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Reliability Modeling and Analysis of European Train Control System
Published in Qamar Mahboob, Enrico Zio, Handbook of RAMS in Railway Systems, 2018
A brief historical review can indicate the background that the ETCS was initialized. Since the very early days, railway lines have always been divided into sections or blocks, and only one train is permitted in each block at a time to avoid collisions. Humans were firstly employed to stand along with lines and gave hand signals to a train driver whether he/she can go ahead or not. And then, with the development of technology, electrical telegraph, telephone, optical signaling, and mechanical signaling were also respectively introduced in railways, to transmit the information that a train had passed a specific block or the block was cleared. In 1980s, the concept of automatic train protection (ATP) systems appeared on the scene. Such kinds of system allows automatic braking, so as to effectively prevent trains from possible overspeeding or exceedance of stop signals (Palumbo et al., 2015).
Applications I – drives
Published in D.A. Bradley, Power Electronics, 2017
Control and communication is based upon the following systems: The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system dealing with safety functions.The Automatic Train Operation (ATO) system performing the driving functions.The supervision system interfacing with the control-room operator.The communications system providing a link between the operator and the passengers.
ORAM: A Structured Method for Integrating Human Factors into SPAD Risk Assessment
Published in John R. Wilson, Beverley Norris, Theresa Clarke, Ann Mills, Rail Human Factors, 2017
Engineered aspects of the railway determine whether overrun protection and mitigation keep the train within the overlap following a SPAD. These engineered measures include the following: train protection system, such as the Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) or Automatic Train Protection (ATP), ensuring that all trains are fitted with the system;train stops;SPAD indicators and related measures;automatic warning via radio;trap points and flank protection;additional Automatic Warning Systems (AWS).
Freight train air brake models
Published in International Journal of Rail Transportation, 2023
Qing Wu, Colin Cole, Maksym Spiryagin, Chongyi Chang, Wei Wei, Lyudmila Ursulyak, Angela Shvets, Mirza Ahsan Murtaza, Ikram Murtaza Mirza , Кostiantyn Zhelieznov, Saeed Mohammadi, Hossein Serajian, Bastian Schick, Mats Berg, Rakesh Chandmal Sharma, Ahmed Aboubakr, Sunil Kumar Sharma, Stefano Melzi, Egidio Di Gialleonardo, Nicola Bosso, Nicolò Zampieri, Matteo Magelli, Crăciun Camil Ion, Ian Routcliffe, Oleg Pudovikov, Grigory Menaker, Jiliang Mo, Shihui Luo, Amin Ghafourian, Reza Serajian, Auteliano A. Santos, Ícaro Pavani Teodoro, Jony Javorski Eckert, Luca Pugi, Ahmed Shabana, Luciano Cantone
With the availability of digital computers, constant brake force models are still being used for applications such as headway design and signalling design. In a signalling design tool developed by Queensland Rail in Australia [5], brake forces were modelled as constants with the consideration of brake delays. The purpose of this tool was to calculate the stopping distance of certain trains. Presciani et al. [6] described a brake model used in an Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system to calculate train braking distance. In this model, the brake force ascending process was regarded as a linear process and modelled as an equivalent step function rather than a ramp function. After this equivalisation, brake forces were then modelled as a constant value for a specific brake scenario. Brosseau et al. [7] developed a braking enforcement algorithm to be used for ATP systems. Empirical formulas were developed to convert different pressure ascending times of different vehicles of the train to a single equivalent pressure ascending time. In this way, the braking enforcement action can be assessed by using only three parameters: initial brake pressure, equivalent ascending time and final brake pressure. This model was later used by Mitsch et al. [8] for the development of a train control algorithm.
Detectability of auditory warning signals in the ambient noise of Dutch train cabins
Published in Ergonomics, 2021
Hanneke E.M. van der Hoek-Snieders, Rolph Houben, Wouter A. Dreschler
In many occupations, employees fulfil auditory tasks, such as speech communication and sound detection (Semeraro et al. 2015). This can be very challenging in some working settings, for example when high noise levels are present (Giguere et al. 2008). For locomotive engineers (train drivers), speech communication and sound detection are important for safe and effective job performance (Zoer, Sluiter, and Frings-Dresen 2014). An engineer needs to communicate to the signaller, conductor, and others by answering calls, making announcements, and using communication equipment. Detection of warning signals is required to be warned in case of events that can compromise safety (Zheng et al. 2007). The signals aim to alert the driver at passing a sign and to verify whether the engineer is still alert for safe driving (Fenner 2002; Scaccabarozzi et al., 2017). In Dutch train cabins, the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system applies a bell-like signal combined with a warning light in the console in case of failure to stop for a stop signal, failure to reduce speed at a caution signal, or failure to comply to the local speed limit. The Driver’s Safety Device (DSD), also known as “the dead man’s switch,” produces a buzzer-type auditory warning and is a fail-safe in case the driver becomes incapacitated.
Intelligent decision support for maintenance: an overview and future trends
Published in International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing, 2019
C. J. Turner, C. Emmanouilidis, T. Tomiyama, A. Tiwari, R. Roy
The scenario depicted in Figure 1 relates to the possibility that sensors have registered faults with a Balise (track-based forming part of an automatic train protection (ATP) system) and trackside signals in a period of time after the section of track has been tamped (where the ballast bed of the track is adjusted). In addition, a bankside sensor has noted some occasional subsidence in the past. All these data streams are recorded at a central control centre. The use of data mining may establish a causal link between these events taking into account the outlier measurement from the bankside sensor leading to the root cause of the fault. The audit trail establishes the order of events via timestamps and the output from data mining/machine learning. Such audit trails once established can help in the decision-making and may also advise trackside workers, undertaking maintenance in future-scheduled activities, to make additional checks based on the history of the track section.