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Using Statistics in Clinical Practice: A Gap Between Training and Application
Published in Marilyn Sue Bogner, Human Error in Medicine, 2018
Roberta L. Klatzky, James Geiwitz, Susan C. Fischer
Reasoning errors can arise not only from particular heuristic approaches, but from misunderstanding basic concepts. One common error has been called the conjunction fallacy. This consists of estimating the probability of two events occurring together (in conjunction) as higher than the probability of the less probable event alone (with or without the other event). In one study, internists were asked about the probability of certain symptoms, given that a 55-year-old woman had a pulmonary embolism (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). A sizable majority of the internists (91%) mistakenly believed that the probability of two symptoms, dyspnea and hemiparesis, occurring together was greater than the probability of hemiparesis alone (but see Wolford, Taylor, & Beck, 1990).
Investigative Sensemaking in Criminal Contexts
Published in Schraagen Jan Maarten, Laura G. Militello, Tom Ormerod, Lipshitz Raanan, Naturalistic Decision Making and Macrocognition, 2017
Schraagen Jan Maarten, Laura G. Militello, Tom Ormerod, Lipshitz Raanan
Interestingly, some of the empirical examples of explanation-building that we present above share characteristics of the so-called “conjunction fallacy” identified in the JDM literature (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). So, for example, in the Linda problem, participants are given a stereotypical description of an individual (“Linda”) and asked to rate the likelihood of two or more conclusions (for example, “Linda is a bank teller” versus “Linda is a feminist bank teller”). Participants rate the conjunctive conclusion (“Linda is a feminist bank teller”) as most plausible when it is consistent with the stereotype given in the description. This judgment is a logical “fallacy” if the task is simply to derive a probabilistic judgment of separate conclusions, since the singular conclusion is a subset of the conjunctive conclusion. However, reconceived as an explanation-building task, the selection of the conjunctive conclusion makes perfect sense: it offers a coherent explanation of the largest subset of evidence available in the description. So, for example, in the vignette where a grandmother reports bruising on a child, logically the most probable conclusion is simply that the child has been abused, but officers tended to draw a conjunctive conclusion that the child had been abused by the mother’s violent boyfriend. In this context, it behoves investigators to consider the conjunctive possibility rather than the singular conclusion.
Artificial Intelligence Six Cognitive Driven Algorithms
Published in Rodgers Waymond, Artificial Intelligence in a Throughput Model, 2020
Most people perpetrated what is described as the conjunction fallacy: They thought the probability of the conjunction is higher than the probability of the elementary event. This implies, given the card example above, the probability of drawing a diamond picture card is greater than the chance of drawing a simple diamond. Here again, it is the stereotype of the feminist that leads us to this incorrect conclusion in decision-making.
Quantum models of cognition and decision
Published in International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems, 2018
Conjunction fallacy occurs when estimated probability of conjunction of events p(A ∩ B) is higher than probability of one individual event out of two events, p(A) or p(B). Paradigmatic example of this case is the Linda problem described by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman [6–8].