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Game Theory
Published in Erchin Serpedin, Thomas Chen, Dinesh Rajan, Mathematical Foundations for SIGNAL PROCESSING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND NETWORKING, 2012
Erik G. Larsson, Eduard Jorswiec
In order to compute Nash equilibria for extensive form games more easily, there is a canonical transform to a corresponding game in normal form. All possible strategies in the extensive form game are represented as actions in the normal form game. For the invader game in Figure 19.8, the game matrix is a simple two-by-two matrix which is easily computed in Exercise 19.13.13.
Agents in Economic Markets and Games
Published in Mariam Kiran, X-Machines for Agent-Based Modeling, 2017
Stackelberg competition model. Each firm takes turns to act as a leader and makes a decision on its production level. It is similar to playing an extensive form game with a decision tree in game theory. The strategies can then be represented as a decision flow showing firms making decisions one after the other [83].
Enhancing cyber-physical security in manufacturing through game-theoretic analysis
Published in Cyber-Physical Systems, 2018
Zach DeSmit, Aditya U. Kulkarni, Christian Wernz
Extensive-form games are used to study cases where players make decisions sequentially. In addition, extensive-form games allow to capture situation where players make decisions multiple times in the game. There are two broad classifications of extensive-form games based on the information available to the players: games with perfect information and games with imperfect information. We begin by discussing games with perfect information and then discuss games with imperfect information. For games with perfect information, we will use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) concept to characterise the best strategy profile. For extensive-form games with imperfect information, we will use the Bayesian NE condition.