021
James Bond and others superspies have used suitcase size nuclear weapons, and it is hypothetically possible for terrorists to acquire such, or larger, nuclear weapons, but the threat thus far remains verbal. Nevertheless, the U.S. and other nations are taking the necessary precautions in the form of national nuclear counterterrorist efforts. This involves assessing the interest and capabilities of terrorist groups in acquiring and employing nuclear weapons; addressing vulnerabilities with respect to the storage of those materials; developing and improving means of detecting nuclear weapons or material in the possession of terrorists; and identifying the source of such items through nuclear forensics and attribution.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Verification of an Unstructured Mesh-Based Transmutation Toolkit
Published in Nuclear Technology, 2021
Tucker C. McClanahan, Tim Goorley, John Auxier
The field of post-detonation nuclear forensics continues to be an area of research to combat an ever-changing threat basis of nuclear terrorism and state actors around the world.1–5 The Nuclear Forensics Attribution Act codified into law the need for technological readiness through an interagency and academic collaboration in the event of a nuclear detonation.6 The technical nuclear forensics field was created to directly address the technological challenges associated with the analysis of pre-detonation and post-detonation nuclear materials.7 As a part of the analysis of post-detonation materials, the isotopic composition and location of the debris is of interest to many agencies.4,8,9 Much work has been done over the years to develop nuclear fallout analysis codes that predict the particle size and resulting dose distributions, and the spatial dispersion of the fallout particulates in the event of a detonation.10
A Method to Estimate Fission Product Concentration Uncertainty in a Multi-Time-Step MCNP6 Code Nuclear Fuel Burnup Calculation
Published in Nuclear Technology, 2020
Yasuhiro Minamigawa, Evans D. Kitcher, Sunil S. Chirayath
Trace concentrations of fission product nuclides in chemically separated plutonium (Pu) from irradiated nuclear fuel can provide valuable information for nuclear forensics analysis upon interdiction of such a material by law enforcement agencies. These fission product concentrations in neutron-irradiated nuclear fuel are generally estimated using neutron transport codes coupled with fuel isotope depletion and generation codes. There are a few neutron transport codes based on the Monte Carlo (stochastic) numerical method that work in tandem with nuclear fuel depletion codes used in estimating the concentration of fission products. The estimated fission product nuclide concentrations using these types of computational codes will have associated uncertainties (errors) due to the stochastic nature of the neutron transport method. Even when accounting for the variance of the input parameters or accuracy of the neutron cross-section data (ENDF/B-VII.1), there would be an intrinsic stochastic error due to the stochastic nature of the Monte Carlo method employed. The popular way to reduce this stochastic uncertainty is to simulate a large number of neutron particle histories in the calculation, which is computationally expensive.
Nuclear Forensics Methodology for Reactor-Type Attribution of Chemically Separated Plutonium
Published in Nuclear Technology, 2018
Jeremy M. Osborn, Evans D. Kitcher, Jonathan D. Burns, Charles M. Folden, Sunil S. Chirayath
The growing concern regarding nuclear terrorism has heightened the need to develop nuclear forensics analysis techniques that allow nuclear material source attribution, thereby strengthening nuclear deterrence. Attribution consists of nuclear and traditional forensic evaluations, the process by which interdicted, illicit nuclear material is analyzed in order to identify its location of origin and production source.1 In the event of plutonium interdiction, its origin must be established for further action. Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would monitor such plutonium through safeguards agreements with countries. However, there are cases of plutonium production occurring in states where nuclear fuel cycle facilities are not under IAEA safeguards.2 It is known that weapons-grade plutonium (~94% 239Pu) will be produced if uranium is subject to low levels of fuel burnup [<5 GWd/metric tonne uranium (MTU)] (Ref. 3). If plutonium is interdicted, quick and accurate information on the origin of the material will be needed by decision makers. To this end, a robust nuclear forensics attribution capability would be greatly advantageous.